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Two goods commonly provided by local governments-education and
neighborhood security-have an enormous impact on day-to-day quality of
life. Not surprisingly, these goods generate a great deal of debate. Currently,
widespread controversy surrounds proposals to restructure the provision and
consumption of education through vouchers. Likewise, private alternatives
to public security, such as gated communities, produce reactions ranging
from outrage to enthusiasm. School finance and zoning, both of which bear
directly on the provision of these goods, are perpetual sources of discussion
and dissension. These issues, as well as the larger theoretical questions
underlying them, should be of particular interest and importance to legal
scholars. After all, legal structures, institutions, and rules determine how
these goods will be provided, funded, and consumed.' Yet legal scholars
1. See Clayton P.'Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1185, 1185
(1996) (observing that law is pervasively involved in dividing up responsibility for the provision of
various goods between governments, markets, and households "by creating incentives, prohibitions,
and mandates for one or more of these groups to provide a particular good or service"). State
constitutions, for example, mandate the public provision of education, see id. at 1185 n.2 (citing
Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 101 (1995)), and state laws govern its delivery. Similarly, local zoning laws determine how
neighborhoods will form, thereby determining how goods such as education and neighborhood
security will be consumed. See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047,
1081 (1996) (discussing state zoning enabling acts and other laws that empower cities to regulate
residential options).
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have failed to generate a convincing descriptive account of how the quality
of these goods is determined and how people make choices about consuming
them.2 This failure has limited the legal academy's contribution to the public
discourse.
Legal scholarship has typically assumed that the quality of locally
provided goods is driven by some combination of market-like consumer
behavior ("exit") and political activity ("voice").3 Although the "exit-voice"
framework is useful, it is incomplete with respect to certain kinds of locally
provided goods, such as education and neighborhood security. It overlooks
the critical role of user behavior-the acts and omissions of the school's
students and the neighborhood's residents-in determining the quality of
these goods. Everyone intuitively recognizes that the participation of users
in "consuming" a good like education or neighborhood security profoundly
influences the quality of that good, and in some sense "produces" the good.
Indeed, there is significant empirical backing for this intuition, and
economists have formalized this and related points.4 Nevertheless, the
influence of user participation has not been adequately recognized in legal
scholarship, nor have its implications for law been fully explored.5 Because
2. There has been some interesting and important work in this area, however. See, e.g., Gerald
E. Frog, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1998); Gillette. supra note 1; Michael J. Trebilcock,
Ron Daniels & Malcolm Thorburn, Government by Voucher, 80 B.U. L REV. 205 (2000).
3. This framework was formalized in ALBERT O. HIRsCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRms, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970), and is frequently applied
in scholarly discussions of local public goods. See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GIL.ErYE & LYNN A.
BAKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 376 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the
exit-voice "analysis has recently been adopted in much of the legal literature that discusses the
capacity of residents to monitor the conduct of local officials" and collecting citations to such
literature). For example, the controversy surrounding educational vouchers has been characterized
as a dispute over which of these two quality-control mechanisms is more effective. See generally
James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE LJ. 259 (1991) (reviewing JOHN E. CHUBB &
TERRY M. MOE, PoLrncs, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990)).
4. See Charles F. Manski, Educational Choice (Vouchers) and Social Mobility. 11 ECON.
EDUC. REV. 351, 356 (1992) (discussing the role of student interactions in the production of
education). The relationship between population characteristics and the cost and quality of goods
like education and neighborhood security has also been examined in the economic literature. See,
e.g., Robert M. Schwab & Wallace E. Oates, Community Composition and the Provision of Local
Public Goods: A Normative Analysis, 44 J. PUB. ECON. 217 (1991) (suggesting that community
composition plays a central role in determining the level of outputs for key goods like education and
public safety); Mark Dynarski, Robert Schwab & Ernest Zampelli, Local Characteristics and Public
Production: The Case of Education, 26 J. URB. ECON. 250 (1989) (finding that local population
characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, have an impact on the costs of producing educational
achievement); Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Local Zoning Ordinances to Regulate Population
Flows and the Quality of Local Services, in ESSAYS IN LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS 201 (Orley C.
Ashenfelter & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1977) (observing that the quality of local services such as
education and public safety depends on the characteristics of the community, and discussing
empirical support for this idea).
5. For example, Clayton Gillette makes only passing mention of this point in an article
addressing the implications of decisions about local public goods, before moving on to discuss
general notions of community and equality. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1213-14 ("If we believe
that those who are most likely to leave low-quality public schools for higher quality private ones are
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participation is central to quality and users are heterogeneous in their
participation, the formation, membership, and internal behavior of user pools
should be of great interest for law and policy. An approach that emphasizes
user dynamics will yield policy prescriptions that are very different from
those generated by the usual exit-voice approach. Moreover, such an
approach offers a new vocabulary that can facilitate a more meaningful
dialogue about schools and neighborhoods.
To develop a useful new way of thinking about local public goods, it is
necessary to pin down the nature of the goods themselves: Are education and
neighborhood security ordinary consumption goods which consumers should
be free to select at will, or are they in some important sense true "public
goods"? 6 I argue here that they are both and that this dual nature generates
an interesting set of strategic dilemmas. Although these goods are consumed
by individuals in much the same way as are other consumer goods, they are
also "public goods" in the economic sense. For this reason it is appropriate
to refer to them, as I do in this Article, as "local public goods."7 The
composite pattern of consumption of education or security across an entire
community generates a public good-an educated populace, or a safe
populace-that is distinct from the consumption good that each individual
student or resident obtains by attending a particular school or living in a
particular neighborhood. The community as a whole has an interest in
ensuring the quality of these goods because everyone in the relevant
community experiences (indeed, cannot escape experiencing) their impact.8
These goods, therefore, hold both consumption value and public value. 9
individuals who would have been 'better' peers of those who remain, then opting out imposes real,
but less measurable, costs.").
6. See infra notes 15-16 (defining public goods).
7. Some authors use the phrase "local public goods" to refer to any goods that are typically
provided publicly by local governments. See HUGH STRETrON & LIONEL ORCHARD, PUBLIC
GOODS, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, PUBLIC CHOICE 54 (1994) ("[W]e will treat as public goods all those
whose supply is determined not by individual market demand but by collective political choice, i.e.
any goods and services which governments decide to supply free or below cost to their users.").
Moreover, the goods that are the focus of this paper-education and neighborhood security-also
have characteristics of "public goods" as that term is used by economists, making the term "local
public goods" even more apt. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (disuussing criteria for
"public goods").
8. I will not attempt to determine precisely how broadly or narrowly one should define the
"relevant community," except to observe that it will often be broader than an individual
municipality or other discrete user pool and may, for example, encompass an entire metropolitan
area. If the relevant community were defined very broadly (say, to encompass the entire nation), the
term "local public good" would become a bit of a misnomer. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD
SANDLER, THE THEORY OF ExTERNALmTES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 24 (1986)
(defining "local public goods" as those public goods "whose benefits involve only a small
jurisdiction such as a municipality or town").
9. I will term this public value "composite value" to distinguish it from consumption value and
to emphasize that it is determined by the composite pattern of consumption throughout the relevant
community. See infra text accompanying notes 13-27 (discussing and distinguishing these two
sources of value).
2001] Beyond Exit and Voice 5
My approach thus makes explicit two points that are often suppressed or
glossed over in current analyses: that users (students and residents) are
themselves involved in producing education and neighborhood security, and
that what they are producing is critically important, not only for themselves
as consumers but also for everyone else within the larger community.'0 In
tandem, these two points illuminate both the way in which the quality of
these goods is determined and the strategic dilemmas that are involved in
their provision.
This Article uses game theory to systematically work through the
implications of user participation for education and neighborhood security.
The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I argues that existing models for
understanding these goods are inadequate. Existing approaches do not
carefully separate the two distinct sources of value associated vith these
goods, and they do not fully take into account the role of user participation in
producing them. I argue that users affect quality not only through the
exercise of "voice" but also through their everyday acts in consuming
education and security. Likewise, "exit" means something different in the
context of these local public goods than it does in the context of ordinary
consumer goods. In an important sense, "exit" is not really possible; as long
as one remains in the relevant community, one will be affected by the quality
of education and security in that community as a whole."
Part I turns to game theory for guidance. It sets out the first of two
collective-action problems highlighted by a focus on user participation. This
first collective-action problem involves a particular user's choice of a
consumption community, or "user pool." One can choose to remain in what I
will term the "default pool' 12 (for example, an inner-city public-school
system) or one can opt for a private alternative or move to a different
jurisdiction (e.g., a suburb) in which to consume the good. Well-off
participants may be able to increase their consumption value by opting for a
private or suburban alternative, but if too many quality-enhancing players
choose this strategy, the public value associated with the composite
consumption of the good is likely to decline significantly.
Part II addresses a second collective-action problem---one's choice of
behavior within a given user pool. The things one does (or fails to do) as a
member of a user pool generate spillover effects within that pool. Being a
good student or an alert neighborhood resident will have a positive impact on
10. Both of these points have, of course, been recognized at some lev-el in the existing literature.
See infra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing the two sources of vmlue associated with
goods such as education and neighborhood security); see infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text
(discussing consumers as coproducers).
11. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 101 (noting that the key feature of public goods is that "there
is no escape from consuming them unless one were to leave the community by which they are
provided").
12. The use of "default" terminology in this context is borrowed from Clayton Gillette. See
Gillette, supra note 1, at 1193-98 (applying contractual-default theory to local public goods).
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the quality of education or neighborhood security; being a disruptive student
or an inattentive neighbor will have the opposite impact. These intrapool
choices can be conceptualized as decisions of whether to cooperate or defect.
User heterogeneity has important consequences here: some participants may
be better equipped than others to generate positive spillovers for their fellow
pool members. Such heterogeneity also points to an opportunity to increase
cooperation by enabling users to participate more positively.
Part IV considers how the two "games" just described interact with each
other and with legal rules to generate real-world outcomes. I open this Part
by considering how various combinations of cooperative behavior in the two
collective-action problems might achieve the critical concentrations
necessary to a quality good. I then consider the possibility that attempting to
solve one problem may make solving the other problem either easier or more
difficult. For example, formation of exclusive user pools may be a viable
way of solving the second collective-action problem, but it may lead to
sorting effects that exacerbate the "choice of pool" dilemma. By the same
token, certain characteristics of a given user pool, such as its size and
stability, may make cooperative action easier or harder. Legal rules designed
to address the "choice of pool" dilemma may impact these characteristics of
user pools and may thus affect the amount of cooperation that takes place in
the intrapool interaction.
In Part V, I consider some specific implications of refocusing attention
on users and user pools. While my primary goal is to develop a more useful
theoretical approach for understanding the dynamics involved in the
provision of local public goods, there are some interesting real-world
applications. I consider two legal mechanisms-education vouchers and
residential zoning-through the lens of user participation.
I. The Role of User Participation
In this Part, I consider how a focus on user participation would alter
conventional understandings of two local public goods-education and
neighborhood security. In subpart A, I lay the groundwork for the remainder
of the Article by defining terms, and briefly sketch how a user-participation
approach would differ from prevailing models. In subpart B, I explore the
implications of user participation in more detail, taking into account user
heterogeneity and the shape of the production functions for local public
goods. Subpart C details the ways in which a focus on user participation
revises and augments our understanding of voice and exit.
A. Rethinking Education and Neighborhood Security
Publicly 8 rovided goods like education and security defy easy
categorization. At one level, they look like ordinary consumption goods
13. They have been variously denoted "mixed goods," "impure public goods," or "merit
goods." See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13 (1959)
[Vol. 80: 1
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which the private market can (and often does) provide to individuals. People
certainly obtain education and security for their own families' personal
consumption, and they may indeed shop for these goods, much as they would
for a consumer good like a toaster. Of course, goods like education (unlike
commodities purchased off the shelf) may require group consumption for
reasons of economy and logistics. This does not, in itself, suggest that public
provision is desirable or that a public good is at stake. Private groups (or
"clubs") can easily be formed to provide the benefits of joint consumption. t4
Viewed from the perspective of individual consumption, these local
public goods lack the defining characteristics associated with the economist's
notion of public goods. s They are not "nonrivalrous"--the enjoyment of a
unit of education or police protection leaves less of that resource for others
(e.g., through straining of inputs such as teachers, police cars, and facility
space). Nor are they "nonexcludable"--schoolhouse doors can be closed and
police-protected enclaves can be created.16  Based on these features,
education and neighborhood security look like private goods.17 Unless one
recognizes a larger dimension to these goods that transcends the value that
(describing "merit wants" as public wants, such as "free education," that are "considered so
meritorious that their satisfaction is provided for through the public budget, over and above what is
provided for through the market and paid for by private buycrs"); Frog, supra note 2, at 26 n.6 and
sources cited therein; KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS 10 (1995)
(discussing education and health as merit goods).
14. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1188 (discussing situations in which residents can form private
"clubs" to consume higher levels of service than those publicly provided).
15. Two features-nonrivalry of consumption and nonexcludability of benefits-are generally
taken to be the defining characteristics of "pure public goods." CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 8,
at 6-7. See also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTON 105 (2000) (stating that pure
public goods are "nonrivalrous" and "nonexcludable"); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17
(1982) ("Public goods are defined by two properties: jointness of supply and impossibility of
exclusion."); ELINOR OSTROM, ROY GARDNER & JAMES WALKER, RULES, GAMES, AND COMJtMON-
POOL RESOURCES 7 (1994) (noting that public goods exhibit low "subtractability" of benefits and
difficult exclusion). Some definitions of public goods include only one or the other of these criteria.
See, e.g., STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLSTIC
COMPETITION 6-7 (1991) (explaining the split among economists on this point and the author's
decision to focus only on the nonrivalry condition); id. at 191 n.2 (collecting and comparing
economics texts on this issue); Joseph Raz, Right-Based Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182,
187 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (defining public goods by reference to nonexcludability).
16. It is often noted that no real-world good qualifies as a "pure" public good. See, e.g., JAMES
M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 49-50 (1968) ("Strictly speaking, no
good or service fits the extreme or polar definition in any genuinely descriptive sense... The
standard examples such as national defense come reasonably close to descriptive purity, but even
here careful consideration normally dictates some relaxation of the strict polar assumption.");
WALSH, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that pure public goods are "difficult to discover" and discussing
the argument "that there is no such thing as a public good in an objective sense, and that it is a
purely cultural construct") (citation omitted). Nevertheless, goods clearly vary in their degree of
"publicness.' See HARDIN, supra note 15, at 19 ("Although it is not easy to think of examples of
physically consumed, pure public goods, one can easily list goods that seem similar to public goods
over some range of the number of customers.").
17. See OSTROM, GARDNER & WALKER, supra note 15, at 7 (categorizing goods with easy
exclusion and high subtractability of benefits as "private goods").
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individuals get from consuming them, it is difficult to account for their public
provision.
8
This larger dimension is not difficult to detect. One can easily
recognize that the local public goods under discussion here have meaning
and value beyond the aggregated instances of personal consumption.' 9 The
composite consumption of these goods throughout the relevant community
generates larger public benefits-an educated populace or a safe populace-
that can be considered apart from the sum of the benefits each individual user
receives from consuming the good.20  These are true public goods
experienced by the community as a whole, and their absence, or low quality,
will be felt as a "public bad." 21 They are, in true public-goods fashion, both
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.22 An educated populace provides benefits
that are undiminished, no matter how many people enjoy them. Likewise, no
one in the relevant community can be excluded from enjoying such a benefit
(or from suffering from its absence). This second dimension of utility arising
from local public goods gives society as a whole a large stake in the quality
of goods like education and neighborhood security. The public aspect of
these goods not only explains the existence of widespread public provision
but also explains why people should care about the quality of that public
23provision.
18. See Frug, supra note 2, at 30 ("Once one adopts a consumer-oriented definition of city
services and a voluntary association image of cities, transferring public services to the private sector
seems easy and uncontroversial.").
19. See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, EXTERNAL BENEFITS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 3 (1964)
("There seems to be a presumption that such external benefits do exist in some form. For if they do
not, then education is merely another private consumption or investment good; and in that case why
is it provided publicly?"); MUSGRAVE, supra note 13, at 13 (observing that education and health
care have characteristics of "social wants" because "everyone stands to gain from living in a more
educated or healthier community"); WALSH, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that many goods such as
housing, health care, and education arguably have "public goods characteristics, because of
interaction effects").
20. To describe this more precisely, the consumption that takes place in each individual user
pool generates externalities for people who are outside of that user pool, but within the larger
community. All of these extra-pool externalities (that is, all of the spillovers from consumption that
are not captured by the respective individual pool of consumers) together make up a public good (or
public bad) that is shared by everyone within the entire relevant community. There are also
spillovers that take place within the individual pool, based on the actions of pool members. See
infra subpart I(B).
21. See WEISBROD, supra note 19, at 80 ("The real benefits of education are the real costs of
non-education.").
22. Cf. MANCJR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 15 (1971) ("The very fact
that a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the
benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement.").
23. The "public goods" aspect of education and security distinguishes the problems discussed in
this Article from many other situations involving user participation. For example, the participation
of employees has a critical impact on the quality of the firms for which those employees work,
Because employees are heterogeneous rather than fungible, movement between firms has impacts
for both the "gaining" and "losing" firms. However, there is not a strong public interest associated
with this movement, because society at large is not seriously affected by the quality of these various
employee pools. In contrast, the consumption of a good like education across all user pools within a
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Thus, goods like education and neighborhood security have a rather
interesting dual character, working both as articles of individual consumption
and as public goods. These two distinct sources of value, while sometimes
mentioned, are rarely isolated and formalized.4 Indeed, there is often a
tendency to focus on one of these elements to the exclusion of the other .5
To consider both here, I will refer to the public value associated with the
composite consumption of publicly provided goods as "composite value" to
distinguish it from the "consumption value" one receives from one's own (or
one's children's) individual use of goods such as public schools and public
sidewalks. 26 The interplay between these two sources of value creates a
strategic dilemma that I will examine in some detail.V For now, it is
sufficient to note that consumption value typically drives individual decisions
about one's choice between competing local public goods (such as which
given community-such as a major metropolitan area-has quite profound implications for that
entire community. In other words, a particularly low-quality inner-city school is a matter of
concern for the entire metropolitan community, including those whose children attend a suburban
school; a particularly low-quality firm does not typically inflict similar externalities on the
surrounding community.
24. See SHMANSKE, supra note 15, at 103-06 (noting that these two aspects of mixed goods
have been at times recognized in the literature, but their implications have not been sufficiently
explored); WEISBROD, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that the "external benefits" associated with the
education of other people's children "have been relatively neglected by economists"). The two
distinct sources of value associated with these goods have not gone wholly unremarked, of course.
See, e.g., SHMANSKE, supra note 15, at 94-115 (distinguishing the "utilization dimension" of mixed
goods from the "public goods dimension"); WEISBROD, supra note 19, at3 (noting that demand for
education may be divided into "demand by parents on behalf of their present and prospective
school-age children" and "all other demand"); Robert D. Cooter & James Gordley, The Cultural
Justification of Unearned Income: An Economic Model of Merit Goods Based on Aristotelian Ideas
of Akrasia and Distributive Justice, in PROFITS AND MORALITY 150, 160 (Robin Cowan & Mario J.
Rizzo eds., 1995) (constructing an equation that recognizes the fact that merit goods "receive weight
in their own right" apart from "their capacity to satisfy individual preferences"); BUCHANAN, supra
note 16, at 176-77 (discussing the "publicness and privateness" elements in a category of goods
designated as "partially divisible goods and services, with interactions extending over groups of
critically large size"); Henry M. Levin, The Economics of Educational Choice, in MARKEr
APPROACHES TO EDUCATION: VOUCHERS AND SCHOOL CHOICE 23, 26 (Elchanan Cohn ed., 1997)
(discussing the "private" and "social" purposes of education).
25. For example, Gerald Frug has identified and criticized a tendency among commentators to
view these goods as if they were ordinary articles of consumption. See generally Frog, supra note
2, at 45-47 (suggesting that the consumer-oriented vision of city services such as education and
safety should be wholly replaced by one focusing on their community-building potential). Yet
Frug's focus on these goods as "public" ones gives insufficient attention to the fact that these goods
are also, in an important sense, consumer goods.
26. Both types of value are ultimately "consumed" by individuals, of course. See Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954) ("I
assume no mystical collective mind that enjoys collective consumption goods ... ").
"Consumption value," as I use the term, refers to the value associated with the specific product one
chooses to consume (by selecting a particular school or neighborhood), whereas "composite value"
represents a public good (or bad) that one cannot help consuming (that is, enjoying or suffering) as
long as one remains within the relevant community. Thus, since "consumption value" relates to the
direct and purposive acts of an individual as a consuner, it is directly analogous to the value one
derives from consuming a particular private good.
27. See infra Part IK-
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school one's child will attend), while composite value tells us why we should
care about the quality of all such goods within the relevant community.
Not only is the nature of education and neighborhood security
inadequately parsed in existing accounts, but in addition, too little attention is
paid to the way in which quality is determined. The question has not been
completely ignored, of course, and much of the existing theory is helpful as
far as it goes. But existing approaches lack descriptive power because they
fail to properly account for the role of user participation in determining
quality. Instead, they tend to focus on one or both of the classic quality-
control mechanisms in Albert Hirschman' s framework: exit and voice.
Much academic literature adopts what can loosely be called a
"consumer choice" model that, consistent with a view of local public goods
as ordinary consumer goods, focuses on the market-oriented mechanism of
exit.29  This model envisions a Tiebout-inspired world in which citizen-
consumers "vote with their feet" for the package of locally provided
amenities that best suits their preferences. 30 The work of James Buchanan
and others on club theory3' coexists with the basic Tiebout model. 32 Under a
club-theory approach, municipalities or other communities can be thought of
as special-purpose consumption clubs whose members sort themselves by
their demand for local public goods.33
Hirschman's work focuses not only on exit but also on the additional,
and intrinsically political, mechanism of voice.34 The exit-voice framework
is now an established fixture in legal scholarship, and is routinely applied to
28. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3; see GILLETrE & BAKER, supra note 3, at 376 (discussing
applications of this framework). Hirschman also considers a third factor related to quality: loyalty.
See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
29. See Frug, supra note 2, at 25-35 (describing and criticizing this view).
30. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1965); see
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (forthcoming Nov. 2001) (manuscript dated
Oct. 2000 at § 3-12, on file with the Texas Law Review) (explaining Tiebout's theory, which posits
that citizen-consumers "select the community that best matches their preferences"); Gillette, supra
note 1, at 1192 ("One of the features that makes decentralized government most attractive is its
capacity to offer different packages of goods and services and thus to appeal to the various
preferences of different actors who can, with relative ease, migrate to jurisdictions that offer the
package that is most attractive.").
31. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 125 (1965);
CORNES & SANDIER, supra note 8, at 3-4, 157-242; Todd Sandier & John T. Tshirhart, The
Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J. ECON. LIT. 1481 (1980).
32. See William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations, Homeowners, and the Benefit View of the
Property Tax, 18 ST. TAX NOTES 1781, 1784 (May 22, 2000) (noting that "[c]lub theory and the
Tiebout hypothesis have largely had separate intellectual developments[,]" despite the connections
between them).
33. See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 41 (1977) ("Both the private club
and the exclusive suburban community make it possible for groups of similar individuals to obtain
goods and services that require collective provision and in the quantities and qualities suited to their
closely shared means and preferences."); SHMANSKE, supra note 15, at 24 (observing that where
"multiple, competing clubs" exist, "through self-selection consumers might end up in clubs whose
members desire the same particular types and amounts of jointly shared goods" and noting that
communities might operate as such clubs).
34. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 15-20 (discussing categories of exit and voice and their
relationships to economics and politics, respectively).
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questions involving goods provided by local governments. a5 In this model,
when people are unhappy with the package of amenities a particular local
government is providing, they can opt for a different municipality or a
private provider (exit), or they can agitate for change through the political
process (voice).
Although this model is helpful, it rests on an assumption that does not
hold true for education and neighborhood security-that the goods are
produced exogenously by producers who are distinct from consumers t and
that declines in quality are the result of factors wholly external to the
consumer.38 A paradigmatic example of such an exogenously produced good
would be a widget produced in a distant factory. Such a widget might
decline in quality because of a hole in the widget mold or a leak in the
factory roof, but not because of anything the consumer did or failed to do.
39
35. See GILEMT & BAKER, supra note 3, at 376 (describing the use of this framework in legal
scholarship and collecting source citations); Liebman, supra note 3, at 295-98 (using exit-voice
analysis to critique education vouchers).
36. Exit can involve either leaving the jurisdiction for another more to one's liking--"voting
with one's feet" in a literal sense--or physically staying within the jurisdiction while opting for a
private alternative to the publicly provided good in question. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1215
("Opting out of the background level of service offers a private contractual analogue to a more
traditional Tieboutian acquisition of the desired level of service through physical exit."); Liebman,
supra note 3, at 276 (noting these two forms of exit in the education context). These two types of
exit are not identical in their implications. One involves physical departure from the community
and the direct withdrawal of tax money while the other does not. See James M. Buchanan.
Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1971) (discussing the fiscal effects of
migration from the city center to the suburbs). Moreover, private alternatives can be purchased on
an "a la carte" basis (for example, one can choose to buy only private schooling or private
neighborhood security); in contrast, choosing a new municipality means rejecting one entire
package in favor of a different one. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1215.
37. In at least one place in Exit, Voice, and Lo)alty, Hirschman does recognize that an
individual could be simultaneously involved in both consumption and production. HIRSCrhIAN,
supra note 3, at 100 (explaining that "the 'buyer' is now in reality a member and [that] as such he is
involved in both the supply and the demand sides, in both production and consumption of the
organization's output"). Yet Hirschman does not expand on this theme or explain how user
participation contributes to quality. Elsewhere, Hirschman's schema suggests that user involvement
in production is limited to the relatively indirect mechanism of voice. See id. at 33 (stating that
"[t]he voice option is the only way in which dissatisfied customers or members can react whenever
the exit option is unavailable') (emphasis added); see also id. at 17 (opining that "[i]n a whole
gamut of human institutions, from the state to the family, voice.., is all their members normally
have to work with"). A vivid example of the rhetorical implications of this assumed dichotomy
between producers and consumers is found in Myron Lieberman's book advocating a market
approach to education. See MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBUC EDUCATION: AN AUTOPSY 45-66 (1993)
(discussing "producer-consumer conflict" in education).
38. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 4 (assuming that the performance of firms and
organizations is "subject to deterioration for unspecified, random causes").
39. Although I am discussing publicly provided goods in this Article and am here contrasting
them with a privately produced item, the distinction I am making does not break cleanly along
private/public lines. There are many goods that are wholly private and for which the users share
substantially in production: social gatherings, clubs, churches, singles bars, and restaurants are a
few examples. See Michael Rothschild & Lawrence . White, The Analytics of tie Pricing of
Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers are Inputs, 103 J. POLIT. ECON. 573,
574 (1995) (noting that spectators at sporting events "consume not only the game but also the
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The exit-voice framework does recognize a role for the consumer, of
course-the consumer can react to quality declines by buying someone else's
product (exit) or by complaining (voice), either of which may spur the
producers of the good to make improvements. For example, our widget-
maker might react to declining sales or customer complaints by repairing the
widget mold or patching the factory roof.
This picture is incomplete as applied to education and neighborhood
security. Clearly, users do influence these local public goods through exit
(by forming, joining, or leaving user pools) and through voice (by
complaining about a good or agitating for more funding). And, indeed, some
aspects of these goods are exogenously provided-teachers, school
buildings, police officers, and patrol cars are supplied through the
appropriate governmental channels. But in a very important sense, users are
also directly involved in producing the goods and determining the quality of
the goods through their participation.40 Thus, their acts of consumption are
also acts of production.4
B. Participation, User Heterogeneity, and Critical Concentrations
It is helpful at this point to spell out some of the more obvious impacts
of user participation with respect to the two goods under discussion. In the
case of education, studies have confirmed what common sense suggests-
that peers in school have a tremendous effect on a student's educational
experience and achievement.42  The users of the educational product
experience of being part of the crowd" and that "[a]t theaters, amusement parks, resort cruises,
private clubs, trendy restaurants, and charity balls, the other customers partially determine the
quality of what each customer consumes"). There are also publicly provided goods, such as trash
collection, that are not produced by users to any significant extent.
40. See Oates, supra note 4, at 205 (noting that "characteristics of the individuals of the
community are themselves a critical determinant of the level of local services"); Manski, supra note
4, at 356 (noting the role of student interactions in the production of education); Schwab & Oates,
supra note 4, at 218 (noting that many studies support the idea "that the level of attainment in a
school system or the level of safety in a neighborhood depends not so much on the instructional
staff or frequency of police patrols as on the characteristics of the residents of the jurisdiction");
Robert M. Schwab & Ernest M. Zampelli, Disentangling the Demand Function from the Production
Function for Local Public Services: The Case of Public Safety, 33 J. PUB. ECON. 245, 254 (1987)
(noting the role of income level of residents in producing public safety).
41. See Schwab & Zampelli, supra note 40, at 246-47 (noting that the income of residents is a
factor both in the production of public safety and the demand for it); cf. Denise Rdaume,
Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 10, 15 (1988) (discussing
goods such as culture which "unite production and consumption"). The fact that consumption and
production are simultaneously occurring presents some interesting complexities. For example,
Schwab and Zampelli suggest that "[iut is plausible that for some goods, efficient consumption may
require homogeneous communities, while efficient production may require heterogeneity; overall
efficiency would then require a balancing of these two conflicting objectives." Schwab & Zampelli,
supra note 40, at 246.
42. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLMCS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
119 (1990) ("Researchers have found that student achievement is influenced by the attitudes and
behavior of other students in a school-by the pressures from student peer groups.") (citations
omitted); see id. at 101 (discussing the dynamic whereby "children bring their (families'] values and
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therefore help determine its quality and content. Students can either enhance
the quality of the educational product through high achievement, excellent
work habits, and good behavior, or they can detract from it through
problematic behavior and poor attitudes. Put another way, each student's
participation (or lack thereof) generates spillover effects that will have an
impact on other students within the same user pool. Caroline Hoxby
identifies several peer-effect spillovers:
A student's innate ability can affect his peers, not only through
knowledge spillovers but through his influence on classroom
standards. A student's environmentally determined behavior may
affect his peers. For instance, a student who has not learned self-
discipline at home may disrupt the classroom. Peer effects may
follow lines like disability, race, gender, or family income: a learning
disabled child may draw disproportionately on teacher time, racial or
gender tension in the classroom may interfere with learning, richer
parents may purchase learning resources that get spread over a
classroom. Peer effects may even work through the way in which
teachers or administrators react to students.
4 3
The quality of student participation may in part be a function of
exogenous factors in the school setting (how engaging the teachers are, for
example, or how well designed the classroom is), but the students themselves
also bring in clusters of behaviors and attitudes that greatly impact the
learning process. If we assume these behaviors and attitudes are largely
learned in the home, this would explain empirical findings that academic
results are highly correlated with the socioeconomic background (that is, the
education level and income) of the students' families. In contrast, links
between student achievement and other sorts of inputs-such as teacher
salaries, student-teacher ratios, or expenditure levels-have not been
consistently demonstrated*4  As John Chubb and Terry Moe observe, the
importance of family background is "[o]ne of the strongest and most
habits [to school] and spread them among other children"); Vernon Henderson et al., Peer Effects
and Educational Production Functions, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 97,97 (1978) (finding "that the principal
variable or effect which is at the potential disposal of policy makers and which has a consistent and
strong impact on the achievement of individual students is the quality (characteristics) of the typical
or average student in a class"). A recent study found significant peer effects after controlling for the
selection biases endemic to such inquiries. Caroline Hoxby, Peer Effects in the Classroom:
Learning from Gender and Race Variation (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7867, Aug. 2000), available at http.//www.nber.org/ papers/w7867.
43. Hoxby, supra note 42, at 5-6; see also Manski, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that in addition
to direct student interactions, students may influence the production of education indirectly by
affecting such things as teachers' instructional decisions, teacher recruitment, and course offerings).
44. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 42, at 101; Oates, supra note 4, at 208-09 (discussing empirical
work, including the Coleman Report, consistently showing the significance of socioeconomic
factors to scholastic achievement and finding no such relationship between other kinds of school
inputs). This is not to dispute that such factors could have an important influence in certain
instances. Indeed, some empirical evidence indicates that smaller classes result in better student
performance. See, e.g., Douglas S. Wood, Do Smaller Classes Equal Better Students? (Oct. 31,
2000) (discussing 1999 follow-up study of Tennessee's Student Teacher Achievement Ratio Study),
at http:lwww.cnn.com/SPEClALS/2000/democracylprivateschools.publicmoneyl stories/class.size.
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consistent finding[s] in research on student achievement," while "[b]y
comparison, the influence that schools have on student achievement has often
appeared weak.' 45  This suggests that the consumers of education (the
students and their families) may be among the most important factors of
production, perhaps even eclipsing variations in monetary inputs 6 If, in
fact, endogenous factors dominate the education-production process,
exogenous improvements (better-designed facilities, smarter teachers, or
more money) may not be sufficient on their own to improve educational
quality.47
Similar principles apply in the case of neighborhood security, While
some aspects of security are provided exogenously by the local government
(police officers, police cars, and the like) much of what makes a
neighborhood safe or unsafe has to do with the residents of the community
who are the consumers of neighborhood security.48 Obviously, if residents
45. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 42, at 101. Chubb and Moe, apparently believing these
endogenous influences to be insensitive to policy, focused their attention instead on a cluster of
factors relating to the "organization" of the school. See generally id. Finding these "organization"
factors to be important to student outcomes, Chubb and Moe enthusiastically embraced the notion
of school choice, which they felt would lead schools to improve their organization. See id. at 185-
229. However, as James Liebman quite convincingly establishes in his review of their book, the
factors they label "effective school organization," and which they characterize as the cause of
student achievement, can in fact be better understood as the result of that achievement and of
parental and student sorting. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 261-77.
46. Oates, supra note 4, at 212 (observing that evidence suggests that effects of budgetary
inputs on quality of education and public safety are "dwarfed in importance by the characteristics of
the population itself"); cf. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 290-91,
297-98 (1999) (discussing anecdotal and empirical evidence that questions the link between money
and achievement and discussing studies showing a robust link between the socioeconomic status of
one's peers and one's achievement levels).
47. See David F. Bradford & Harry H. Kelejian, An Econometric Model of Flight to the
Suburbs, 81 J. POLIT. ECON. 566, 578 (1973) (arguing that "the findings of researchers into the
causes of persistent poverty, and, in particular, the apparent difficulty of explaining the
effectiveness of schooling in terms of anything other than the socioeconomic background of a child
and his fellow students, suggest that public expenditures, even income transfers, are not sufficient to
deal with important manifestations of poverty"); Ryan, supra note 46, at 308 (observing that
"providing additional resources may not even be a particularly effective way for the state to remedy
unequal or inadequate schooling" and that "a more effective approach may entail ensuring that
poorer students have access to more advantaged peers"); Oates, supra note 4, at 213 (noting that
reforming school financing to equalize inputs "may have only modest effects on differentials in
outputs" and noting differentials in achievement levels among Hawaii school districts, despite state-
level financing). Of course, one response to the realization that money makes only a small
difference is to suggest that we apply a great deal more of it to the harder-to-serve populations. See
Dynarski, Schwab & Zampelli, supra note 4, at 262 ("Our results indicate that differences in local
characteristics across [school] districts can be offset only by large variations in spending, because
expenditure has a small effect on achievement relative to local characteristics."). This suggestion
makes sense only if one assumes that the local population characteristics are impervious to change,
See Ryan, supra note 46, at 289 (noting that changing a school's composition may be a more
promising avenue for change than increasing expenditures, given the lack of evidence that even
substantial increases in expenditures can overcome negative peer influences).
48. Empirical work suggests that population factors such as socioeconomic status and age are
strongly associated with crime rates, while no strong relationship exists between crime rates and
police inputs or expenditures. See Oates, supra note 4, at 209-12 (discussing previous studies and
presenting statistical results).
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are themselves involved in crime, this dilutes the quality of the community's
security. But there are other very important aspects of user participation in
the neighborhood setting. As Jane Jacobs convincingly argued forty years
ago, the perceived security of a given area does not depend so much on
police presence, but rather on how many law-abiding people are routinely out
and about on the streets and engaged in casual observation and enforcement:
The first thing to understand is that the public peace-the sidewalk
and street peace-of cities is not kept primarily by the police,
necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost
unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the
people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.... No
amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual
enforcement of it has broken down.
49
Recent sociological work in Chicago supports the primacy of various
sorts of "indigenous informal social control," such as "the willingness of
residents to intervene to prevent acts such as truancy, drinking, vandalism,
and street-comer disturbances (e.g., harassment, loitering, fighting)" in
maintaining public order ° Tenant groups in housing projects have made
similar use of informal social controls and indigenous enforcement to reduce
crime and maintain order.51
If neighbors' eyes-and wills-are the critical components of
neighborhood security, exogenously provided factors may play a limited role.
Features such as bright lights or video-camera surveillance may do little or
nothing on their own to enhance security.52 Other externally imposed
measures, such as harsher enforcement of existing laws, are also of
questionable efficacy in reducing crime.53 Instead, it appears that
49. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 31-32 (1961).
50. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AMi. J. SOC. 603,612 (1999). Some
of the forms of informal social control cited by Sampson and Raudenbush, such as "agitating for
voting referendums" to close down bars where drugs are sold, or complaining until a "drug house"
is demolished, would fall under the rubric of "voice.' Id.
51. SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RisE AND FALL OF A MODERN
GHETTO 29-34,77-83 (2000).
52. See JACOBS, supra note 49, at 42 (explaining that while lights may make eyes more
effective, "unless eyes are there, and unless in the brains behind those eyes is the almost
unconscious reassurance of general street support in upholding civilization, lights can do no good");
Jason Ditton, Crime and the City: Public Attitudes Towards Open-Street CCTV in Glasgow, 40
BRr. J. CRIMINOL. 692 (2000) (finding that closed-circuit surveillance cameras in the center of
Glasgow did not make people feel safer).
53. Sampson and Raudenbush's recent work in Chicago suggests that evn those law
enforcement efforts directly targeted at controlling neighborhood disorder (i.e., "broken windows")
may be of less value in fighting crime than has often been supposed. Sampson & Raudenbush,
supra note 50, at 638 (remarking that "the current fascination in policy circles on cleaning up
disorder through law enforcement techniques appears simplistic and largely misplaced, at least in
terms of directly fighting crime") (citations omitted). The original "broken windows" hypothesis
suggested that disorder causes or attracts crime. See id. at 604 (citing James Q. Wilson & George L
Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety.: Broken Windows, AT.ANTIc MONTHLY, Mar. 1982,
at 29). The Sampson and Raudenbush study shows that disorder is not correlated with higher crime
2001]
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cooperative action by the residents themselves offers the most promising
avenue for making neighborhoods safer.
In this context, user participation may largely involve keeping an eye
out for others and being out and about in the streets and parks oneself. While
user participation could encompass such concerted actions as neighborhood
watches or safety patrols, the concept extends to the most unplanned and
everyday of activities, such as walking a dog, going for a jog, or taking a
walk to the comer store or mailbox. Seemingly trivial individual decisions
about whether and how to use the neighborhood sidewalks, streets, and parks
may make a substantial qualitative difference in the aggregate. For example,
the current trend towards wholly privatized play has undoubtedly had a
negative impact on neighborhood safety.
54
Clearly, users differ in the way they consume publicly provided goods
like education and neighborhood security, and this heterogeneity has
consequences. Some users make a habit of consuming these goods in a
manner that enhances their quality. For simplicity, I will call these
consumers "quality-enhancing users." Examples would include the attentive
student who behaves and participates in class, the neighborhood resident who
keeps eyes and ears open for trouble and makes frequent, purposeful use of
the local sidewalks and streets, and a group of joggers that circumnavigates
the public park every morning and evening.
Unfortunately, not all users-and not all uses-fit into the quality-
enhancing mold. Some users make a habit of using publicly provided goods
in a manner that detracts from their quality. For simplicity and symmetry, I
will call these users "quality-detracting users." Examples would include
students who bring drugs and violence into the school and people who use
their local streets and public parks as venues for drug sales and gang activity.
Many users fall in between these two extremes. For example, some people
are technically in the user pool, but are either physically absent or are, for all
practical purposes, noncontributors. Here, think of the student who sits in the
back of the classroom without speaking or of the neighborhood resident who
stays behind barred windows and bolted doors, rarely venturing into the local
streets. Other users may be relatively malleable and may follow the lead of
levels once one controls for the structural disadvantages of an area (e.g., concentrated poverty) and
the "collective efficacy" of its residents. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 50, at 638. The
authors do suggest that neighborhood disorder may have an indirect effect on crime by demoralizing
citizens and thereby impeding their efforts to cooperate with each other and take a stand against
crime, and by inducing people to leave the neighborhood (or keeping them from entering). Id. at
638. Moreover, a neighborhood that internally chooses to come together to address disorder may
build social ties and demonstrate commitment that will have the effect of reducing crime. Id. at 638
n.36. In other words, it is the endogenous process of neighborhood participation that holds value in
addressing crime, not the presence or absence of disorder itself.
54. See RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE 271 (1989) ("In our zeal to keep kids 'off
the streets' and contain them within safer places, we contribute to the further deterioration of our
public space. As we shuttle our children from one safe and certified adult to another, the streets
continue to deteriorate in accordance with the negative view held toward them.").
[Vol. 80:1
Beyond Exit and Voice
the dominant users in the group, whether for good or ill. Young students in a
classroom are often particularly good examples of this phenomenon.
These categories are admittedly somewhat artificial. People are not
immutably cast into one or another of these roles; individual students and
residents may be quality enhancers at times and quality detractors or
noncontributors at other times. Moreover, one of the most promising
strategies for improving the qualit of these goods is to assist people in
becoming quality-enhancing users.5 But it is still helpful to formalize what
is intuitively obvious-that users are heterogeneous, and that this
heterogeneity has consequences for quality.
Users are not only heterogeneous as individuals, but they also influence
others within their respective user pools. The nature and intensity of this
influence will depend, in part, on the mix of other users already in a given
pool. The way in which combinations and concentrations of heterogeneous
users determine the quality of local public goods is not necessarily
straightforward. 6 In general terms, we know that peers influence each other
in school and that neighborhoods are safest when law-abiding people are out
and about in them. The recipe for success almost takes on the character of a
paradox or a tautology. For example, law-abiding people will not be out and
about in a neighborhood unless it is already the sort of neighborhood in
which law-abiding people feel safe enough to move about freely.
The resolution of this problem requires a "critical mass" of quality-
enhancing activity to establish a baseline level of quality upon which other
quality-enhancing uses can build.57 While the dynamics of quality
enhancement are not entirely clear and would be a matter for empirical study,
casual observation suggests that quality improvements tend to snowball once
a certain critical mass of quality-enhancing activity is established. Whether
or not there are enough quality enhancers in the user pool at any one time
depends not only on who is in the pool but also on what they are doing. This,
in turn, depends on the combined outcome of two linked sets of individual
55. See infra subpart 11(C) (describing possible ways to improve cooperation within the user
pool). In this respect, my model differs from that of some economists who have explored the
significance of population characteristics. See, e.g., Schwab & Oates, supra note 4, at 220-30
(presenting a model in which people are placed into two static categories: A and B).
56. See, e.g., Paul Glewwe, Estimating the Impact of Peer Group Effects on Socioeconomic
Outcomes: Does the Distribution of Peer Group Characteristics Matter?, 16 ECON. EDUC. REV. 39.
43 (1997) (discussing the role of distribution of peer characteristics in determining peer impacts).
57. See, e.g., J. Douglas Wilms & Frank Echols, Alert and Inert Clients: The Scottish
Experience of Parental Choice of Schools, in MARKET APPROACHES TO EDUCATION: VOUCHERS
AND SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 24, at 425,439 (recognizing the possibility "that there is a critical
proportion of high-ability and high-SES [socioeconomic status] pupils necessary to establish a
favourable disciplinary climate and strong norms for academic success") (citation omitted);
THoMAs C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 91-110 (1978) (discussing and
modeling "critical mass" in the context of various social phenomena); Pamela Oliver et al., A
Theory of the Critical Mass. L Interdependence, Group Heterogeneit, and the Production of
Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 522, 522 (1985) (tracing the importance of "critical mass" to
successful collective action).
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decisions: the choice of a user pool and the choice of action within one's user
pool.
Figure 1 illustrates how the quantity of quality-enhancing users in a
given user pool might relate to quality.
58
Figure 1.
Quality
U---------------------- ----- I--------- -----------------------
B C
Number of Quality-Enhancing Users
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the number of quality-
enhancing users within a given user pool. I am making the simplifying
assumption that each quality-enhancing user is identical in terms of her
quality-enhancing propensities (although the effects of those propensities
will differ in magnitude depending on the number of other quality-enhancing
users already in the pool). 9 The vertical axis represents the quality of the
local public good--education or neighborhood security. To simplify matters,
I am assuming that the range above the top dashed horizontal line (marked
A) represents a level of quality that is unambiguously "acceptable" or
"adequate" and that the range below the lower dashed horizontal line
(marked U) represents a clearly "unacceptable" or "unsatisfactory" level of
58. Figure I is based on the S-shaped "general third-order" production function curve presented
in Oliver et al., supra note 57, at 527-28 & fig.l(a).
59. In reality, some users might be "super-enhancers" whose impact is several times greater
than that of an underachieving quality enhancer. This reality is suppressed in my model; I am
assuming that each quality enhancer is essentially fungible in terms of her quality-enhancing
capabilities. Additional quality enhancers added to the pool may have a larger or smaller marginal
impact on quality than the ones added previously, but in my model this is wholly a function of the
cumulative concentration of quality-enhancing users in the pool, not the result of any innate
differences among the individual quality-enhancing users themselves.
(Vol. 80:1
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quality. In the quality range between these two dashed lines, some users
would find the quality acceptable, and some would find it unacceptable.
The curve in Figure 1 is one possible depiction of the relationship
between the number of quality-enhancing users and the quality of the local
public good.6 The relationship is positive across the entire range: as more
quality-enhancing users are added to the user pool, the quality increases. But
the relationship between quality-enhancing users and quality is not steadily
linear.6 1 In the range to the left of the leftmost vertical dashed line (point B),
adding an additional quality-enhancing user makes little or no difference in
quality. Likewise, subtracting a quality-enhancing user in this range does not
result in any significant reduction of quality. This reflects the intuition that
some schools and neighborhoods are in such bad shape that no individual
quality-enhancing user can make a difference.62 In the range to the right of
the rightmost vertical dashed line (point C), a critical mass of quality-
enhancing users exists to ensure an acceptable level of quality. Beyond point
C, each additional quality-enhancing user adds less and less in marginal
terms to the overall quality of the good. This reflects the intuition that
schools and neighborhoods may reach a plateau where adding more well-
prepared and disciplined students or more safety-minded, law-abiding
neighbors will not result in significant improvement.
The curve is steepest in the area between B and C. This steep part of
the curve corresponds to quality levels that are neither unambiguously
60. Of course, the precise shape of the curve would be an empirical question and would be
highly context-specific. See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 42, at 105 (finding, with respect to
peer effects in education, that "achievement is a concave function of class quality"); Oliver et al.,
supra note 57, at 525-28 & fig.1 (discussing various shapes of production functions for public
goods). However, the S-shaped curve shown in Figure I seems intuitively plausible for goods like
education and security. See idU at 528 (noting that this general type of curve tracks a common
pattern for public goods: "a period of start-up costs or other sources of low but increasing marginal
returns, which leads to a period of higher returns; then satiation sets in and produces diminishing
marginal returns").
61. See Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, hales, and Ljmnpy Goods: Alternative
Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (discussing a type of "public
good which is not provided in smoothly increasing amounts as the level of contributions
increases").
62. This intuition is sometimes expressed rather inaccurately by saying that the school or
neighborhood is "beyond saving' or "hopeless." Because of the interdependence of decisions,
however, retaining even a few quality-enhancing users could make a tremendous difference in
transforming a school or neighborhood. See SCHELUNG, supra note 57, at 97 (observing that the
fact that a particular collective enterprise ultimately falls does not tell us how close it came to
succeeding or "[t]he number along the way who, if they could [have been] enticed or coerced into
staying, would [have made] the whole thing viable"). Thus, a few quality enhancers who
committed themselves to "sticking" could set in motion a chain of events that would trigger and
buttress behavioral changes among existing pool members and ultimately attract additional quality-
enhancing users. See id. at 97-98 (explaining how the behavior of people who act unconditionally
can affect the behavior of those whose decisions are conditioned on what others do). Such a
dynamic could, in time, pull the user pool up to the critical threshold. Nevertheless, it is likely that
a single quality enhancer camot "go it alone!'; instead, a core of quality-enhancing users would be
necessary to generate enough momentum to effectuate change.
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acceptable nor unambiguously unacceptable. In this range, adding or
subtracting a quality-enhancing user has a large effect on quality. This
reflects the intuition that schools or neighborhoods that are in this marginal
state are most susceptible to change, either for better or worse. Not only
does each arrival or departure of a quality-enhancing user make a large
difference on its own, but each arrival or departure is also likely to spur
additional entry or exodus. Because users in a given pool will have varying
tolerances for drops in quality, it is likely that a departing quality-enhancing
user could drive the quality level below the minimum acceptable level for
some additional user, thus triggering that user's departure as well.63 The
second user's departure could, in turn, drop the quality level below the
minimum that yet another user would find acceptable, thus spurring the third
user's departure. 64 The process works in the other direction as well. Each
new quality-enhancing user improves the quality of the good, and this may
drive the good above the minimum quality threshold of some additional
quality-enhancing user, thus inducing her to enter the pool. That entry will
likely spur further entries.65
If the curve depicted in Figure 1 matches up with reality in even a rough
sense, this has important implications for local public goods. It means that
the total utility generated by a set of user pools in a given community can
increase or decrease depending on how the various heterogeneous users are
distributed among user pools. While the question is an empirical one, our
intuitions suggest that once a critical mass of quality-enhancing users is
achieved in a school or neighborhood, additional quality enhancers generate
decreasing marginal improvements. In contrast, the loss of each additional
quality-enhancing user from a user pool that is quite close to falling below
critical mass produces a large increment of harm. For example, a very safe
neighborhood does not stand to gain nearly as much from the entry of an
additional quality-enhancing family as does a marginal neighborhood.
Similarly, most people intuitively recognize that having concentrated
pockets of quality-detracting users is much different (and arguably much
worse) than having quality-detracting users spread thinly among user pools.66
63. See id. at 96-99, 101-02 (describing such chain reactions in a variety of contexts); cf.
Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATH. Soc. 143, 181 (1971) (modeling
neighborhood "tipping" with respect to race).
64. SCHELLING, supra note 57, at 96-99, 101-02.
65. Cf. id. at 101 (discussing "tipping in" and "tipping out"). The effects of increasing and
decreasing quality on membership may not be symmetrical, however. For example, the quality
level that triggers a person's exit may be far lower than that which would later be required to induce
that same person's re-entry. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 7; Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W.
Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 2027, 2046-47 (2001) (providing an example in which a norm shift in one direction is much
easier than a shift in the opposite direction).
66. Analogous concerns exist regarding concentrated pockets of poverty. See. e~g., Bradford &
Kelejian, supra note 47, at 586 ("To the extent that the probability of being poor is increased by the
fact of growing up among poor people, any force increasing the concentration of poverty becomes
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In the latter case, spillover effects from quality-enhancing users may render
the quality detractors harmless, or group norms and the threat of exclusion
can operate to change the behavior of the quality-detracting users. As every
elementary-school teacher knows, separating troublemakers from each other
often results in a net reduction in trouble. Empirical work indicates that the
achievement levels of students are sensitive to peer effects; that is, low-
achieving students will do better if they are placed with higher-achieving
students than if they are pooled with each other.67 Similar spillover effects
have been documented in neighborhoods with respect to behavioral
characteristics such as involvement in crime, drug and alcohol use, and
unemployment.68
In other words, the shape of the curve in Figure 1 suggests that shifts of
users among and between user pools is not a zero-sum game.6 If, instead,
the relationship between the number of quality-enhancing users and the
quality of the good were perfectly linear, a quality-enhancing user would add
the same amount of utility to any pool she joined. In that case, any loss to
the user pool from which a quality-enhancing user departs would be exactly
offset by the gains to the new user pool which that same individual joins.!°
While a relationship of perfect linearity seems unlikely,71 it is important
to note that even a perfectly linear relationship between quality-enhancing
users and the quality of schools and neighborhoods would not necessarily
make us indifferent to how quality-enhancing users are distributed among
pools. The reason for this becomes clear if we recall the earlier distinction
between consumption value and composite value.7- Figure 1 represents the
of interest for social policy."); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 50. at 609-10, 625 (discussing
problems associated with concentrated disadvantage and presenting a finding that "concentrated
disadvantage is the single most important predictor of disorder in Chicago neighborhoods").
67. See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 42.
68. See Anne C. Case & Lawrence F. Katz, The Company You Keep: The Effects of Family and
Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youths (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, working Paper No.
3705, May 1991), available at http://www.nber.org/paperswv3705.
69. See FRSCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-17) (noting the possibility
that there may be "beneficial peer-group effects from mixing rich and poor" which would keep
migration from being a zero-sum game); Wilms & Echols, supra note 57, at 439 (discussing the
possibility that movement of students among schools may not be a zero-sum game and the potential
that "movement of high-SES [socioeconomic status] pupils from low to high SES schools would
have little effect on popular schools, but dire consequences for schools losing their more able
pupils").
70. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1193 ("When a resident moves, the loss from membership in
one community is offset by the gain in membership to another."); Hoxby, supra note 42, at 2
(noting that if peer effects were strictly linear, the situation becomes a zero-sum game, as "[i]n order
to give one student a better peer, one must take that peer away from another student; the two effects
exactly cancel").
71. While Hoxby's study did not find the spillovers from one peer's achievement level to that
of another to be "generally non-linear," she questions the linear "baseline" model and suggests that
the existence of channels other than achievement levels through which peer effects may occur could
make overall effects nonlinear. Hoxby, supra note 42, at 36.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 13-27 (discussing these two sources of value).
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quality of a particular school or neighborhood and can be thought of as
corresponding to the consumption value experienced by the users of that
school or neighborhood. Arithmetically summing the consumption values
associated with all pools captures only part of the picture. Each of these
individual pools is also generating spillovers for the community at large, and
these spillovers together make up composite value. While it makes sense to
think of each pool as generating spillovers commensurate with its own
quality level, it could be the case that pools falling below a certain threshold
of absolute quality will generate disproportionately large negative spillovers
for the community as a whole. In other words, a single abysmal pool might
generate negative spillovers several orders of magnitude greater than might a
half-dozen somewhat below-average pools. 73 Thus, we would want to be
sensitive to the distribution of the quality-enhancing users, even in the case
where a linear relationship exists between the number of quality enhancers
and quality. Nevertheless, our concern with the distribution of quality-
enhancing users is clearer and more pressing if we assume a nonlinear
relationship like the one shown in Figure 1.
The curve shown in Figure 1 seems to suggest the desirability of
policies that attempt to perform a sort of local-public-goods triage. If we
assume that there are numerous competing user pools in a given metropolitan
area with similar quality functions, these will have varying numbers of
quality-enhancing users at any given time, placing them at different points on
the curve. Quality-enhancing users can do the most good in the critical
center range, where each additional participant makes a large contribution to
quality and is particularly likely to spur the addition of more quality-
enhancing users (either by attracting new quality-enhancing users or by
transforming additional existing users into quality-enhancing users). Once
an acceptable level of quality is assured in a given school or neighborhood,
adding more quality-enhancing users to that pool will not generate significant
gains. Instead, we might be better off if we (as a society) could convince
additional quality-enhancing users to join a pool in which they could make a
larger difference.74
The shape of the curve might also suggest that pulling quality-
enhancing users from the schools that are in the worst shape (and where
those users' efforts are essentially wasted) would also be a good idea. For
obvious reasons of equity and distributive justice, this second suggestion is
troubling. It is also unlikely to be a viable solution even from a more
utilitarian standpoint, because schools and neighborhoods trapped in the
"unacceptable" range are very likely to generate large negative spillovers for
73. It is also possible that a particularly outstanding school or neighborhood might generate
disproportionately large positive spillovers for the community as a result of reaching a particular
level of absolute quality, although this seems less likely.
74. This might not be the case if doing so meant forgoing large positive spillovers that could
only be attained by reaching a particular level of absolute quality. See supra note 73.
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the rest of the relevant community. Instead, it might make more sense to
undertake policy directions that would get all user pools past point B, where
further gains will come relatively easily and where the dynamic will be set in
motion for ultimately achieving a critical mass of quality-enhancing users.
But this is getting ahead of the story a bit. Before launching into a more
formal game-theoretic analysis of the situation, I want to step back and
consider how a focus on participation alters the exit-voice framework. I will
start by showing how the idea of participation differs from the usual notions
of voice, and then discuss how this enhanced notion of user influence
changes our understanding of exit.
C. Beyond Voice and Exit
1. Beyond Voice.-It is important at this juncture to emphasize that
users do influence quality through the exercise of voice, as well as through
their everyday participation. Even mundane exercises of voice
(complaining) can impact the quality of schools and neighborhoods, and
voice writ large (political activism) may help to determine funding levels,
which may be relevant to quality concerns. Nevertheless, a focus on voice as
the exclusive quality-control mechanism available to current users misses
much of the picture. A close look at the notion of voice, and its implicit
limits and assumptions, shows why this is so. Hirschman defines voice as:
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective
petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a
higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management,
or through various types of actions and protests, including those that
are meant to mobilize public opinion.75
Although this definition begins quite expansively,76 the list of voice
alternatives contained within it reveals some conceptual limits. Most
significantly, this notion of voice implies a distinction between consumers
and "management": consumers voice their concerns either to the
management directly, or to persons or institutions capable of influencing the
producers. Voice focuses on communications from customers to those
persons ostensibly in charge of controlling quality. 7 Indeed, the term voice
75. HIRsCHMAN, supra note 3, at 30.
76. The first part of the definition, taken alone, would draw within its reach virtually any action
taken by anyone in any context from which one is not actively fleeing. For example, it would
encompass playing solitaire on the job (instead of quitting), revising a mangled manuscript (instead
of tossing it in the garbage), and distracting one's racquetball opponent when one is losing (instead
of abandoning the game). These kinds of actions are indeed taken "to change, rather than to escape
from, an objectionable state of affairs," id., and they may indeed communicate something, but they
are not what we would normally think of as voice.
77. See, e.g., id. at 4 ("The firm's customers or the organization's members express their
dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is
subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen ... (and] [a]s a
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itself implies some listening other.78 Voice is, therefore, a fundamentally
indirect method of controlling quality-as is exit.
79
What users do on a day-to-day basis in their schools, neighborhoods,
and parks does not fit comfortably within this notion of voice. 80 One can, of
course, argue that the term voice should be applied to anything that a user
does, including such quotidian actions as paying attention in class or walking
one's dog around the park. Yet forcing these sorts of user behaviors to fit
into the "voice" box impedes analysis and reinforces the faulty assumptions
that currently omit user participation from the quality equation. Because the
term voice suggests that "users" and "producers" are mutually exclusive
categories, one is led to assume that only the latter group is ultimately
responsible for producing the good and determining its quality. This
assumption, in turn, points to legal and policy solutions that ignore the real
role of users in producing these goods.
The term voice, as it has been used in the literature, suggests that users
are important to quality only insofar as they act as instruments for coercing
action on the part of another party who is ultimately responsible for
producing the good. Because the state can itself coerce the putative
providers of local public goods, having users capable of performing this task
might not seem very important. In fact, it might seem more efficient to have
the state directly impose requirements on the local governmental entities in
charge of providing local public goods, thereby taking the "middleman" user
out of the picture, along with the uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of
voice at the local level.
Such a line of reasoning would miss what is perhaps the central feature
determining the quality of local public goods-the day-to-day participation
of the users. State coercion imposed upon the provider of the good cannot
substitute for this participation, which arises endogenously. Because quality
depends in large part on who the users are and what they are doing, a
result, management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible cures of customers'
and members' dissatisfaction."); id. at 17 (discussing "the channels of communication between
members and management in the public school systems") (emphasis added).
78. For example, it would make sense to speak of voice when an apartment dweller complains
to management about faulty plumbing or leaky windows. It would make little sense to think of that
apartment dweller as exercising voice when she cleans up the apartment or rearranges the
furniture-even though the latter activities may have a much more profound influence on the
quality of the apartment-dwelling experience.
79. Hirschman notes, correctly, that voicing one's views is a more direct communication than
taking some action from which one's views might be inferred. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at
16-17. Yet neither mechanism is as direct as influencing quality through one's own participatory
acts.
80. To be sure, Hirschman's discussion of voice at times seems to edge close to my notion of
user participation. See id. at 51 (discussing how people exiting from a given neighborhood "will be
lost to the citizens' groups and community action programs that would attempt to stem and reverse
the tide of deterioration"). However, to the extent -irschman is referencing efforts to improve a
school or neighborhood by cooperative behavior from within, the notion of "participation" better
captures what is happening than does the term "voice."
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solution premised on state coercion of the "management" or the "producer"
will be incomplete at best. Instead, user participation should be recognized
as an important component of quality and a factor of production in its own
right, separate and apart from the mechanism of voice.8f
Finally, some exercises of voice (for example, constant complaints and
threats of litigation) may actually make other useful sorts of participation
more difficult to sustain. Chubb and Moe's work on education supports this
interpretation. In their study, effective schools were correlated with parental
support, not with parental complaints and challenges:
Parents who unite behind a school, trust it to do what is best, and
support its objectives and programs in the home can be a real asset to a
school that wants to build an effective school organization. Parents
who regularly challenge school priorities, frequently object to tracking
policies or course assignments, and disagree with personnel decisions
can cause real problems for the development of a coherent, ambitious,
professional organization.
82
Strong parental support is also likely to foster routine cooperation
among the end-users of education-the students. Conversely, student
cooperation may be undermined by constant parental complaints. While an
image of a school populated by obedient and unquestioning automatons is as
repugnant as it is implausible, it is nevertheless true that schools cannot
thrive without some minimal level of cooperative participation from most of
the students, most of the time.
2. Beyond Exit.-Just as voice does not fully capture all of the ways in
which current users can impact the quality of a local public good, the term
exit does not adequately convey what happens when a user decides to switch
user pools. When viewed through the lens of user participation, such a
decision has implications for the pool that the user joins, for the pool left
behind, and for the larger community.
Conventional accounts suggest that exit-buying local public goods
from a different supplier, either by physically leaving the jurisdiction or by
opting for a private alternative-is analogous to switching to a different
consumer product, such as a new breakfast cereal. The motivation in both
cases is the desire to satisfy one's preferences or "tastes."83 Exit does at least
two laudable things in this standard story. First, the exiting individuals are
able to realize their consumer preferences more fully. Second, exit provides
81. Cf. Schwab & Zampelli, supra note 40, at 255 (discussing the role of residents' income
levels in producing public safety); Manski, supra note 4, at 356-57 (noting the role of students in
producing education).
82. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 42, at 147.
83. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1188 (observing that a decision to opt out of a publicly
provided level of service arises from the "desire to achieve one's preferences privately where one is
unable to satisfy them through the political process" and noting that this desire appears, at least
initially, analogous to preferring "full service restaurants to fast-food").
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compelling market signals to the producer of the disfavored commodity and
could spur product improvements.84 Relatedly, the threat of exit-that is,
competition-is thought to provide market discipline and to prevent declines
in quality.
For several reasons, this account of exit does not translate well to the
local-public-goods context. First, it misapprehends the motives behind exit.
Ordinary consumer motivations-paying for what one wants and getting
what one pays for-are often attributed to people making decisions about
where and how to consume local public goods. For example, James
Buchanan observes that high-demand users (such as those with a taste for
premium education) will readily opt out of a given consumption pool if they
can realize higher net benefits consuming alone or consuming in some other
pool.85 Exit is often formulated as a switch to a "better school" or a "safer
neighborhood," with the school or the neighborhood conceptualized as a
bundle of physical facilities and state-provided services. I contend that it is
more fruitful to think of users as selecting among user pools rather than
among exogenously provided products, and that this distinction has
implications for the meaning of exit.
Here, it is helpful to consider how ordinary consumer goods differ from
the local public goods under discussion. The former are exogenously
produced, allowing one to decide in some meaningful way which lawnmower
is "better" or which brand of cereal is more to one's taste, independent of
what other consumers are doing. Because local public goods are largely
endogenously produced, buying the best possible product means, in practical
terms, joining the best possible user pool.86 People making decisions about
local public goods are not motivated solely by a desire to avoid cross-
subsidizing other users or by the desire to find an exoqenously provided
package that fulfills their preferences at the lowest cost.8 Rather, they are
driven by the desire to join the best possible user pool. This means that
individual decisions about user pools are interdependent.
Because of this interdependence, the nature and meaning of exit is
different than it is for other consumer goods. Exit has financial impacts in
the local-public-goods context, of course, just as it does in the context of
other goods. When well-off taxpayers form new, autonomous pools or clubs
84. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 21 ("[B]y inflicting revenue losses on delinquent
management, exit is expected to induce that 'wonderful concentration of the mind' akin to the one
Samuel Johnson attributed to the prospect of being hanged.").
85. Buchanan, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that "where the municipality finances and provides a
good that can be secured independently with little or no loss in efficiency, the shift of high-demand
subgroups into their own purchase units cannot readily be forestalled while sharing gains are
retained for remaining groups").
86. Cf. Schelling, supra note 63, at 145 ("To choose a neighborhood is to choose neighbors. To
pick a neighborhood with good schools is to pick a neighborhood of people who appreciate schools
(or of people who want to be with the kind of people who appreciate schools).").
87. See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE PoLITcs OF EXCLUSION 18 (1976) ("Higher taxes alone
do not explain the flight of middle-income families and businesses to the suburbs, but they combine
with poor schools, racial tensions, rising crime rates, and other problems in the older cities to
accelerate the process."); cf. Oates, supra note 4, at 213 ("There is, I feel sure, a good deal more to
local zoning policies than just keeping down local tax rates.").
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for consuming local public goods, this can pose a fiscal threat to the pool of
consumers left behind. James Buchanan views this threat as so great that he
recommends paying the high-demand users to stay put.88 But loss of tax
revenue is not the only problem with out-migration. Exit imposes other sorts
of costs as well, including costs which relate to the lost participation of the
users.89 Recognizing these additional costs of exit makes an important
analytic difference. If money were the only problem with exit, changes in
the method and mode of taxing and financing public goods might offer real
hope for deteriorating areas (assuming, for a moment, that the relevant
political hurdles could be overcome). If lost participation is the real problem,
nothing short of replacing or retaining that participation will prevent quality
declines.90
The importance of lost participation becomes particularly clear if we
consider exit to wholly private alternatives, which may not necessarily
involve an immediate negative impact on the funding of local public goods.
At first blush, opting out of public provision would seem, if anything,
generous. For example, each child who is placed in a private school
ostensibly reduces the financial burden on the public school system, while
the child's parents must continue to contribute their share to a public school
system from which they do not derive any consumption value.9' Not only
does this picture ignore the well-recognized problem that exit may drain
away voice (and ultimately money and service levels),9 but it also ignores
88. Buchanan, supra note 36, at 1 (arguing that "potentially-mobile central-city taxpayers who
contribute to net fiscal surplus must be deliberately induced to remain in the sharing community by
appropriate fiscal adjustments"); see also Gillette, supra note 1, at 1204-05 (discussing various
"bribes" to retain individuals who would otherwise choose to opt out).
89. Hirschman recognized the costs associated with this dynamic. See HIRScHMAN, supra note
3, at 100 ("Parents who plan to shift their children from public to private school may thereby
contribute to a further deterioration of public education."). For Hirschman, this deterioration might
be couched in terms of the loss of voice, although his observations are consistent with a broader
understanding of the participation losses imposed by exit.
90. This does not mean that would-be exiters must necessarily be retained. As will be
explained infra in subpart IV(A), there are two ways to obtain the necessary concentration of
quality-enhancing users in a particular user pool-either by attracting and retaining quality-
enhancing users or by transforming current users into quality-enhancing users.
91. Cf. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1213 (providing an example in which private snowplowing
reduces the costs that would otherwise be borne by taxpayers); see also id. at 1187 (discussing why
people are willing to opt for private provision when they "must still pay for the publicly provided
services of which they do not partake"). It should be noted that those who opt out while remaining
within a given community are in fact still partaking of the composite value associated with the local
public good, even if they choose to obtain consumption value privately. Similarly, childless
individuals receive composite value from their tax contributions to public education, even though
they receive no consumption value from the public school system. Both sets of individuals are also
affected by the capitalization of public school quality into property values. See FISCHEL, supra note
30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 6-12) (explaining that "no-kids voters" are motivated to support
public school spending because good schools increase their property value); id. (manuscript dated
Oct. 2000 at § 6-14) (presenting findings showing that home buyers take school quality into
account).
92. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1207-11 (discussing political costs that might be associated
with decisions to opt for private provision). These effects could be particularly strong if the users
who leave are the ones who would othervise be the most vocal. See HRSChIAN, supra note 3, at
45-46; see also Liebman, supra note 3, at 294-99. Money would also be directly drained away from
Texas Law Review
the costs that stem directly from the loss of a user who may be quite valuable
and quality enhancing. Because of these costs, and as a result of the strategic
dilemmas I will work through later in this Article, 93 it is indeed possible for
collective-action problems-free-riding-to occur even when no financial
support is withdrawn from the default pool.
Thus, when quality-enhancing users depart, real costs are imposed on
those left behind that cannot be rectified by changing the way that the local
public goods are funded or provided. People intuitively recognize that
leaving the public school system or entering a gated community has
consequences far greater than selecting a product from a supermarket shelf.
The hostility that many people feel towards those who opt for such private
alternatives likely reflects the intuition that making such choices is costly for
those left behind, in a way that transcends mere dollars. 4 The departure of
quality-enhancing users from a default pool is particularly costly insofar as it
sets in motion a chain reaction, both as to departures from the pool, and as to
cooperation within the pool.95 A decline in the ratio of quality-enhancing
users in the default pool spurs additional exits by quality enhancers. We can
assume there is something like a "tipping point"-a point at which the ratio
of quality-enhancing users drops below some critical threshold and triggers a
mass exodus.96 There may also be negative behavioral shifts among those
who stay within the pool. Even those users otherwise predisposed to quality-
enhancing behavior may lose hope of making a difference, and may stop
attempting to generate quality improvements from within.
97
Moreover, in the context of local public goods, exit may not act as a
viable feedback mechanism for spurring product improvements or as a
source of competitive "market-discipline" benefits. Because the consumers
are in large measure the product, people are not choosing or rejecting a
product that can be easily improved exogenously; rather, they are choosing
or rejecting each other. Exit in this context can be more accurately
the "losing" school to the extent that the departure of the student results in a withdrawal of any state
or federal funding that is allocated on a per capita basis.
93. See infra Part II.
94. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1190 (observing that "[t]he private institutions to which people
seeking to opt out have migrated are consistently under attack as exclusionary and elitist, if not
unconstitutional"); id. at 1190-91 n.27 (collecting sources attacking residential community
associations and other entities making use of private security forces).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65 & fig.1.
96. Cf Schelling, supra note 63, at 181 (defining "tipping" in the context of housing
segregation). In Figure 1, the tipping point would occur somewhere to the left of point C. Once C
or greater quality enhancers are present, an unambiguously acceptable level of quality has been
achieved. Because people have different tolerances for quality levels, any small upward or
downward shift in the range between B and C could set in motion a chain reaction that could either
drive the quality up to an unambiguously acceptable level or drive it down to a clearly unacceptable
level.
97. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zanir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the
Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 392-99 (1998) (suggesting that "hopelessness"
explains why people often fail to achieve collective goals).
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conceptualized as an elaborate "matching" exercise in which users match
themselves up with other users, and in which each ensuing shift in user pools
changes the product selections available to the remaining users.! Because
users are heterogeneous, matching equates to "sorting"--at least if exit is
easy and if groups are able to use exclusionary devices (such as admissions
criteria). The situation is not so much one of products competing for
consumers; rather, it is more a matter of consumers competing with each
other for spots in the best user pools. For this reason, exit cannot fully and
simultaneously empower all consumers. Some users will find themselves
unable to join desired user groups (because they are excluded), or, if
exclusion is prohibited, other users will find themselves unable to consume
their preferred product (which requires the ability to join with other quality-
enhancing users and to exclude quality detractors).
A simple thought experiment demonstrates this point. Imagine a room
filled with one hundred people, half of whom are excellent athletes and half
of whom are couch potatoes. Splitting the room randomly into two teams to
accomplish some physical task is likely to result in teams of roughly equal
ability. Imagine instead that each person in the room is given a voucher to
join either Team A or Team B, but that teams (as constituted at any point in
time) can choose to vote would-be members in or out. One would expect a
core group of athletes to quickly align themselves with one of the two teams
and to apply exclusionary admissions criteria to any persons who wished to
join. Other athletes, fearing that they might be left behind with the couch
potato contingent, would be expected to rapidly seek admission to the
"athlete" team. Couch potatoes might try to sneak onto the team as well, so
as to free-ride on the talents of the athletes. But if admission is controlled by
a current majority of athletes, the couch potatoes would not succeed in this
ploy. At the end of the day, and barring any confounding interpersonal
considerations or side payments, 9 one would expect to see a team of athletes
and a team of couch potatoes. The ability to join either team quickly
becomes constrained and cannot produce favorable competition that would
98. For a discussion of other "matching" exercises, see Alvin E. Roth, The Evolaiaon of the
Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POUT.
ECON. 991 (1984) (analyzing the matching game between medical students and hospitals); Stephen
R. Heifetz, Efficient Matching: Reforming the Market for Law Review Articles, 5 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 629 (1997) (analyzing the matching game between law reviews and authors). For goods like
education and neighborhood security, the matching exercise is greatly complicated by the fact that
quality is endogenously determined to a significant degree. In other words, one is not matching up
with an entity that may have a relatively fixed set of traits (at least in the short run), but rather with a
constantly changing group of fellow users.
99. If side payments were allowed, couch potatoes could try to recruit athletes to their team by
offering them cash signing bonuses. Cf. Rothschild & White, supra note 39, at 575-76 (discussing
the use of scholarships to attract particularly desirable students who will generate positive
externalities in higher-education settings). Giving less desirable user pools the wherewithal to
attract and retain more desirable members is indeed one possible strategy for improving those pools.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-69.
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"raise all boats" because the very means of competition is bound up in the
team's membership.'°
This example illustrates the polar case in which members constitute the
only relevant input. It is likely that other inputs have some significance in
the context of education and security. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
the exit mechanism can trigger the same sort of feedback loop for product
improvement in the public-goods context as it does in the context of ordinary
consumer goods. Unlike a manufacturer of a breakfast cereal who can use
the data generated by exit to design something more to consumers' tastes, a
local government or school district has relatively little ability to exogenously
raise product quality; instead, quality depends largely on the users
themselves. This means that measures designed to spur market-like
competition among providers-measures which would make perfect sense
with ordinary consumer goods-may not work to improve quality in the
local-public-goods context.' 0' On the contrary, the exit of quality-enhancing
users takes away a principal means by which product improvements might be
effectuated."'2
This is not to say that competitive forces and the possibility of exit are
completely irrelevant to quality. There is indeed empirical evidence
suggesting that areas containing more schools and school districts have
higher student-achievement levels, and economists have credited competition
with these favorable outcomes. 0 3  Assuming competition is really
responsible for the gains, 1' 4 that competition may take the form of
100. One might object that in the long run the couch potato team could improve itself by
undertaking an exercise regimen, cutting back on fatty foods, and the like. It is certainly true that
endogenous changes among users within a pool can improve the quality of the public good-in this
case, the team's performance. Indeed, I will argue that transforming users is one of the most
promising avenues for raising the quality of local public goods. See infra subpart I(C). The point
here is that merely empowering users to choose among pools does not itself lead to uniformly
improved public goods, but rather to sorting.
101. See infra subpart V(A) (discussing this point in the context of education vouchers).
102. In the consumer-goods context, the exit of too many users too quickly can drive a firm into
bankruptcy before it has a chance to respond. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that "if the
revenue decline exceeds a certain large percentage of normal sales volume, no recuperation
ensues-beyond a certain point, losses will weaken the firm so badly that bankruptcy will occur
before any remedial measures can take effect"). In the local-public-goods context, the exodus need
not be so dramatic to prevent recovery; each exiting quality-enhancing user not only takes away
revenue but also directly reduces the quality of the good, making it immediately less attractive to
the remaining users.
103. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 6-8) (collecting results
of several studies that find better standardized-test scores in areas with more school districts);
Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 90
AM. ECON. REv, 1209, 1236-37 (2000) (finding higher student achievement per dollar spent in
areas with a large number of school districts); Michael L. Marlow, Public Education Supply and
Student Performance, 29 APPLIED ECON. 617, 623-24 & tbl.3 (1997) (presenting findings that areas
with more schools and school districts have higher achievement-test scores).
104. It is possible that factors other than competition are responsible for some of these
differences. For example, parents may feel more empowered (or less trapped) where many school-
district choices exist; this empowerment may raise the quality of their participation. Or perhaps the
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endogenous competitive behavior among user pools rather than changes in
the exogenous package provided by school administrators. For example,
parents for whom exit from a particular school district is costly might pull
together and undertake cooperative tutoring sessions to raise or maintain test
scores. Their goal would be to make the school attractive to the "right" sort
of peers, thereby safeguarding the quality of the school over the long run. t
This sort of user-centered competition depends upon the costliness of exit for
at least some portion of the user pool. In any event, it is clear that the threat
of exit (or the threat of nonentrance of members of a mobile population) tW
operates somewhat differently in these contexts than it does for consumer
goods, due to the role of users in producing the product and the relative
ineffectiveness of exogenous inputs in raising quality.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, exit is in an important sense not
fully possible.10 7 While one can certainly opt out of a particular public
school or political subdivision, one cannot avoid consuming the public good
(or bad) that is produced through the composite consumption of all the users
throughout the entire relevant community. Nor does the creation of ever
smaller and more homogeneous "consumption clubs" within the public
sphere remove the members of such clubs from the effects of this composite
public good (or bad) on the larger community.1t 8 For this reason, all persons
within the relevant community retain an interest in the quality of all local
public goods within that community.1 9 For the same reason, law and policy
have a potential role to play in structuring the provision of, and ensuring the
quality of, these goods.
presence of many separately administered school districts yields a culture in which more
conversations about education occur, with implications for attitudes and achievement levels. In
other words, education may become more salient for the population as a whole when there are
various educational approaches in the vicinity for perusal and comparison. To the extent more
schools districts mean smaller schools, the independent impact of size should be taken into account
as well. See Marlow, supra note 103, at 623 (citing a study by Eberts, Schwartz. and Stone on the
inverse relationship between school size and student achievement); infra note 229 and
accompanying text (discussing potential impact of size of user pool on collective action within the
pool).
105. If we assume that test scores and other indicia of school quality are capitalized into
property values, this would also be a way of protecting one's investment in one's home. See
FISCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 6-14) (discussing homeowner's stake in
capitalization of test scores).
106. See id. (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 4-1) (explaining that the notion of "exit"
encompasses the failure to enter a particular community); see also id. (manuscript dated Oct. 2000
at § 3-12) (observing that the Tieboutian model of mobility is meaningful in assessing how people
who move for reasons unrelated to public services make choices among available communities).
107. See HIMSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 100 (discussing situation in which "full exit is
impossible" even after one stops consuming a particular product); id. at 101 ("The distinguishing
characteristic of these [public] goods is not only that they can be consumed by everyone, but that
there is no escape from consuming them unless one were to leave the community by which they are
provided'").
108. Cf. Buchanan, supra note 36, at 8 (describing out-migration into separate "fiscal clubs" for
joint consumption of goods).
109. See supra subpart I(A) (discussing composite value of publicly provided goods).
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II. Choosing a User Pool
Given the degree of interdependence between individual choices about
local public goods, it makes sense to turn to game theory for guidance."1
0
The first collective-action problem highlighted by a focus on user
participation involves making a choice among user pools. This choice can be
simplified to the binary option of staying in a default user pool ("staying
put") or choosing a private or other exclusive (e.g., suburban) alternative
("opting out"). Under current legal and institutional arrangements, opting
out costs some nontrivial amount of money and is accessible only to some
subset of the default pool population. For purposes of setting up the game, I
will initially suppress this fact by assuming that all players are capable of
opting out. Later, I will relax this assumption and consider the impact of
current arrangements on the collective-action problem I have outlined.
A. Cooperation and Consumption
The Stag Hunt Game"' provides a good starting point for thinking
about the strategic dilemmas involved in a quality-enhancing user's choice
among user pools. David Lewis provides the following description of the
dilemma:
Suppose we are in the wilderness without food. Separately we can
catch rabbits and eat badly. Together we can catch stags and eat well.
But if even one of us deserts the stag hunt to catch a rabbit, the stag
will get away; so the other stag hunters will not eat unless they desert
too. Each must choose whether to stay with the stag hunt or desert
according to his expectations about the others, staying if and only if no
one else will desert.112
There are some obvious parallels between the decision whether to opt
out of a default pool and the decision whether to abandon the stag hunt to
chase a rabbit. In both cases, the loss of participation makes things worse for
those left behind. Expectations about what others will do influence one's
choice: if one expects all the other quality-enhancing users to abandon a
110. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 8, at 132 (discussing the "important role for game
theory" in developing public-goods models).
11I. The Stag Hunt Game gets its name from a passage in Rousseau:
If a deer was to be taken, everyone saw that, in order to succeed, he must abide
faithfully by his post; but if a hare happened to come within the reach of them, it is not
to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, and, having seized his prey, cared
very little, if by so doing he caused his companions to miss theirs.
JEAN JACQUES RoussEAu, ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 349 (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1952), quoted
in EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 121 n.15 (1977). The payoff
structure of the Stag Hunt Game is identical to one variation of the Assurance Game. See infra note
135; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at 392 n.40 (discussing two different variations of the
Assurance Game).
112. DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION 7 (1969), quoted in ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note
111, at 121.
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particular user pool, one's best strategy is to do likewise. The local-public-
goods situation arguably resembles the stag hunt in a third respect as well-
the best outcome can be achieved if everyone cooperates by staying put. In
the stag hunt, this greater good is the more filling stag meal.' 13 Coordination
in the local-public-goods context might be expected to maximize the
composite, community-wide value associated with a good like education,
while also securing a consumption good of relatively high quality for each
individual. In this sense, it can be said that we are all better off by
cooperating.
It is easy to see that the parallel between the stories breaks down at this
point. Unlike the superior good which one can enjoy only through
cooperation in the stag hunt, the composite value associated with a safe or
well-educated populace is enjoyed equally by those who contribute to its
production by staying in the default pool and by those who opt for another
alternative. In other words, one cares about the "stag" of community-wide
safety or education being brought down, but one has no particular interest in
participating in its demise. For one's own consumption purposes, the
"rabbit"-a private or suburban education, for example-is preferred.
Moreover, the goal of a safe or well-educated public can still be successfully
achieved even if some percentage of players defects. In short, it is in
everyone's interest to have these larger targets successfully pursued, but in
nobody's interest to be in the hunting party that does the pursuing.
Another major difference concerns the heterogeneity of the participants
in the local-public-goods "game." To put it into the language of the stag
hunt, some participants are skilled hunters who can easily catch a rabbit or
can contribute greatly to the killing of the stag-these hunters are the quality
enhancers who also have the wherewithal to opt out of the default pool.
Other participants lack the capacity to pursue rabbits, although they may be
able to make contributions to killing a stag-these are quality-enhancing
people who are unable to leave the default pool. Finally, there are
participants whose presence threatens the success of the hunting party: not
only are they inept at hunting-they also scare away stags and may even lob
stray arrows at their fellow hunters. These rogue hunters--quality
detractors-provide yet another compelling incentive for quality-enhancing
users to opt for rabbit hunting.
114
Although the Stag Hunt Game helps to illuminate certain aspects of the
local-public-goods dilemma, it is obviously not a perfect fit. This is so
113. If a better good were not possible through cooperation, the Stag Hunt would not present a
coordination game at all; everyone would simply hunt rabbits from the outset and would be quite
happy to do so. Likewise, if one accepts a privatization model for public goods, in which everyone
can do just as well providing for themselves as they can by coordinating, there would be no strategic
dilemma presented at all.
114. Of course, those who opt out of a default pool do not truly "go it alone" as the rabbit-
hunting image would suggest but instead join other, more exclusive groups-the equivalent of
private hunting parties.
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because citizens receive a two-part payoff associated with the local public
goods under discussion-one part corresponding to the consumption value (if
any) they receive from consuming the good in question, and the second part
corresponding to the composite value that is generated by the overall pattern
of consumption of this good throughout the community.115 The first of these,
consumption value, is directly determined by one's choice of user pools-for
example, the school one chooses for one's children. The second part of the
payoff, composite value, is sensitive to the overall pattern of choices that
individuals throughout the larger community make about user pools.
One way to conceptualize the dilemma created by this two-part payoff
is to think of the chooser as simultaneously juggling two roles: that of a
consumer and that of a citizen.1t6 In her consumer role, she cares about the
consumption value of the good: whether her children are getting a good
education, or whether her family is safe in their neighborhood. In her citizen
role she cares about composite value: whether all children are generally
getting a good education, or whether all people are generally safe in
community neighborhoods. Because of the role of participation and the fact
that users are heterogeneous, these two roles may conflict with each other to
some degree.
A helpful contrast is found in an example presented by James
Buchanan-that of an inoculation against a serious communicable disease. 
t7
In such a case, the private aspects of the good are in alignment with their
public (spillover) aspects. 18 By acting as a good consumer and getting a
shot to protect oneself, one is also acting as a good citizen by helping to
protect everyone else against the spread of the disease. One might initially
think that the same thing would hold true for a good such as education. After
all, by getting the best possible education for one's own children, one is
certainly contributing in some degree to "an educated populace." However,
115. See supra subpart I(A) (discussing these two components of value); see also TERRY M,
MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PuBuC 275 (2001) (noting that the decision of a
parent as to whether or not to support vouchers "is made up of two components, one social and one
personal-and the personal component may be quite influential in their thinking").
116. Terry Moe recently found this citizen-consumer framework to be descriptive of public
school parents' judgments about education vouchers. See MOE, supra note 115, at 288 (explaining
that parents making judgments about vouchers "appear to be combining two roles: they are
consumers, concerned about their own personal interests, and they are citizens, concerned about
society as a whole"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 923-25 (1996) (positing that individuals may desire different outcomes and follow different
norms in the role of a citizen than they do in the role of a consumer). But see Lewinsohn-Zamir,
supra note 97, at 380-91 (criticizing the consumer-citizen distinction).
117. BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 181.
118. See id. (suggesting that distribution of a scarce inoculation drug based solely on its private-
goods aspects will lead to an efficient result). In Buchanan's view, it is not possible to improve on
the distribution produced by the market, since each person's consumption of the Inoculation
provides the same spillover benefits to the rest of the population (assuming the distribution pattern
does not itself impact the spillover effects). Id. & n.6.
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the dynamic of multiple user pools within a given community makes this
analysis a bit too facile. In the case of local public goods such as education,
one may find the best consumption value in a homogeneous enclave or in a
private setting. But by withdrawing one's participation from the "default"
educational setting, the quality of that default option diminishes, with
deleterious long-term impacts on the composite value of the public good in
question.
Because these two roles are in conflict, it matters how heavily each is
weighted. I do not assume that the consumer role will automatically win out,
but it is very likely to do so in the settings I am discussing here-education
and neighborhood security. In these contexts, it is often the consumer's
children (rather than the consumer herself) who will enjoy the direct benefits
of consumption or who will bear the burden of consuming a substandard
product. This is self-evident in the case of education. Moreover, one of the
primary reasons people choose to move to a suburb (or a gated community)
is for the perceived safety of their children." 9 Any individual may operate
under a number of different codes and may well be willing to sacrifice
ordinary sorts of narrow self-interest to the public good.1t ' But one's role as
a parent usually decisively overrides all other moral codes.'2'
In other words, concern for the community at large (composite value)
will often pale next to concerns about one's own child (consumption value).
Even so, it is likely that at least some people take an enlightened enough
view of self-interest to recognize the significance of composite value to their
own long-term well-being. Among people for whom a concern about
composite value is sufficiently strong, a strategic dilemma evolves which
may have the structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma.'2 The next section
formalizes this dilemma.
119. See, e.g., Roy Hayhurst, In Gates We Trust, DALLAS MORNING NE%\S, Mar. 29, 1998, at
9A (quoting a gated-community member who explains, "[w]e live in a gated community for
comfort and security because we have four children"); Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center:
Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban Fear, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45, 51-56
(2001) (presenting and discussing interview excerpts in which gated-community residents indicate
that fear for their children was a primary factor motivating their residential decisions).
120. STRETrON & ORCHARD, supra note 7, at 13.
121. See CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ExEcUTIVE 267-68 (1937) (describing a
typical man with a stringent set of potentially conflicting moral codes, who will "kill, steal, cheat
the government, rob the church" for the sake of his children), quoted in STRErN & ORCHARD,
supra note 7, at 13; see also MOE, supra note 115, at 287-88 (finding, based on empirical data, that
parents considering vouchers are not "driven mainly by naked self-interest" but that "self-interest is
far more important than political science would lead us to believe").
122. The Prisoner's Dilemma is based on a stock story involving the interrogation of two
prisoners. Although the prisoners would do better jointly if both refused to testify against the other,
each faces a payoff schedule in which he does better by testifying, no matter what the other prisoner
does. As a result, the dominant strategy is for both to testify. The mathematician A.W. Tucker is
credited with developing the model. See CHARLES J. GoEiZ, LAW AND ECONoMtCS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 8-17 (1984).
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B. The "Choice of Pool" Game
To illustrate how the strategic dilemma might play out in the case of
education, 123 I will start with a two-person game modeling the decision
whether to "stay put" in an inner-city public school or "opt out" to a private
or suburban school or home-schooling alternative. 124 Next, I will model a
slightly more realistic multiparty game.
1. Two-Person Game.-The participants in our two-person game are
two individual heads of household, Rudy and Carrie. Both have children,
and must decide whether to stay put in the urban public school or opt out to a
private school, suburban school, or home-schooling alternative. Both Rudy
and Carrie are truly capable of opting out; this is neither forbidden by
prevailing legal structures nor foreclosed to them due to financial
pressures. 125  Both are also relatively enlightened and other-regarding
individuals. They care not only about the consumption value of education
received by their respective children but also about the composite value of
education throughout the larger community. In addition, I will make the
following simplifying assumptions:
(1) Rudy, Carrie, and their respective children will be quality enhancers
in whatever school they decide upon. In other words, their
propensity to cooperate within the pool will not be affected by their
choice of whether or not to stay in the pool.
(2) The preferences of Rudy and Carrie are identical and symmetrical.
The decision of whether or not to opt out has only to do with matters
of relative and absolute educational quality (as defined below), and
not with other factors (such as a preference for religious training
unavailable in the public schools).
123. A similarly structured game might be developed to understand decisions about
neighborhood security-that is, whether to "stay put" in an urban neighborhood or "opt out" to a
private alternative (such as a gated community with a private security force) or another jurisdiction
(such as a suburb). Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100
COLuM. L. REv. 1965, 1991-93 (2000) (presenting three alternative game matrices modeling the
"stay/leave" decision in the context of housing segregation).
124. The contrast I draw here between an "inner city" and a wealthy suburb is admittedly
something of a stereotype and is certainly not descriptive of all modem urban situations. See
generally ALEX MARSHALL, How CITIES WORK: SUBURBS, SPRAWL, AND THE ROADS NOT
TAKEN (2000) (discussing the changing roles of cities and suburbs). In some places, the central city
has become a locus of wealth where people affirmatively choose to live, while some suburban areas
are occupied by those with less money and less choice. My reliance on this dichotomy stems only
from its long familiarity as a shorthand way to refer to areas of relative advantage and disadvantage.
The basic choice situation described here remains applicable, regardless of where the relatively
disadvantaged and advantaged areas lie geographically.
125. It does not matter whether we think of opting out as costless or whether we simply view
the payoffs given for opting out as being net of any costs associated with exercising that option.
126. To the extent these other factors account for a significant proportion of the opting out that
actually occurs, this framework will be of less descriptive value. About twelve percent of school-
aged children in the United States attend private schools (a figure that has remained relatively stable
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(3) As in the real world, Rudy and Carrie will be able to adjust their own
behavior based on the choice the other person has made. In other
words, there are repeated rounds of play, the players take turns
making decisions, and each player can see what the other player has
done during his or her latest turn.127
(4) Educational quality is rated "rotten," "decent," or "good." By these
terms, I mean to designate not only the quality of academic programs
and the associated educational outcomes but also other important
factors that are predicates to achieving those outcomes (safety,
discipline, and a good learning environment).
(5) Another dimension of educational value is designated by the term
"exclusive." This offers a proxy for factoring in the importance of
the perceived relative quality of education.'2 People care not only
about the absolute quality of their children's education but also about
how that education stacks up to that received by relevant others.17
9
since 1940), and of these, almost eighty-five percent attend religiously affiliated schools. JOHNI F.
WITTE, THE MARKEr APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S FIRST VOUCHER
PROGRAM 5-6 (2000). But it is unclear how many parents sending their children to religiously
affiliated private schools are motivated to do so by the religious environment per so, rather than by
other user-pool, curricular, or disciplinary considerations. The growing number of non-Catholics in
Catholic parochial schools suggests that nonreligious motivations play a role. See Timothy Egan,
The Changing Face of Catholic Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,2000, at 28. LEXIS, News Library.
NYT File (reporting that the percentage of non-Catholics in Catholic schools has increased more
than four-fold in the past 30 years, to 13.4 percent and observing that in the Archdiocese of New
York, the figure is 20 percent). In any event, the vast majority of "opting out" involves a move to a
suburban public school rather than to a private school. See Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprmvl: Not
Just an Enviromnental Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301,327 (2000) (noting that most parents prefer to
"move to suburbia and send their children to 'good' ... public schools for free" rather than "stay in
cities and spend thousands of dollars on private schools").
127. See Oliver et al., supra note 57, at 524-25 (discussing sequential decisionmaking and
interdependence of decisions in contributions to public goods).
128. See generally Richard McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE U. 1 (1992)
(discussing the importance of preferences for a higher relative position). To the extent an exclusive
private or suburban school gives its students a competitive advantage in further educational or
employment opportunities, it will be more highly valued, whether or not it is actually of higher
quality in absolute terms. It is unclear whether such a preference for exclusivity would be present to
the same degree in the context of neighborhood security; if it were not, this might present a
difference in the payoff structures and dominant strategies for the two local public goods.
129. In this two-person game, I am assuming the only relevant "other" for comparison purposes
is the other player in the game (who can also opt out). If the two parties agree to cooperate,
therefore, concerns about another party's gaining an advantage are eliminated. In a more realistic
multiparty game, there would be many "others" to be concerned about, and it would not be possible
to eliminate concerns about relative position so easily. The attractiveness of the cooperative
solution would drop accordingly. Finally, a concern for relative position could cut the other way
(leading quality-enhancing users to stay in the default pool) if they perceived the universe of
relevant others as being limited to those within their own user pool (rather than all those viewed as
relevantly like themselves throughout the larger community). See generally ROBERT H. FRANK,
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985). Where
important benefits (including intangible status rewards) are awarded based on one's position within
a given user pool, this may well affect one's decision about which pool to join. See infra note 168
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Thus, in our two-person game, an education that is "good" in
absolute terms can be "good and exclusive" (if only one player
receives a good education) or "good and equal" (if both players
receive a good education). 130
(6) If both Rudy and Carrie stay put, their (and their children's)
participation will ensure a good quality education in the default
school. If only one or the other opts out, the remaining player will
still be able to keep the school quality at the "decent" level. If,
however, both opt out, the public school quality will fall to "rotten."
In other words, I am assuming that some critical mass of quality
enhancers will keep the public schools "good," and that some smaller
number of quality enhancers is necessary to keep the schools
"decent."
131
(7) Rudy and Carrie are quite enlightened and other-regarding, but they
are also very concerned about the education of their children. They
recognize that their decisions about whether to opt out or stay put
will have consequences, and they further recognize that the "payoff'
they receive from the decision on this matter will be made up of two
components: consumption value and composite value. I will assume
(somewhat arbitrarily, but not altogether implausibly) that their
payoffs run as follows for these two components:
Consumption Component
Rotten education for my child = -2
Decent education for my child =2
Good (and equal) education for my child = 5
Good (and exclusive) education for my child = 7
Composite Component
Rotten education throughout community as a whole = 0
Decent education throughout the community as a whole = 2
Good education throughout community as a whole = 3
As this schedule indicates, I am assuming that the consumption and
composite payoffs are independent of each other-in other words, that the
and accompanying text (discussing preferential college-admissions treatment for a top percentage of
students in each high school).
130. In a multiparty game, matters get considerably more complex. I will assume that a good
education achieved by opting out is made more valuable because of its exclusivity. The placement
of the curve in Figure 3, infra, reflects this assumption. Likewise, I will assume that a good
education achieved in the default pool will be rendered marginally "less good" by the fact that
someone else is receiving an education that is more exclusive.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 57-65 & Fig. 1.
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education Rudy's and Carrie's children receive will remain unaffected by the
quality of the education received by others throughout the society.1n I have
also made the possible payoff range for the consumption component larger
than that for the composite component, which reflects the intuition that
people have a much larger stake in the former. In other words, my payoff
structure assumes that people care a good deal more about what happens to
their own kids than what happens with education in the community at large.
Those valuations, in combination with the other assumptions outlined
above, yield the payoff grid shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2.
Payoffs for (Rudy, Carrie)
Carrie Stays Put Carrie Opts Out
Rudy Stays Put 8,8 4,9
(5+3,5+3) (2+2,7+2)
Rudy Opts Out 9,4 5,5
(7+2,2+2) (5+0,5+0)
Each payoff is the sum of two figures: one which represents the utility
derived from consumption of education and another which represents the
utility derived from the composite provision of education. The first set of
numbers in each cell shows total payoffs for Rudy, and then for Carrie. I
then repeat these payoffs in parentheticals, showing the two components of
the payoff (consumption value + composite value).
The game, set up in this fashion, is a typical Prisoner's Dilemma. First,
look at things from Rudy's point of view. No matter what Carrie does, Rudy
is better off opting out. If Carrie stays put, Rudy can do better by opting
out-he can reap both the benefits of a decent public school system and a
good (and exclusive) education for his own children (total payoff of 9).
Staying put would reduce his payoff to 8. Even though it would make the
public school system "good" rather than merely "decent," his children would
receive only a "good and equal" education rather than the "good and
exclusive" education available by opting out. Of course, if Carrie is going to
opt out, Rudy has an even greater incentive to opt out as well; otherwise, he
132. While this assumption seems plausible across some range, there would likely be a point
where the low quality of the surrounding education would have such severe spillover effects as to
effectively reduce the payoff associated with the consumption component-as well as to impose an
additional set of costs on society not captured in the game as currently formulated.
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will be bearing the burden of keeping the public schools "decent," while
downgrading his children's education to merely "decent." Meanwhile,
Carrie gets the benefit of decent public schools while securing an exclusive
education for her own children. While Rudy considers himself enlightened,
he is not about to put the good of the community above the education of his
kids.
Things look identical from Carrie's point of view. The result is that
opting out is the dominant strategy for both, making the lower right-hand cell
the equilibrium solution. In that cell, most kids get a rotten education, but
Rudy's and Carrie's kids get a good education. 33 The total combined payoff
associated with the lower right cell is the lowest of the bunch. Rudy and
Carrie could collectively do much better if they could agree to stay put
(again, assuming enlightened preferences), but the temptation to defect is
enormous. Opting out while the other stays in offers the best of both worlds
and the highest individual payoff. The person who opts out is free-riding on
the other participant's work on behalf of the public schools and can glean the
community-wide benefits without contributing to them. All the while, the
person who opts out is able to secure her kids an exclusive education and a
competitive advantage in the lottery of life.
This game structure and the resulting dominant strategy depend on the
specific payoffs I have built into the example, which depend in turn on a
number of assumptions about the players that would not hold true for
everyone. One could easily imagine different orderings of subjective
valuations that would turn the game into Chicken,134 an Assurance Game,
t35
or a straightforward nongame situation. 36 In addition, the payoffs can be
133. Notice that the payoff they receive in the lower right-hand cell is the "good and equal"
payoff. Since both players in the two-person game now receive the same education, it is arguably
no longer "exclusive." In a multiparty game, of course, relatively large numbers of people could
opt out before the benefits of exclusivity would start to erode.
134. "Chicken" gets its name from a dangerous automobile game in which two cars drive
toward each other on a straight stretch of road. The first driver to swerve is a "chicken" and loses
the game. Of course, losing the game in this fashion is a better outcome, even for that driver, than if
neither driver swerved and the cars crashed into each other. See GILTE & BAKER, supra note 3,
at 38 n.6.
135. The Assurance Game is identical to the Stag Hunt in that the best outcome for an
individual occurs when the other party also cooperates. The worst outcome for an individual occurs
when that individual cooperates but her opponent does not. The rank ordering of the other two
outcomes (universal noncooperation and individual noncooperation while the other player
cooperates) varies in different formulations of the game. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at
392 nn.39-40 and sources cited therein (describing the Assurance Game and noting variations of it),
Amartya Sen is credited with formulating the "Assurance Problem." Amartya K. Sen, Isolation,
Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114 (1967).
136. If cooperative action cannot provide a joint higher payoff for the players, there is no
possibility of gains through cooperation and thus no "game" at all. Instead, there is only an obvious
choice between ranked alternatives. For example, I attribute a large degree of enlightenment and
other-regarding preferences to Rudy and Carrie. For many people, the consumption component of
the payoff might so utterly dwarf the composite component as to make the latter irrelevant. In such
a case, parties that could realize a higher consumption through opting out would simply do so; if
their utility is not sensitive to composite value, no form of collective action could provide a greater
joint payoff.
Beyond Exit and Voice
affected by norms, laws, agreements, and other factors, as will be discussed
presently; this can also transform the game from a Prisoner's Dilemma into
another sort of game altogether. 37 Nevertheless, the scenario set forth above
demonstrates that under at least some imaginable circumstances it is possible
even for people who care deeply about the community to find themselves in a
situation where their dominant strategy is to opt out.
2. Multiparty Gamne.-Of course, games about goods such as education
and security are never played between just two individuals; rather, they
involve the interaction of relatively large groups of individuals.1 3s We can
still assume that, at least within some range, individuals' decisions to stay put
would have a positive impact on composite value, while decisions to opt out
would have a negative impact. However, the quality of education likely does
not depend in a directly linear fashion on the number of quality-enhancing
persons making the cooperative choice of staying put.) Across some
portion of the continuum, one individual's cooperation or defection might
add or subtract little or nothing in terms of quality, while at other points one
individual's cooperation or defection might result in a rather dramatic change
in quality. Figure 1 presented one possible way in which quality might
correspond to the number of quality-enhancing users. Figure 3, based on
diagrams developed by Thomas Schelling, 14 shows how this might translate
into a framework for deciding whether to stay put or to opt out in a
multiparty game.
Figure 3.
Utility
0
Number of Other
Users Staying Put M
137. See infra subpart II(C).
138. It is important to clarify here that I am still discussing the "choice of pool" interaction, not
the interaction among members of a given pool. The latter, which will become important later, see
infra Part Il, is being bracketed out of the analysis for now.
139. See supra Fig. 1 and accompanying text.
140. See SCHELLING, supra note 57, at 220-43; see also JON ELSTER, THE CE,-ENT OF
SOCIErY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 27-30 & fig.1.5 (1989) (discussing and applying Schelling's
work).
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In Figure 3, the vertical axis represents utility, viewed from the
perspective of an individual decisionmaker, Ingrid. I will assume that Ingrid
shares all of the preferences that were previously attributed to Rudy and
Carrie. 14 1 The horizontal axis represents the number of other players who are
making the cooperative choice-in this case, staying put. The curve marked
O tracks Ingrid's utility if she opts out. As the upward path of the curve
indicates, her utility increases as more players choose to stay put. This
occurs because the people staying put are contributing to the composite
value, which forms part of Ingrid's payoff. The curve marked S tracks
Ingrid's utility if she chooses to stay put. Again, the greater the number of
other people staying put, the better she does. Because Ingrid's children are
consuming education in the default pool under this scenario, the cooperation
of others boosts not only the composite value that makes up part of Ingrid's
payoff but also Ingrid's own consumption value. This results in a steeper
slope for curve S, especially across the critical middle range.
As drawn, the graph depicts a typical multiparty Prisoner's Dilemma.
No matter what everyone else does-that is, no matter how many others opt
out and how many others stay put-Ingrid always does better by opting out.
The utility gap is particularly large if few others cooperate, because this
results in a markedly inferior education in the default pool. But even if
everyone else cooperates (bringing the schools up to an acceptable level),
Ingrid can still do a little better by opting out. This will enable her to obtain
a slightly more exclusive education for her children, which will win them a
competitive edge over those in the default pool.
Significantly, the payoff schedule shown in Figure 3 is based on the
specific preferences and assumptions associated with Ingrid, which would
not necessarily be shared by other quality enhancers facing the same choice.
For example, I am assuming that Ingrid, like Rudy and Carrie in the earlier
example, has no difficulty opting out-we can think of opting out as being
costless for her, or we can simply think of the cost as already being netted
out of the payoff schedule shown in Figure 3. Opting out is, of course, costly
under current institutional arrangements and is not available to everyone.
We might think of another individual who could not afford to opt out at all.
For her, the 0 curve would simply not appear as an option and she would
face no game or dilemma. The decisions of others in the game would have
an impact on this individual's utility, and her S curve would slope
accordingly, but she would be locked into the stay-put solution. For another
person, opting out might be attainable but would come at a very high cost
(perhaps he would have to work a second job or take out a loan with a very
high interest rate). Because the 0 curve reflects the net utility associated
with opting out, that person's higher costs associated with opting out would
shift the curve downward. 142 This could make staying put his dominant
141. Presently, I will consider the possibility that individuals may have (or may develop)
different sets of preferences.
142. The subsidy for a public-school education has the effect of reducing the cost of both the
stay-put option and certain opt-out options (i.e., suburban schools). This would have the effect of
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strategy across the board, or it might become dominant once some number of
other quality-enhancing users also decided to stay put.
I am also assuming that Ingrid assigns some importance to composite
value. Indeed, this is what makes her utility responsive to changes in the
number of other cooperators even when she is opting out. However, she also
values consumption value fairly highly. In contrast, another individual might
weight consumption value so much more heavily than composite value that
composite value would not factor in at all. Such a person's 0 curve would
be flat, because it would not depend to any degree on the number of other
people remaining in the default pool. On the other hand, there are some
individuals who weight composite value extremely heavily (or perhaps value
signaling to the world that they weight composite value extremely heavily),
so they would choose the stay-put option no matter what, even if this meant
sacrificing consumption value. For example, one might think of President
Carter's decision to send his daughter to public schools in the District of
Columbia, despite the ready availability of alternatives that would (at least by
some accounts) have offered higher consumption value.143 For such people,
the S curve would lie above the 0 curve at all points.
In addition, I am assuming that Ingrid cares somewhat about her
position relative to others. For this reason, she will choose to opt out even in
the situation where enough other cooperators have raised the quality level of
the default school into the acceptable range. Another individual might value
membership in the diverse default community more highly than attaining a
higher relative position than those in the default pool. For that person, the 0
curve would drop down below the S curve (making staying put his preferred
strategy) in the far right-hand portion of Figure 3, where many cooperators
have ensured an acceptable default school.1;2 These are only a few examples
of the many ways in which user heterogeneity might affect the collective-
action problem. In addition to differences between users, it is also likely that
changes in utility schedules may occur over time within the same user.
Preferences may shift, perhaps as a result of positive or negative experiences
in a given situation or with particular other users. At the point when an
individual is making the decision of whether to stay put or opt out, the utility
associated with the opt-out choice is really a prediction, just as the utility
assigned to the stay-put option is a projection based on current information.
To the extent financial circumstances play a role in the decision, this too may
change for a given user over time.
placing the respective curves higher on the graph than they would otherwise be. I am making the
simplifying assumption that there is a single opt-out opportunity available to a given individual. In
reality, there are a variety of public and private alternatives, as well as self-produced options such as
home-schooling-each of which would present a different mix of costs and benefits. In a more
detailed depiction of the problem, one might include separate curves for each of these various
options.
143. For more information on the Carters' decision, see Merrill Sheils, A School for Amy,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1976, at 61.
144. In such a case, the situation would amount to an Assurance Game. See supra note 135.
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The point marked M has special significance. From Ingrid's
perspective, this represents the number of other cooperators she would need
to join up with in staying put to achieve a result that she would prefer to the
outcome she would receive in a world where everyone opts out. 145 In other
words, an M-sized group acting together could generate a better outcome for
Ingrid than the mass-defection option would generate for Ingrid. If we
assume that there are at least M others who face a payoff schedule similar to
Ingrid's, the potential would exist for everyone in an M-sized group to better
their lot by acting collectively.1 46 Yet there is little incentive to organize
such a group, particularly if one suspects that some other coalition will form
to do the same thing. Assuming such a cooperative coalition does exist, one
clearly does better if one is not a part of it; the people opting out at point M
end up doing even better than those staying put. 41 It is possible to think of
the situation as a Chicken Game among all possible M-sized groups, in
which the worst outcome for all concerned would be the one in which no M-
sized group stays put. But, of course, Chicken is won by precommiting not
to provide the good in question. There is also the problem of how to get the
M-sized group together in the first place. For any group smaller than M
members end up worse off than in a world where everyone opts out.44
Unless a mechanism exists to make cooperation contingent on obtaining the
necessary group size, it may be impossible ever to form a sufficient coalition.
And, of course, group heterogeneity further complicates coalition-building
efforts.
One more point about Figure 3 bears mention. This Figure assumes that
even in a world in which no quality enhancers cooperate by staying put,
Ingrid can still do much better by opting out. No matter how horrible schools
or neighborhoods may be in some places, those who remove themselves from
those bad schools or neighborhoods can achieve some relief, even though
they continue to be affected by spillovers in the form of lower composite
value. At the extreme, this proposition might become empirically
questionable. If there truly were neighborhoods and schools devoid of any
quality-enhancing users, this could have such dramatic effects on the entire
surrounding community that it would become increasingly difficult to wall
145. See ELSTER, supra note 140, at 28 (identifying this as the point of "self-sustaining
cooperation"). If one assumes that group members share homogeneous preferences, as Elster seems
to do, it would be correct to say that this number of cooperators would each do better than they
would do under a world of universal defection. If group members are heterogeneous, other group
members might require a group of either more or less than M other cooperators in order to make
them better off than they would be in a world of universal defection.
146. See id. These other group members could either have a payoff schedule identical to
Ingrid's, or they could have a payoff schedule in which even less cooperation yields them a better
result than universal defection.
147. See id. (noting that even though cooperators will do at least as well in this situation as they
would in a world of universal noncooperation, "[tihe noncooperators will, of course, do even
better").
148. See it at 29 (noting that even if a smaller group is "bound to each other with the strongest
bonds of loyalty, they will perceive that cooperation is pointless-it is essentially dissipated among
the noncooperators-and disband").
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oneself off and achieve a higher consumption value in a private or suburban
setting. For example, societal order might break down so completely that the
crime and disorder spilling out of the worst neighborhoods and schools
would make life unlivable for the entire relevant community. If this were the
case, the 0 and S curves would actually meet at the far left-hand side of
Figure 3, creating a game of Chicken with even higher stakes than the one
just described.
Whatever the precise shape of the curves, society has a large stake in
ensuring that some collective block of quality-enhancing individuals stays
put. But few people have an individual interest in being among those who
stay in the default pool. In the section that follows, I will explore some of
the ways that legal rules and societal arrangements operate (or might operate)
to achieve the desired result. For example, if opting out requires purchasing
a market-rationed private alternative or paying the minimum housing price to
join an exclusive suburb, financial barriers to exit will essentially "trap" a
large segment of the population in any given default pool. If there are
enough quality-enhancing users in this segment to ensure quality, society's
worst outcome is avoided, albeit inequitably. It would be as if society had
made lower- and middle-class quality enhancers the "designated swervers" in
the incipient game of Chicken.
C. Locks, Bribes, Norms, and Pacts
There are several potential strategies which, alone or in combination,
might solve the collective-action problem just outlined. These strategies fall
into four broad and somewhat overlapping categories-locks, bribes, norms,
and pacts. The first three of these can be viewed as altering the relative
payoffs associated with the two options facing a quality-enhancing individual
in the opting-out game, while the fourth involves addressing the dilemma
through concerted action.
Figure 4 shows how increasing the utility associated with the
cooperative solution would change the game:
Figure 4.
Utility
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Recall that the S curve represents the stay-put cooperative choice. If the
utility associated with this choice were increased across the board for a given
individual to S1, that individual would find himself facing an Assurance
Game rather than a Prisoner's Dilemma. In other words, the individual can
do best by cooperating (staying put), provided at least M other people also
stay put. A policy or legal change that made opting out less attractive or
more costly could have the same result, if it shifted the 0 curve to a similar
position relative to the S curve. If the game's payoffs can be changed in this
fashion so that cooperation is a dominant strategy, provided enough other
people cooperate, the fourth strategy, pacts, could have an especially
important role to play. While it might be possible for people to join together
and act collectively even in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, agreements are
more likely to offer a viable and stable solution where an Assurance Game is
involved. Once the required number of participants are cooperating, there is
no longer any temptation to defect.
1. Locks.-One obvious response to collective-action problems like the
opting-out game is to lock the participants into the cooperative strategy-in
other words, force them to stay put. A literal example of this principle was
recounted by Thomas Schelling: In World War I, German soldiers were
sometimes chained to their machine guns so that they could not act on an
impulse to flee.149 Similarly, Edna Ullmann-Margalit has observed that two
mortarmen ensnared in a strategic dilemma in which each has an incentive to
desert would find it in their mutual interest to have mines laid around their
area so that neither of them could desert.1 50  This obviously operates to
change the payoff associated with deserting such that staying to fight
becomes the dominant solution.
One might similarly think that somehow locking users into the default
pool would be an obvious solution to the "choice of pool" problem. 15t The
most secure kind of lock-simply forbidding people to leave a given school
149. THOMAS C. SCHEL.ING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 196 (1984).
150. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 111, at 32 (observing that this solution "effectively
eliminates the possibility of desertion, and consequently each is happy to stay by his mortar and
fight, knowing that the other has in fact no alternative but to fight too, with the result that the attack
is repelled and they both stay alive").
151. Indeed, Hirschman and others have recognized that blocking exit is often the best way to
ensure effective voice. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 79 ("Specific institutional barriers to exit can
often be justified on the ground that they serve to stimulate voice in deteriorating, yet recuperable
organizations which would be prematurely destroyed through free exit."); id. at 45 (noting that if the
most vocal customers are the first to leave, this suggests that "voice would be an effective
recuperation mechanism only in conditions of full monopoly 'when the customers are securely
locked in'); see also Liebman, supra note 3, at 302 (arguing that locking people into the public
schools might be the most effective way of maximizing voice and thereby improving those schools).
Whether or not it would also ensure effective participation is less certain; this will depend in part on
the outcome of the second collective-action problem this Article addresses-the interaction within
the user pool. See infra Part III. However, so that we can examine the locking mechanism as a
solution to our first collective-action problem, I will assume for present purposes that quality-
enhancing users will remain quality-enhancing users whether they are in the default pool voluntarily
or whether they are locked into that pool. This assumption will later be relaxed. See infra Part IV.
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or neighborhood-is both out of bounds constitutionally and out of reach
politically.152 But there are many other legal and structural features that
operate, or potentially could operate, as locking (or at least "sticking")
mechanisms for some subset of users. Perhaps the most important of these
are the financial hurdles that individuals must surmount in order to opt for a
private or suburban alternative. Exit from the default user pool is not
costless under the present system and is not possible for a large subset of the
population. One must either be able to afford the "entry fee" to a suburban
life-which often requires spending more on housing-or one must be able
to pay for a private alternative to the publicly provided good. Because not
everyone has the resources to take advantage of either alternative, many who
desire to leave will be unable to do so. Yet lowering the barriers to exit
would have the effect of further decreasing the quality of the default option.
Conversely, raising the barriers to exit would trap more quality-enhancing
users in the default pool and raise the quality of the good. But there are other
factors that make such barrier-raising problematic and inequitable. 53
The current system of free public education works to subsidize the
cooperative choice. Taxpayers must pay for this public option, whether or
not they end up actually selecting it. At least to the extent people compare
private alternatives with the public alternative available in the default pool,
this subsidization will make the latter compare more favorably than it
otherwise might154 Such financial locks can alter the payoffs encountered by
at least some of the players in the opting-out game, and thus, change their
dominant strategy. If the cost of opting out becomes prohibitively expensive
for particular players, they are no longer faced with a dilemma in any
meaningful sense of the word (though they certainly may feel unhappy with
the outcome). In such a case, their only option is to stay put.
Another set of lock-in possibilities would involve providing a
mechanism whereby quality-enhancing users take turns in the default user
pool. We might assume that everyone has a strong interest in keeping a
sufficiently high ratio of quality-enhancing users in all user pools (including
the default pool) but that everyone would personally prefer to opt for a
different pool. If this is the case, the game is one in which everyone vill try
to free-ride on the participation of others and will likewise do everything
152. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down as unconstitutional a
law requiring public-school attendance). But see Liebman, supra note 3, at 307 (contending that
Pierce might not rule out a compulsory public-school-attendance law if it were based on legislative
findings, offered various "release time" and other options, and permitted those with bona fide
religious objections to opt out).
153. See infra subpart IV(C) (discussing possible cooperation problems among users who are in
a pool against their will).
154. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 285-86 (discussing impact of the implicit penalty that the
current structure imposes on those leaving the public schools). Because public education is also
"free" in exclusive suburbs, this subsidization factor would seem to be largely absent in the choice
between urban and suburban public educational opportunities. Howevr, if state school financing
arrangements required the wealthier districts to help finance the poorer ones, resulting in a
substantially heavier tax burden for suburbanites (relative to the education received) than that borne
in the inner city, this would make opting out to the suburbs less attractie..
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possible to avoid being a "sucker" upon whom others can free-ride. 155 A
"turnstile" mechanism which allows everyone to be a free rider and a
"sucker" in turn could provide a neat theoretical solution. 156
It is hard to imagine how to implement a pure turnstile system
consistent with constitutional and political constraints.'57 But it might
nevertheless be possible to structure incentives to approximate a "rotation"
system among those who might otherwise opt out. This might be
accomplished through a system of education-voucher credits that could be
built up based on the number of years one attends an at-risk school. For
example, a voucher equal to roughly half a year of private school tuition
could be granted for every year a student spends in an at-risk school; the
voucher could also be saved up and applied to tuition at a college or
university. Families of limited means could thereby earn the right to rotate
out of the default pool or, alternatively, could choose to save up credits to
pursue future opportunities.
The possibility of earning voucher credits might help to retain more
well-off quality enhancers within the pool, at least in the short run. For
example, a family might decide to economize on costs by sending children to
public school in grades one through eight, and then'use the voucher credits to
move the child to a private school for the high school years. Allowing the
voucher credits also to be applied to higher education might cause some
families to change their minds when the child reached high school age,
provided that other quality-enhancing students in the same position were
making the same "stay put" decision at that point. A similar program is
conceivable in the neighborhood-security area: a tax credit could be provided
for every year one stays in an at-risk neighborhood. This might
simultaneously allow people of limited means to escape the neighborhood
eventually, while encouraging them to stay put in the short run. If enough
other people did likewise, this short-run decision might turn into a long-run
solution.
Another possible way to lock users into the default pool would be to
expand the default pool to encompass an entire metropolitan area or region.
Annexation (and, more broadly, centralization) are strategies that can ensure
that the financial burden is shared across an entire area. With monopoly
power, a single provider can make entry of other providers more difficult and
can reduce instances of opting out."58 But these techniques would not solve
the participation dilemmas outlined here. Users can only interact at the
individual neighborhood or school level. Therefore, designating an entire
155. See ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC
GOODS PROBLEM 63-64 (1989) (applying "free-rider" and "sucker" designations to the Prisoner's
Dilemma).
156. See id. at 207-08 (discussing "turnstile!' arrangements for moving between "free-rider" and
"sucker" subgroups).
157. But cf. Wilma Norton, Living in Harmony, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, at 1B
(describing a plan of rotating school zones, in which neighborhoods "take turns" being bused),
158. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1204 (discussing how centralization could deter opting out of
public provision).
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metropolitan area as a single "user poor' is essentially meaningless. For
participation purposes, the area would remain an agglomeration of separate
subpools unless a mechanism were added to mix the users together in some
manner.
159
2. Bribes.-Another possibility is to focus not on trapping quality-
enhancing users in the default pool, but on using incentives to attract and
retain them. To put it pejoratively, this would mean bribing quality-
enhancing users to stay put.'1 One possible type of incentive has already
been discussed--offering voucher credits or tax credits to people who stay
within the default pool. Another controversial possibility is to focus
incentives on those who are most able to leave-the wealthy. James
Buchanan suggested this strategy as a possible way to overcome the tendency
for "high-demand" users to out-migrate from urban centers.t6 1 Payment
could involve, for example, reducing tax burdens or providing a premium
level of services to wealthier users. t62 There are also more subtle ways of
going about attracting or retaining the wealthy. For example, an urban center
could subsidize goods that are disproportionately enjoyed by the wealthy
(such as symphonies, museums, and operas)., 63  Yet such proposals raise
egalitarian concerns, and some of the more blatant forms of discrimination in
favor of the wealthy could run into legal barriers as well. t64
Another troubling characteristic of such a strategy is its implicit
assumption that all wealthy people are necessarily going to be quality
enhancers. This is not the case. While there may be some correlation
between wealth and quality-enhancing tendencies, there is not complete
correspondence between these categories.1te  Since opting out costs money,
159. See GERALD E. FRUG, CIY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNrTIES WrrHou-r BUILDING
WALLS 186-88 (1999) (discussing a plan to make school districts more heterogeneous by permitting
students to attend schools anywhere within a metropolitan area when doing so would increase,
rather than decrease, the diversity of the student body).
160. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1204; Buchanan, supra note 36, at 11.
161. See Buchanan, supra note 36, at 4. Buchanan based his suggestion on the impact of out-
migration on the tax base, but the additional impacts of lost participation would seem only to
strengthen his argument.
162. See id at 10 (discussing "bribes or side payments" to induce the well-off to remain in the
collectivity, such as "tax-price reductions and/or budgetary changes'); id. at 15 (discussing
"differential adjustments on the consumption services side" such as "special police details in high-
income areas of cities"); see also John Conley & Manfred Dix, Beneficial Inequality in lhe
Provision of Municipal Services: IWhy Rich Neighborhoods Should Get Plowed First (June 2000), at
http://www.cba.uiuc.edu/jpconley/documents/public-financetdifferntial-acess.pdf (making a
similar argument for differential service levels).
163. See Buchanan, supra note 36, at 14 (suggesting that "municipalities should listen more
carefully to those who recommend fiscal support for art museums, symphony orchestras, theaters,
and parks").
164. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE
TRACKS (1986) (discussing legal challenges to unequal provision of municipal services).
165. In the neighborhood-security context, the opposite may in fact be the case. Those who are
not regularly employed may be invaluable in watching out for trouble in the streets. See JACOBS,
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however, wealthy quality enhancers are the quality enhancers most at risk of
leaving the pool. Yet simply keeping the wealthy within the urban core may
not necessarily solve the user-pool problems that are the focus of this Article.
It is quite possible to live in a private gated community within a city and to
send one's children to private schools.
Magnet schools offer a more targeted vehicle for attracting and retaining
quality-enhancing users. 166  Unlike incentive plans targeted only at the
wealthy, magnet schools would theoretically attract people who value
education. Likewise, incentives for home buyers in central cities might
attract people who are interested in putting down roots and contributing to
the community. In Washington, D.C., a $5000 tax credit offered to first-time
home buyers in the District has helped to spur an influx of new residents and
a revitalization of the city. 167
Not all incentives to keep users in a user pool are monetary, nor are they
necessarily intentional. An interesting development in several state
universities has been to adopt a policy of accepting a given percentage of top
students from each high school within the state.168 While this may have been
motivated by a desire to maintain a diverse student body and equalize
opportunities at the university level, the arrangement creates a powerful
incentive for parents to keep their children in schools where they are likely to
be user pool standouts-rather than in ones in which they will be surrounded
by other high-achieving students. 69 This mixing of user pools may well
supra note 49, at 282 (discussing contributions to safety made by people who are "hardly successes
by most standards" and observing that "[tihe amount of time they devote to street watching and
street management makes some of the rest of us parasites upon them"); see also VENKATESH, supra
note 51, at 33-34 (relating a Chicago Housing Authority project manager's comment that mothers
receiving government assistance were among the most effective leaders of tenant groups).
166. There is some evidence that magnet schools can effect changes in the student body. See
Ryan, supra note 46, at 312 (observing that "magnet schools have shown some ability to attract
suburban students to city schools"). But it is not clear that magnet schools can substantially boost
performance through additional expenditures. For example, the lavish magnet school program in
Kansas City, Missouri, which outfitted schools with such amenities as a planetarium, a robotics
laboratory, and a working farm, and boosted per-pupil expenditures to nearly twice the state
average, had rather underwhelming results. See id. at 290 (contrasting the increased student
spending with mixed performance on national and statewide tests).
167. See Peter Behr & Judith Evans, Revived District Joins the Region's Economic Boom;
From Jobs to Housing, Nearly All Sectors Take Part, WASH. POST, May 31, 1999, at A01, LEXIS,
News Library, WP File (reporting that 70% of all home buyers in the District in 1998 took
advantage of the District's $5000 first-time home buyer tax credit and that 40% of these new buyers
came from outside the District).
168. See Paul Attewell, Mirage of Meritocracy, AM. PROSPECT, July 17, 2000, at 12 (noting
that Florida guarantees a spot to the top 20% of each high school graduating class, California to the
top 4%, and Texas to the top 10%); Patricia Kilday Hart, Imperfect Ten, TEX. MONTHLY, Apr. 1,
2001, at 52 (discussing impact of Texas's policy).
169. See Attewell, supra note 168, at 12 ("The percentage rules make the current clustering of
professional families in districts with excellent schools highly disadvantageous. Middle-class kids
would have a much better chance of getting into the colleges of their choice if their families moved
down-market into more heterogeneous neighborhoods, where their kids would have a better chance
of reaching the top 4 percent.").
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result in an even more fundamental equalization of opportunities than was
originally envisioned.
3. Nonns.-Game theorists have long recognized that intangible
factors, such as social norms, can change the effective payoffs that the
players experience. For example, notions of honor and disgrace powerfully
alter the payoffs that soldiers experience when confronted with a collective-
action problem. 170 Hirschman suggests that decisions not to exit could at
least in some instances be explained "by members being aware of, and
recoiling from, the prospective consequences of their exit.",17 To the extent
people actually do resist exiting from a particular user pool out of concern
over the impact on those left behind, it would suggest the presence of
powerful social norms in favor of cooperative action that effectively change
the payoffs in a manner analogous to the virtues of honor on the
battleground.
Whether or not such norms exist in some circles, it is fair to say that
they are not robust checks on exit from schools or neighborhoods.
Competing norms in favor of consumer choice seem to dominate, and
concerns about the side effects of individual decisions are often only vaguely
apprehended. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that norms could be
shifted in favor of collective action in this context. Such norm formation
might involve focusing users on the consequences of abandoning the city's
urban schools and neighborhoods, and on the benefits that will redound to
their children if these schools and neighborhoods are instead reclaimed and
improved. Because most moves out of default pools are undertaken "for the
children," such norm-shaping efforts should also focus on what is in the best
interests of the children-with those interests viewed from a broader
perspective.
Indeed, merely reframing the collective-action problem may help to
solve it. There is experimental evidence suggesting that people are more
likely to contribute to a public good when the decision is presented as a
choice of whether to make positive contributions to the well-being of others
than when the decision is framed as whether to purchase a private good that
will make others worse off.172 If this is so, merely convincing people that
170. See ULLMANN-MARGALrr, supra note 111, at 37 (explaining that there is a "decrease in
pay-offs, where being denounced as a deserter is involved, and [an] increase in pay-offs, in tcrms of
esteem, reputation, prestige, and glory, where behaviour which is up to what is considered
honourable is involved"); cf. TIM O'BRIEN, THE THINGS THEY CARRIED 21 (Broadway Books
1998) (1990) ("Men killed, and died, because they were embarrassed not to.").
171. HIRSCHMNAN, supra note 3, at 100.
172. James Andreoni, Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative
Framing on Cooperation in Experiments, 110 QJ. ECON. 1 (1995); see also Eun-Soo Park, Warm-
Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: A Further Erperimental Study of Framing Effects on Free-Riding, 43 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 405, 406 (2000) (discussing framing literature and reporting further
findings that "the negative framing has a most salient effect on the subjects who have individualistic
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private consumption choices about education and neighborhood security
might have negative effects on others may be insufficient to foster
cooperative norms. Recasting decisions about these goods as potential
contributions to a valuable public good might be more useful. This line of
reasoning also suggests that the rhetoric used to discuss these goods may
have important real-world consequences and that viewing these goods as
ordinary consumer items may have an insidious effect on the framing of the
problem. 7
The potential for norms to transform the collective-action problem in
this setting depends, in part, on how quickly those norms might catch on and
spread through the community. 174 This may depend, in turn, on how much
contact various subgroups within the community have with each other and on
how strong the ties are among and between the individuals in these
subgroups. For example, it is relatively easy to imagine a "public school"
norm catching on in a close-knit neighborhood, where individuals live near
each other and interact with each other daily, and where school-related
decisions are the subject of talk among the neighbors. Likewise, people who
interact with each other through their work might be susceptible to the
attitudes of that reference group with respect to gated communities, suburban
living, and private schools. However, it is also possible that people who
strongly believe in pursuing their consumer preferences with respect to
education and security will form isolated pools that are strongly resistant to
these kinds of community-oriented norms.
4. Pacts.-If the premise of this Article is correct, one of the primary
attractions of a given user pool is the other members within that pool. This
suggests that one of the best retention techniques involves instilling
confidence that other quality-enhancing users will also stay in the pool. Such
confidence may be generated to some extent by the fact that it is costly to
move out of a given pool. Finding ways to make the pool "stickier" would
increase that level of confidence, yet mandatory lock-in mechanisms may
create problems of their own. An alternative would be for users to form a
pact to stay put or to otherwise find ways to reduce the risk that one will be
harmed if others flee.
Taking a lesson from the FDIC, one might consider insurance as a way
of overcoming tendencies to flee out of fear. The problem is in some sense
an analogous one, at least with respect to neighborhoods. The effects of user
pools on home values means that in the event of a massive out-migration
from an urban core, people who move out first will do much better than those
value orientation, whereas the negative framing has a rather insignificant effect on the subjects who
have cooperative value orientation").
173. See Frug, supra note 2, at 25-35 (criticizing consumer-oriented vision of local public
goods).
174. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to
the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CMl. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (modeling the spread of norms).
[Vol. 80:1
Beyond Exit and Voice
who move out later. The strategic disadvantage of being the last to leave can
lead to panic-selling in a changing neighborhood. Insurance plans which
indemnify homeowners for dropping home values due to neighborhood
changes theoretically take away the incentive to leave too early.175
Another possibility is a conditional contract among users. This applies
a concept drawn from a very effective fund-raising approach: contributions
are made contingent on the collection of enough other contributions and are
refundable in the event the pre-established threshold is not met. 76 In the
user-pool context, one might imagine making a contract to stay in a particular
neighborhood or school contingent on some critical mass of other quality-
enhancing users also signing on. If a practical way of implementing this idea
could be devised, it could keep the unraveling effect of out-migration from
getting started; the user pool would be able to retain all those users who
would stay if they expected almost everyone else to stay as well.
Significantly, an agreement or pact to stay put might also help to develop
norms supporting this choice (as well as specific substantive norms
supporting quality-enhancing behavior within the user pool). If this effect
were strong enough, it could lend stability to the cooperative solution by
changing the payoffs enough to remove the temptation to defect.177
III. Choosing Actions Within the User Pool
The second collective-action problem highlighted by a focus on user
participation involves the choice of action within the user pool. The
preceding discussion of the "choice of pool" dilemma might seem to suggest
that people are innately either quality enhancers or quality detractors and that
a particular user pool's success depends on its capture of an adequate share
of the former. Of course, this is not the case. Quality-enhancing behavior is
the product of conscious choices; it is not an immutable personal attribute.
Thus, the quality of a local public good will depend not only on who the
pool's users are but also on what they are doing.
A. Quality-Enhancing Behavior and Intrapool Spillovers
Individual choices about whether to undertake quality-enhancing
activities in a given user pool will have spillover effects within that user
175. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123. at 2005-07 and sources cited therein
(describing and analyzing home-equity insurance programs like the one implemented in Oak Park,
Illinois).
176. See ELSThm, supra note 140, at 42 ("Collective action problems can also be transformed if
contributions are made conditional upon each other. The 'money-back' method stipulates that
promises to contribute will be enforced only if a sufficient number of others promise to do the
same.") (citations omitted). Empirical evidence suggests that the "money-back" method is a
successful tactic for obtaining efficient provision of public goods from individual contributions.
See, e.g., Mark Bagnoli & Michael McKee, Voluntary Contribution Gaines: Efficient Private
Provision of Public Goods, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 351 (1991).
177. See supra Fig. 4 (showing the effects of raising the payoff associated vith the cooperative
choice).
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pool. Such choices will generate quality improvements that will benefit not
only the individual undertaking the activities but everyone else within the
pool as well.178 A neighborhood resident who makes the neighborhood safer
by watching out for others increases both her own consumption value and the
consumption value of everyone else in the neighborhood. 179 Within the
confines of the specific user pool, these quality-enhancing behaviors
constitute a "public good"--everyone within the pool will share in the
quality improvements that are generated for that particular school or
neighborhood. This presents a collective-action problem, although its precise
shape is not self-evident. Engaging in quality-enhancing behaviors may be
costly or costless-an individual may find the incremental improvements
generated by her efforts well worth the cost or not worth the cost. She may
prefer to free-ride on the efforts of others, she may only find cooperation
worthwhile if enough other people are also cooperating, or she may enjoy
cooperating no matter what others do.
As these observations suggest, the game is greatly complicated by the
fact that users are quite heterogeneous-both in how highly they value the
various benefits associated with cooperation and in how heavily the costs of
cooperation weigh upon them. For some users, certain forms of cooperation
may be costless or may actually generate positive utility. For example, some
students may find paying attention in class intrinsically rewarding, and some
neighborhood residents may find it relaxing and healthful to take regular
walks along neighborhood sidewalks and park paths. If this is so, then there
is no "game" presented at all and no incentive to defect. If participation is its
own reward, people will have an incentive to cooperate."18
For other users, cooperation may be costly-even prohibitively so.
Some neighborhood residents are in no physical condition to make
appearances on the street. Others, such as those working long hours, may
have very high opportunity costs associated with contributing to
neighborhood safety. Still others, such as those who make their living selling
drugs or who are already engaged in gang activity, may find the cost of
178. Cf CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 8, at 235-36 (discussing maintenance activities in a
club as providing public benefits within that club).
179. Making the individual neighborhood safer may also contribute in some measure to the
overall composite public good of community-wide security. Whether it does so in a particular case
will depend on the extent to which heightened safety in a given neighborhood actually reduces
crime community-wide (as opposed to merely displacing it to other nearby neighborhoods).
Importantly, individuals choosing actions within a user pool are typically not pulled in different
directions by their interests in composite and consumption values, as they are in the opting-out
game. Instead, an individual's intrapool behavioral choices will either move both components of
value in the same direction or will at least improve consumption value while leaving composite
value unchanged.
180. If participants view quality-enhancing activities as intrinsically valuable, they will likely
engage themselves in cooperative activities until the marginal benefits of doing so drop below the
marginal benefits associated with some alternative activity (such as leisure). If all of the value
associated with the cooperative activity is derived from engaging in it, there would be no temptation
to free-ride. Cf. Rdaume, supra note 41, at 10 (observing that because public goods such as culture
are intrinsically enjoyed only as they are being produced, there is no free-rider problem).
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contributing to a safe neighborhood quite high indeed. In the education
setting, cooperative behavior may involve good study habits and other forms
of "school readiness" that are a function of factors in the home that are not
within the control of the individual student. Students who are impoverished
or who arrive at school from disordered home environments cannot as easily
engage in quality-enhancing behaviors as can privileged children from
supportive homes. Because of these types of heterogeneity, behaviors that
are costless or utility-producing for some people will be very costly or
perhaps wholly out of reach for others.
One might object at this point that I am describing sociological
phenomena rather than true collective-action problems-that these people are
not "playing games" in any meaningful sense but, instead, are doing what
they are led to do by their environment, upbringing, and preferences. For
example, it is often noted in the context of education that achievement is tied
to certain relatively immutable characteristics of family background-
education level and economic status. Since it is hard to do much about these
characteristics through policy, one might think that there is no hope for user-
centered quality improvements.' It is certainly true that some behavioral
patterns are entrenched and problematic. Couching the situation in terms of
"payoffs" rather than in the more familiar language of socioeconomic
disadvantage is nevertheless helpful. It leads us to consider the ways in
which legal and policy structures might operate to change those payoffs. It
also reminds us that choices are still, in fact, being made by individuals, even
if those choices are highly constrained.
Moreover, certain kinds of troubling user heterogeneity are a function of
group processes, and changes in user-pool dynamics could have
consequences for these processes. - For example, some people receive a
particularly large payoff from defecting within the user pool, not because
they intrinsically enjoy defecting but because the social hierarchy within that
particular user pool assigns social rewards to those who disrupt the school or
the neighborhood. Likewise, some children are driven by peer pressure to
avoid succeeding in school, 83 and some neighborhood residents are kept off
neighborhood streets by intimidation tactics wielded by a subset of the
neighborhood population. Such problems may be responsive to cooperative
action within the user pool.
While there are many kinds of cooperative behaviors for which costs
will vary widely among users, some types of cooperation will be costly for
almost everyone. A classic example is punishing unacceptable behaviors
within the user pool. Ousting an individual from a school or from a
181. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 260,266-277 (discussing the assumption that factors such as
student ability and family resources, which are closely linked to educational outcomes, are
relatively insensitive to policy).
182. Id. at 293 (arguing that because of spillover effects from peers, combining students in
different ways could yield improvements).
183. See Ryan, supra note 46, at 288-89 & n.171 (summarizing and discussing anthropological
studies about the peer pressure to avoid success in school that African-American students often
face).
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neighborhood is obviously costly to those doing the punishing. 184 More
subtle forms of punishment, such as shunning or shaming, can also impose
social or other costs on the punisher.185 While the benefits of punishing a
particular individual are diffuse and spread across the user pool, the punished
individual has a concentrated interest in avoiding the punishment and in
making life miserable for would-be punishers. t86 The result is a collective-
action problem that carries some of the overtones of interest-group politics;
the punishable individual is in roughly the same position relative to the
punishment as an interest group is with respect to legislation that would
disproportionately harm it while generating diffuse benefits.
87
Whether or not a particular user pool can summon the will to oust a
particular individual (or engage in lesser forms of punishment designed to
deter quality-detracting behaviors) depends on the intrapool dynamics of
cooperation or noncooperation. In the absence of collective action by those
who stand to gain from the punishment, the punishment may not occur.
Cooperation in this context can take the form of direct sanctions against
wrongdoers or might instead involve actions and attitudes supporting official
enforcement. 188  For example, if students and parents exhibit their
willingness to back up an administrative decision to oust a troublemaker, the
decision is more likely to be made in the first place. Similarly, neighborhood
residents might act cooperatively when they assist the police in apprehending
a criminal. In contrast, parents who display their distrust of school
administrators and residents who express animosity towards the police may
implicitly encourage those in charge to turn a blind eye to problematic
behavior.
In such cases, where cooperation is somewhat costly to the individual,
but where the individual stands to gain from her own cooperation if enough
others cooperate also, the interaction can be formalized as an Assurance
Game.189 In such a game, the best payoff results from mutual cooperation.
This cooperation can be expected if individuals are able to make cooperation
pacts with each other. If each person's cooperation increases her own
payoff, and if she believes others will also cooperate, there is no incentive to
defect. We can see this both in a simple two-person interaction and in a
184. See ELSTER, supra note 140, at 41 ("Punishment almost invariably is costly to the
punisher, while the benefits from punishment are diffusely distributed over all members.").
185. See id. at 133 (observing that "expressing disapproval is always costly," requiring at least
"energy and attention" and perhaps also "alienat[ing] or provok[ing] the target individual, at some
cost or risk to oneself"). But see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics
of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1028 n.95 (1995)
(suggesting that "because people enjoy expression as an end in itself, expressing disapproval is not
always costly" and observing that if this disapproval serves to "alienate the target" this is not a cost,
but rather "the whole point").
186. ELSTER, supra note 140, at 41 (discussing punishment as a "public good").
187. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 23 (1991) (discussing the economic theory of interest-group influence).
188. Here, user participation begins to blur into certain varieties of supportive "voice." See
supra subpart I(C) (distinguishing voice from participation).
189. See supra note 135 (describing the Assurance Game).
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multiparty interaction. In setting up the game to reflect a type of cooperation
that is individually costly but beneficial for the group, I will use the example
of taking part in a neighborhood watch effort.
B. The Participation Game
1. Two-Person Game.-Imagine that two people, Rita and Cedric, are
living in a particular neighborhood that is neither entirely safe nor entirely
unsafe. Each must decide whether to cooperate on a given evening by
participating in a neighborhood watch or defect by staying inside and reading
a book.h '9 If both participate in the neighborhood watch, neighborhood
safety will definitely improve substantially. If only one participates, safety
may improve a little, but the lone watchperson will find the experience
terribly boring and perhaps also frightening. If neither participates,
neighborhood safety will definitely suffer. The payoffs for Rita and Cedric
are identical, as follows:
Much safer neighborhood: 150
Somewhat safer neighborhood: 50
Unsafe neighborhood: 0
Costs of doing the watch with another person: 50
Costs of doing the watch solo: 100
Figure 5.
Payoffs for (Rita, Cedric)
Cedric Does the Watch Cedric Reads a Book
Rita Does the Watch 100, 100 -50.50
Rita Reads a Book 50, -50 0,0
The net payoffs of Rita and Cedric appear in each cell of Figure 5. The
best outcome for both players occurs if both do the watch. But if either
player expects the other to defect, that player will choose to defect as well.
The worst individual payoff occurs when the player does the watch solo,
190. A similar example is presented in GMILETrE & BAKER, supra note 3, at 38, in which
players must choose between patrolling a neighborhood and holding out. In Gillette and Baker's
example, the payoffs are structured as a Chicken Game. The Patrolling Game makes only a brief
appearance in a series of examples illustrating general principles of strategic interaction in the
provision of public goods, but its content nicely underscores the role of user participation in the
provision of neighborhood security. See id. at 37-38.
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because it generates only 50 in benefits but involves 100 in costs (half of this
cost is due to the boredom and unease associated with doing the watch solo,
while the other half relates to the energy expenditure that is always required
to do the watch, whether alone or in tandem).
The obvious solution is for Rita and Cedric to agree that they will both
do the watch. Given this payoff structure, neither of them will have an
incentive to defect or a reason to suspect that the other person will defect-
defecting would reduce the payoff for the defector, as well as for the other
person. If they do not make an agreement to cooperate, however, they may
both end up defecting out of fear that the other person will defect.
2. Multiparty Game.-Matters become more complicated when more
than two players are involved. Figure 6 shows one imaginable way in which
the situation just described might translate into a multiparty game:
Figure 6.
Utility
D
0 .........- " ', Number of
Other
C Cooperators
M1 M2 M3
In Figure 6, the vertical axis represents utility, as viewed from the
perspective of an individual decisionmaker, Irving. The horizontal axis
represents the number of cooperators-in our example, the number of people
participating in the neighborhood watch. The C curve represents the utility
associated with cooperation in combination with varying numbers of other
cooperators. The D curve represents utility associated with defection when
varying numbers of cooperators are present. The shapes of these curves and
their relationship to each other are empirically unknown and may vary
greatly depending not only on the kind of cooperation involved but also on
the preferences and resources of the particular individual confronting the
choice.
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This basic situation, as drawn, constitutes an Assurance Game. If Irving
expects at least M2 other people to cooperate, he will do best by cooperating
as well. Yet beyond point M3, the additional gains produced by further
cooperation are so minimal that additional cooperators incur net costs by
cooperating. If there are at least M3 cooperators, Irving would do better to
free-ride on their efforts. This is not particularly problematic unless it leads
to resentment on the part of others and an unraveling of the cooperation pacts
that the others have made. Defection begins to be tempting if cooperation
levels fall below M2. To the left of point Ml, cooperation is not self-
sustaining. In other words, it takes at least M1 cooperators to do better than
everyone would do in a world of universal defection. If Irving expects less
than M1 other people to cooperate, he should definitely defect. Unless at
least this minimum number can agree to work together, the group will remain
in the far left-hand portion of the graph, where defection is the dominant
strategy and where there are insufficient cooperators to adopt a different
strategy.
Figure 6 might seem to inspire optimism. After all, an Assurance Game
is a much easier type of collective-action problem to solve than a Prisoner's
Dilemma. But user heterogeneity adds an important wrinkle to this picture.
In our simplified two-person game, both people were fully capable of
cooperative action; they shared identical preferences and symmetrical
payoffs. These same preferences and capabilities were then ascribed to
Irving, the individual decisionmaker in the multiparty game presented in
Figure 6. But not all of the players in a given multiparty game will confront
the same payoff schedule that Irving faced. Due to differences in capabilities
and preferences, the game may look quite different from other perspectives.
In fact, the intrapool cooperation game is only an Assurance Game for some
of the participants. If those participants recognize that most others view
defection as an unambiguously dominant strategy, they may lose hope of
getting enough other cooperators to achieve the quality improvements they
seek.19 Likewise, if some users are incapable of cooperative behavior, a
high-quality public good can be provided only if enough other capable and
willing users in the pool actually cooperate.
For example, consider how this same decision (whether or not to
participate in a neighborhood watch) might appear to three additional
fictitious decisionmakers: Greta (a gang member), Horace (a homebound
man), and Josie (an associate at a law firm). For Greta, the sanction for
participating might range from social ostracism to overt violence, while the
benefits of a safer neighborhood are of no value to her. For Horace,
participation is virtually impossible (assuming he cannot conduct
surveillance from his rear window). Horace has a real interest in a safer
neighborhood-it would raise his home's value, which he plans to borrow
191. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at 392-99 (discussing hopelessness as a risk in an
Assurance Game).
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against to cover his mounting health-care costs-but there is no feasible way
for him to participate in bringing it about. For Josie, participation might
mean dropping the ball in the middle of important litigation or sabotaging her
billable-hours target for the month. Because Josie can afford to take a
taxicab home every night, lives in a building with a doorman, and plans to
move as soon as her student loans are paid off,192 she does not have a
particularly strong interest in the safety of the neighborhood as a whole.
In all three cases, though for vastly different reasons, the costs
associated with participating in the watch are prohibitively high relative to
the perceived benefits. Horace is willing to participate but is unable to do so;
Greta and Josie are physically able to participate but are unwilling to do so.
While Horace, Greta, and Josie may seem like hard cases, one can imagine
their abilities and preferences changing over time so that participation would
become a viable strategy. In the next section, I will consider some possible
mechanisms through which users might be transformed into cooperating,
quality-enhancing users.
C. Strategies for Improving Intrapool Outcomes
In the face of user heterogeneity, obtaining the necessary quantum of
participation is no simple matter. We will want to consider ways of changing
perceived payoffs to make cooperation a viable or dominant strategy for as
many users as possible. The best solution is to make cooperation valuable in
itself, rather than costly, for most users. This would turn the situation into a
nongame in which enhancing quality is an automatic byproduct of
maximizing one's own utility. This is already the case for certain kinds of
"participatory oods" such as culture, which can only be enjoyed through
participation.' 9 It can be made the case for goods such as neighborhood
security as well, if neighborhoods can be structured in ways that make
"patrolling" the neighborhood not a chore but an unconscious by-product of
going about one's daily life and enjoying ordinary neighborhood interactions.
As Jane Jacobs explains, "The safety of the street works best, most casually,
and with least frequent taint of hostility or suspicion precisely where people
are using and most enjoying the city streets voluntarily and are least
conscious, normally, that they are policing."' 94 Here, we might think about
the ways that neighborhoods and schools can be made more "user-
friendly"-that is, more conducive to quality-enhancing cooperative use. 195
192. Expected mobility is likely to matter a great deal in individuals' assessments of the
perceived benefits of cooperative action. See infra text accompanying notes 236-48 (discussing the
role of stability and expectation of future interactions in determining intrapool cooperation levels),
193. See Rdaume, supra note 41, at 10-11 (discussing "participatory goods").
194. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 36.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 285-87 (discussing this point in the context of zoning),
see also Frug, supra note 1, at 1090-92 (discussing potential to transform communities along the
lines urged by the "new urbanists").
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In some crime-riddled neighborhoods, of course, casual use of the
streets is not costless and cannot immediately be made so by design. In such
a case, cooperative action among residents may first be necessary to reduce
the costs of using the streets and to establish and reinforce norms that
effectively raise the price of engaging in quality-detracting behaviors.196
This may require concerted efforts that transform otherwise uninvolved
residents into active quality-enhancing participants. In Chicago, there have
been a number of successful grassroots efforts to increase citizen
participation in neighborhood security. 97 Such efforts do their work through
social norms-encouraging cooperation among law-abiding citizens and
discouraging aberrant behaviors. gs For example, faith-based initiatives, such
as prayer vigils, have been used to reduce crime in neighborhoods on
Chicago's South Side.' 99 These vigils help to support and legitimize
community policing efforts and serve as "a visible display of community
solidarity against crime.' '2ro As Dan Kahan explains, such vigils also
encourage cooperative behavior among neighbors:
[T]he vigils foster trust and habits of cooperation among law-abiding
residents themselves. Crime and social alienation reinforce each
other: Rampant crime breeds distrust among neighbors; distrust
weakens citizens' willingness to watch out for each other's interests
and to contribute to the maintenance of the community institutions
that conventionally transmit law-abiding norms; these conditions lead
to more crime.2
Other community-based efforts have also been successful in breaking
this cycle-again by engaging users directly and fostering intrapool
cooperation and quality-enhancing behaviors. Some of Chicago's "CAPS"
(Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy) programs, such as "Operation Beat
196. It is likely that another form of collective action-gang activity-greatly raises the cost of
such efforts in some neighborhoods. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNErr,
COrMUNnTY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 174-75 (1997) (describing a community's "March for
Peace," which drew ridicule from gang members and which some residents avoided, fearing gang
retaliation). Chicago's gang-loitering ordinances have attempted to raise the cost of such illicit
collective activity. The original gang-loitering ordinance was struck down as unconstitutionally
vague, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999), but a new, more narrowly tailored
ordinance has since been enacted. See Fran Spielman et al., City's Hands 7Ted on Gangs: Police
Struggle with Loitering Crackdown, CHl. TRIB., July 21, 2000, at 1, 2001 WL 6686678 (reporting
enforcement difficulties associated with the new ordinance). See generally TRACEY L MEARES &
DAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POL1CING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES (1999)
(discussing the gang-loitering law and other crime-control techniques implicating constitutional
rights).
197. See Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in
the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1865-72 (1999) (describing prayer vigils in Chicago).
198. See id. at 1860 (recognizing the power of social norms as an alternative approach to
reducing crime).
199. lId at 1865 (discussing Tracey Meares's work).
200. Id.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
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Feet," work by "organizing large numbers of law-abiding citizens to occupy
the streets of disorderly neighborhoods during times when those streets might
otherwise have been expected to be the center of criminal activity."
2 02
Because these initiatives directly involve community members, they can
draw on recognized sources of legitimacy within the community and avoid
the tensions that would be associated with a heightened police presence.
20 3
To the extent these and other measures foster and reinforce informal social
controls within families, peer groups, and schools, they have great potential
to address delinquency.2
In the education context, transforming users might mean providing
parents in troubled areas with the resources and skills that they need to help
their children become quality-enhancing participants in their schools. One of
the most hopeful empirical findings is that attitudes and behaviors in one
family can "rub off" on other families through peer contacts in schools. 20 5
This dynamic multiplies the effect of each positive (or negative) change in
user behavior. School policies and institutional choices (themselves the
product of voice or of prior collective action) may also affect the cost of
cooperation within a given user pool.2°6 In a highly disciplined school setting
with few distractions, for example, students may find it less costly to pay
attention. Likewise, if learning can be made intrinsically rewarding for
students, intrapool cooperation would yield positive benefits and would be
pursued for its own sake.
Parents and other user-pool members can also be organized to develop
and reinforce relevant quality-enhancing norms in schools (as well as in the
streets) and to present a united front against, disruptive conduct. The notion
of accountability could be widened-by the pool members themselves-to
apply to the actions of parents and students, not just to the actions of teachers
and administrators. For example, the Chicago public schools are
experimenting with report cards which rate parents on such criteria as getting
the child to school on time, preparing the child for the school day, and having
the child turn in homework. While it is likely that parents would view
202. Id. at 1869 (discussing these programs and citing empirical work in SKOGAN &
HARTNETT, supra note 196).
203. See id. at 1869, 1871-72; Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 50, at 612 (discussing the
importance of informal social control in controlling neighborhood disorder).
204. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 96, 119 (1993) (discussing the family's role in providing informal
social control in preventing delinquency and noting the significance of the social processes of
family, school, and peers in explaining delinquency).
205. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 293 (noting that "a fourth to a third of the effect of
socioeconomic status [on academic outcomes] comes not from the wealth and educational
attainments of Jane's and Johnny's own parents but from the wealth and attainments of their
classmates' parents").
206. Because of user heterogeneity, however, what works to induce cooperation within one user
pool may not be equally effective with a differently composed user pool.
207. See Michael Martinez, Parents Will Get Own Report Cards, CHI. TRIB.. Sept. 22, 2000, at
6, 2001 WL 3711687.
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these report cards with animosity if they were received from teachers or
administrators whom they already view with suspicion, '  similar concepts
initiated by the parents themselves could carry real clout. Being given a "bad
grade" by a teacher whom one neither likes nor trusts might merely replicate
the parents' own negative school experiences; receiving a "bad grade" from
one's neighbors and peers could amount to a powerful social sanction that
could reinforce quality-enhancing norms. -°
Another possibility is to provide direct incentives for quality-enhancing
behaviors among students. A growing trend has been to reward desirable
student behaviors (attendance, attentiveness, good grades, and so on) with
prizes such as food, outings, and even relief from final examinations.2 t0
Some local businesses have gotten into the act by awarding various sorts of
food prizes and merchandise discounts for good grades on student report
cards.211 While these tactics remain controversial, the basic idea of seeking
to transform user behavior by altering perceived payoffs makes good sense.
Arguably, it might be better to try to effect this transformation through norms
or social rewards. Yet it is possible that some of these prizes catch the
attention of the truly relevant norm-forming group-other children or
teenagers-and perhaps help to encourage a norm towards achievement.
In some contexts, there may be practical problems with identifying and
rewarding quality-enhancing behaviors. For example, if much of the quality-
enhancing behavior that occurs in neighborhoods is largely unconscious and
involves simply being out and about on the streets, 22 there would be no
meaningful way to measure and reward individual contributions to
neighborhood safety.
Where measures can be devised that work to induce increased intrapool
cooperation, this might be expected to have a snowball effect on quality.
First, cooperation within the pool is likely to spur more cooperation among
208. The parental report cards in Chicago have indeed been criticized on this ground. See, e.g.,
id. ("Critics contend the checklist could create hostility between parents and teachers ... ."); John
Simmons, A Recipe for Alienating Already-Alienated Parents, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2000, at 19,
2001 WL 3708767 ("Until we find a way to bridge the gulf of fear, distrust, cultural differences,
limited English proficiency and education levels, any 'evaluation' is likely to be seen by parents as
just another barrier to participating in their children's education").
209. See Kahan, supra note 197, at 1872 (discussing "private shaming" as a potential tool for
altering norms and behavior).
210. See, e.g., Linda Perstein, 77Te Sweet Rewards of Learning; Teachers Motivate Students
with Tokens for Candy and Fries, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1999, at Al, 1999 WL 23314700; St.
Vincent Program Encourages Good Grades; Catholic School Youngsters Who Earn an A in
Academic Subjects Will Receive Pizzas, Zoo and Museum 7ickets, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 19.
2000,- at D3; Kellie Patrick, A Bribe Offered to Boost Learning; For Attendance, Boca Principal
WouldAx Finals, SUN-SENT9NL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 24, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 5648377.
211. See, eg., Elizabeth Kelleher, Good Deals as Easy as A-B-C. Some Stores Will Let You
Cash In on YourReport Card, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,2000, at C13, 2000 WL 25425951.
212. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 36.
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existing pool members.213 Second, as quality increases, more quality-
enhancing users are inclined to enter the pool and to stay there, even when
they have the opportunity to leave.214 This second effect means that the
outcome of the intrapool game has real implications for the "choice of pool"
game. As this suggests, neither the "choice of pool" problem nor the "choice
of action within the pool" problem operates in isolation. It is necessary to
examine the interactions not only within these games but also between the
games.
IV. The Interdependence of Interpool and Intrapool Decisions
The two collective-action problems just described-the first involving
choices among pools 215 and the second involving intrapool choices216-are
linked in important ways. The most important and overarching link is that
the outcome of both strategic interactions affects the total number of quality-
enhancing users and the quality of the local public good they are producing.
However, the two games are not played independently and their results
merely summed arithmetically-instead, they interact with each other.
Therefore, addressing one collective-action problem may make the solution
of the other collective-action problem either easier or more difficult. For
example, one of the best ways of heading off potential intrapool collective-
action problems may be to find ways to employ signaling and screening
devices so as to "pool up" with like-minded persons who are both capable of
and committed to cooperation. But such devices will have a sorting effect,
with implications for the "choice of pool" problem. Conversely, measures
designed to address the "choice of pool" problem may have unintended
consequences for user-pool characteristics such as size and stability, and may
thereby decrease the amount of cooperation occurring within a pool.
A. Achieving a Critical Mass
Figure 7 reproduces the quality curve that appeared in Figure 1 and adds
some numeric benchmarks; it brings us full circle to the place our analysis
began.
213. See generally Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through
Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772 (1984) (discussing the theory that people will reciprocate
when other people contribute to the provision of a public good); id. at 783 (reporting "some
experimental evidence that people are induced to contribute more to public goods and charitable
activities by seeing other people contributing") (citing J.H. Bryan & M.A. Test, Models and
Helping: Naturalistic Studies in Aiding Behaviour, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 400
(1967)).
214. For example, in the absence of attrition, neighborhoods and school districts can be
expected to "grow" a middle class over time. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 282 ("[C]ities need not
'bring back' a middle class.., and carefully protect it like an artificial growth. Cities grow the
middle class.").
215. See supra Part II.
216. See supra Part III.
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Figure 7.
Quality
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Just as in Figure 1, the horizontal axis in Figure 7 represents the number
of quality-enhancing users, the vertical axis represents the quality of the local
public good, and the curve represents one possible relationship between these
two factors. The area above the top dashed line represents an unambiguously
acceptable level of quality, and the area below the lower dashed lines
represents an unambiguously unacceptable level of quality. Between these
two lines, opinions vary with tastes. The vertical lines marked 25, 50, 75,
and 100 correspond to the number of quality-enhancing users-that is, users
who are both willing and able to cooperate. On this graph, obtaining an
unambiguously acceptable level of quality requires assembling at least
seventy-five quality-enhancing users in the pool. As the preceding
discussions suggest, this can be done in two ways-either by attracting or
retaining people who are already quality-enhancing users or by transforming
current users into quality-enhancing (cooperating) users.
The outcomes of the interpool and intrapool games described in Parts It
and III will affect the number of quality-enhancing users. Because achieving
the magic number of quality-enhancing users is the goal, it would not seem
to matter how many of these quality-enhancing users are lured into the pool
from without and how many are "grown" from within-any combination of
quality-enhancing users from any source whatsoever would seem to do the
trick. This is technically true, but a little midsleading. The fact that a person
is a quality-enhancing user (or not) in one user pool does not mean that same
user will also be a quality-enhancing user (or not) in a different user pool. A
student who makes wonderful contributions in a relatively sheltered,
nurturing classroom environment might be cowed into silence if moved to a
new user pool; likewise, a student who is pressured into underachieving in
one user pool might quickly become a quality-enhancing user if switched to a
different setting dominated by different internal norms.
Simply adding more users who are currently quality enhancers in their
own user pools may have unintended consequences, either by triggering
changes in those users (e.g., they stop being quality-enhancing after being
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switched to a new user pool) or in the pool itself (e.g., by changing the size,
stability, or other pool characteristics which bear on the ease with which pool
members cooperate with each other). Every change in the membership and
dynamics of a given user pool will have an impact on the intrapool dynamics,
including the prevailing norms within the pool.21 7 These intrapool dynamics
will, in turn, influence quality and thereby affect the decisions people make
when choosing among user pools. Those choices will, in turn, change the
internal dynamics within the pool, and so on.
For example, a user pool might start off with fifty quality-enhancing
users, might then lose half of these to suburban or private alternatives, and
then might undertake intensive programs to turn more of the current users
into quality enhancers. Twenty current users might form a pact to engage in
quality-enhancing behaviors, bringing the total back up to forty-five. This
might improve quality enough to attract ten new quality-enhancing users.
However, three of the newly attracted quality-enhancing users might have
trouble adapting to the new environment and might cease to cooperate, and
the influx of new people might change intrapool dynamics enough to make
two of the home-grown quality-enhancing users stop cooperating.
Meanwhile, the successful new quality enhancers might cause norms to reach
a tipping point, resulting in social pressures that would transform a majority
of users into quality enhancers. These fluctuations would likely unfold
over a period of years. In the meantime, membership in the user pool will be
influenced by other factors as well, such as changes in local economic
conditions.
In the next two sections, I consider two sets of relationships between the
"choice of pool" game and the "choice of action within the pool" game. In
subpart B, I note that expectations about cooperation levels within various
pools play a role in the "choice of pool" game, and I consider ways that
quality-enhancing users might engage in signaling and screening behaviors to
sort themselves into pools with other people whom they expect to be quality
enhancers. In subpart C, I consider how various characteristics of user
pools-all of which might be impacted by efforts to solve the collective-
action problem presented by the "choice of pool game"--may affect the
levels of cooperation within the user pool.
B. Signaling and Screening
An individual will choose to opt out of a default pool only when she
expects to realize a higher consumption value in some other pool.219 That
individual's expected payoff from opting out will depend in large part on her
217. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. Rv. 1, 24
(2001) (discussing how change in group membership can affect group norms).
218. See id. at 34 and sources cited therein (discussing the "tipping point" for norms).
219. In Part I, supra, the game I constructed assumed that a higher payoff was available by
opting out.
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perceptions and predictions about the alternative user pool.Y0 In effect, she
will be trying to determine whether this is a pool with a high proportion of
cooperative, quality-enhancing users.- By the same token, a decision to
leave the default pool will be influenced by one's perceptions and predictions
about the default user pool. It is therefore helpful to consider the ways in
which people obtain information about the likely intrapool interactions, since
their perceptions about these interactions will often drive their decisions
about user pools. Willingness to cooperate in a user pool is a private
attribute that is not readily verifiable. However, people may use techniques
of signaling and screening to increase their chances of "pooling up" with
other cooperators.tm These techniques may contribute to the sorting of users
into stratified user pools.
Because not all users are equally well-equipped to cooperate, players in
the "choice of pool" game might scan the available pools for a proxy
characteristic such as wealth that is thought to be correlated with at least the
ability (if not necessarily the inclination) to cooperate. An individual might
also look for a track record of excellent outcomes associated with past
cooperative behavior (high test scores or low crime rates). More
interestingly, a person might look for pools of users who are signaling that
they are not only able but are also willing to cooperate. It is possible that by
expending substantial sums to join exclusive pools, users are sinaling that
they are persons who value education or security very highly.z ' A person
who places a high valuation on these goods may be more likely to cooperate
as a quality-enhancing user within that user pool.'- 4 It is often noted that the
220. Expected payoffs will, of course, also be affected by perceived differences in exogenous
factors-the qualifications of the teachers or the number of police officers, for example.
221. I do not mean to suggest that individuals put the matter in quite these terms. The task is
probably perceived more vaguely as "finding a good school" or "finding a safe neighborhood:' But
this inquiry will necessarily require considering and making predictions about user pools.
222. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122-58 (1994)
(discussing signaling and screening as mechanisms for conveying and obtaining otherwise
nonverifiable information).
223. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 274 (arguing that both suburban and private schools "are
populated by parents and students who, in the clearest possible way--cash on the barrel head, and a
lot of it-have manifested well-developed tastes for education"). A person who does not value
education highly could also engage in high spending on education, but because this would
presumably yield her a lower utility payoff than alternative expenditures for something she does
value highly (such as a nice automobile), she would be less likely to do so than someone who
genuinely values education. However, it is possible that there are other benefits associated with
high spending on education (such as the status associated with telling people that your child attends
a particular school), that might yield enough utility to make high spending on education worthwhile
for some who do not value the education itself. If so, this would make high spending on education a
less reliable signal of one's private valuation of education. In addition, some people who value
education very highly simply lack the funds to signal this preference.
224. For example, a person who highly values education would be expected to highly value the
results of cooperative action undertaken to improve education, and might also be expected to
experience low or negative costs in engaging in quality-enhancing behaviors relating to education.
In other words, for such a person the benefits of cooperative action would decisively outweigh the
costs, making her very likely to cooperate.
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gates and guards around private communities are relatively ineffectual
against crime.22 One reason why these communities may remain popular
despite this lack of efficacy is that the decision to live in a gated, guarded
community is a powerful signal of being a security-minded individual. Of
course, unless this security mindedness is expressed in some cooperative
action (such as watching out for others in the neighborhood) the results may
be objectively no better than those achieved in a more randomly formed user
pool, such as an urban neighborhood.226
Another way of signaling a commitment to cooperation (and hence to
quality) would be to construct precommitment devices that will require
future cooperation, or to create screening devices that will limit entry.
Management might add these devices as a result of an exercise of voice, or
the measures might be implemented by the users themselves. Either way,
such devices may have the effect of structuring intrapool cooperation and
may therefore affect the "choice of pool" decision. Some exclusive pools
have embedded mechanisms for enforcing cooperation within the pool.
These can also be thought of as exclusion mechanisms designed to ensure a
high ratio of quality-enhancing activity (and a low or nonexistent ratio of
quality-detracting activity) within the user pool. For example, private
schools may require that students exhibit a certain demeanor and level of
achievement or risk being expelled. Gated communities may prohibit certain
behaviors that are thought to, detract from the quality of the neighborhood
atmosphere.227
Suburban public schools and neighborhoods also employ screening
devices. Zoning regulations often operate to maintain a price of admission to
the suburbs (the cost of housing) that is outside the reach of a large
proportion of the population. To the extent wealth is correlated with quality-
enhancing behaviors, this screening mechanism may operate as a rough
proxy for the more direct exclusionary mechanisms that private user pools
employ. 228 Of course, all user pools have some exclusion mechanisms,
insofar as bad actors may ultimately be expelled from school or incarcerated
for committing crimes in a neighborhood. How well these exclusion
mechanisms will work in practice depends on the other users within the pool.
225. See Low, supra note 119, at 53-54 (presenting interview excerpts in which members of
gated communities acknowledge that the security provided by the gates and guards is largely
illusory).
226. It is possible, however, that the illusion of safety enjoyed in a gated community
contributes to actual safety to the extent it encourages law-abiding people to make use of the
community's sidewalks and public spaces. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
227. See SIDNEY BROWER, GOOD NEIGHBORHOODS: A STUDY OF IN-TOWN & SUBURBAN
RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS 70-71 (1996) (discussing privatized living arrangements in which
"[g]atekeepers, doormen, or concierges are used to screen outsiders" and in which "[tihere is a
serious effort to avoid internal conflict by ensuring that residents conform to common norms").
228. See Frug, supra note 2, at 30 (observing that "the current feel of a prosperous suburban
high school is more like that of a private school than that of a central city high school" and noting
that "'exclusive' quality is simply maintained through zoning rather than an admissions office").
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Because these exclusion mechanisms often operate rather weakly and may
completely fail to ensure a critical concentration of quality-enhancing users
in the pool, they are unlikely to operate as strong signals of cooperation
unless the users take concerted action with respect to their enforcement.
Examples of such concerted action might include ubiquitous "We Call
Police" signs in the windows of individual homes or various sorts of "zero-
tolerance" policies adopted in the school setting.-
9
C. Pool Characteristics and the Dynamics of Cooperation
The size, composition, and stability of user pools may also have
important implications for the degree of intrapool cooperation and the
resulting amount of quality-enhancing behavior. Each of these factors may
be affected by the legal arrangements governing the "choice of pool"
decision.
1. Size.-Where a user pool is small, cooperation might prove easier?"
On the other hand, small shifts in behaviors or membership will have a larger
impact in a small group, for good or ill. Size may also be correlated with
other factors which could have an independent impact on quality, such as the
range of class offerings available in a school, the amount of individual
attention that students receive, or the housing density in a neighborhood
setting. Thus, it is likely that changes in user-pool size may have an impact
on both cooperation and quality, but it is not obvious in which direction these
changes would go.
The user pools under discussion here-neighborhoods and schools-do
have some functional size limits. As discussed above,2' a strategy of
expanding the default pool to encompass the suburbs as well would not really
succeed in creating a unitary user pool. Doing this would centralize
'administrative functions and financing (which might well have impacts on
quality), but it would not cause users to interact as one oversized user pool.
Instead, users would continue to interact at the local school and
neighborhood level. Within these functional bounds, however, the size of the
229. There may be independent normative reasons that a policy like "zero tolerance" in the
schools would be undesirable. To the extent administrators feel constrained by such policies to
punish trivial violations, it can result both in unfair punishments and a loss of legitimacy for
administrators. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at
41.
230. See OLSON, supra note 22, at 53-57 (discussing the advantages of small groups). James
Buchanan has argued that "[o]ther things [being] equal, the smaller the number of persons with
whom a person interacts, the higher the likelihood that he will seem to behave in accordance with
something akin to the Kantian generalization principle: in our terminology, that he will provide
public good in his choice behavior." James M. Buchanan, Markets, States, and the Etent of
Morals, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 365 (1978). It is unclear whether this supposition is empirically
true. See Paul Pecorino, The Effect of Group Size on Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game
Setting, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 121 (1999).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
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user pool may be determined in part by applicable law and policy governing
the formation of user pools.
2. Homogeneity and Diversity.-The legal arrangements governing the
formation of user pools for schools and neighborhoods will have some
impact on the degree of homogeneity or diversity of those pools. For
example, zoning ordinances often maintain residential homogeneity along
socioeconomic lines. Some have suggested that groups that are
homogeneous will be able to cooperate with greater ease.2 2 It is clear that
some kinds of homogeneity, such as having common goals and interests,
would unambiguously promote cooperation (at least with respect to those
common goals and interests). Indeed, some of the heterogeneous preferences
and costs discussed earlier could create barriers to cooperative action. It is
less clear whether other kinds of homogeneity would independently promote
heightened cooperation. Many individuals have preferences of some sort
with respect to homogeneity (in some cases desiring it and in other cases
assigning negative value to it).233 These preferences may impact both their
"choice of pool" decisions and their actions within the user pool.
Even if homogeneity promotes cooperation in the short run, people who
learn to cooperate with heterogeneous others will likely prove more reliable
cooperators across the broad range of cooperative situations they will
encounter throughout life. In other words, early cooperative interactions may
have positive spillovers for later cooperative interactions with different
partners. In a general sense, this is what socialization is all about. To the
extent preferences for certain kinds of homogeneity are based on ignorance
and prejudice, these preferences could be changed through successful
cooperative experiences with others.234 Because education has a special role
in attempting to turn children into life-long cooperators, it would make sense
in the education context to shun any short-term cooperative benefits
associated with homogeneity in favor of fostering the more socially valuable
skill of cooperating with heterogeneous others.
For these reasons and others, many view diversity as valuable for its
own sake. Not everyone agrees, of course. Some would maintain that the
232. See NELSON, supra note 33, at 39-40 (contending that "[a] well-defined set of community
objectives and a feasible plan for achieving them are much more likely to emerge when the
community population is homogeneous"); Sugden, supra note 213, at 783 (conjecturing that "the
more homogeneous a community is in respect of incomes and tastes, the more closely it can
approach Pareto efficiency, and the greater will be its success in producing public goods through
voluntary activity").
233. There is an increasing disdain for homogeneity in many communities, with diversity
working as a positive selling point. See FISCHFL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at §
3-17) (observing that "many affluent buyers are eager to avoid the modem stigma of living in a
white-bread suburb"). This attitudinal trend could help to solve the "choice of pool" problem to the
extent that it eliminates any extra increment of value associated with exclusivity (as opposed to
quality). See supra subpart II(B).
234. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123, at 1988-99 and sources cited therein
(discussing possibility that preferences may shift as a result of integration).
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better way to foster diverse ways of life and to best meet the diverse
preferences of heterogeneous individuals is to facilitate the development of
many different kinds of communities. 5 I will not attempt to resolve these
issues here. It is simply important to note that the way in which user pools
are formed will have implications for diversity and homogeneity. Diversity
and homogeneity may, in turn, have implications for the utility people
experience within the user pool and for the degree of cooperation they can
achieve in that setting and in others.
3. Stability.-Another important factor is user-pool stability over time.
It makes intuitive sense that a stable user pool will not only be more cohesive
than one in which turnover is high but will also become better at working
together and will therefore be able to achieve better results. Members of a
stable group can learn what to expect from each other and can develop bonds
of trust that will enhance their ability to achieve common goals.236 Empirical
evidence suggests that members who interact as repeat-play "partners" rather
than as one-shot "strangers" are significantly more willing to contribute to a
public good benefiting the group.237  In addition, subjective expectations
about the length of future interactions appear to affect one's willingness to
cooperate.z 8 These findings provide another reason to question whether a
market model featuring the ability to switch effortlessly among competing
"products" will produce optimal results. However, enforced stability
(locking in users) may not achieve the desired results either; the level of
cooperation within a given pool may depend, in part, on whether users are in
that pool by force or by choice.
Locking people into a particular user pool in the local-public-goods
context is tantamount to locking them into a particular collective-action
game-the one played within that user pool. Some empirical work on
235. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 309 (1974) (arguing that "if there is
a diverse range of communities, then (putting it roughly) more persons will be able to come closer
to how they wish to live, than if there is only one kind of community"); NELSON, supra note 33, at
43 (discussing the view that the best model for society is one "in which people with a wide diversity
of views and behaviors may coexist in separate communities" and citing NOZlCK, supra).
236. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 50, at 612 (positing that "the shared willingness of
local residents to intervene for the common good depends ... on conditions of cohesion and mutual
trust among neighbors" and defining the "collective efficacy" of a neighborhood by reference to
"shared expectations" regarding neighborhood social control).
237. Claudia Keser & Frans van Winden, Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary
Contributions to Public Goods, 102 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 23, 31 (2000) (presenting empirical
work showing that there is much more cooperation in contributing to public goods among small
groups working together in repeated games than there is among small groups whose membership is
constantly changing).
238. See id. at 32-33 (presenting empirical results which "suggest that cooperation is dependent
on the subjects' perception of future interaction" and that "[t]he tendency to cooperate is greater
when subjects anticipate prolonged interaction with others as members of a group'). Because it is
the expectations that matter, even overly optimistic predictions about one's ability to leave a default
pool could have an effect. See JACOBS, supra note 49, at 271 ("The key link in a perpetual slum is
that too many people move out of it too fast-and in the meantime dream of getting out.").
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Prisoner's Dilemma games suggests that when both players are forced to
participate in the game, there will be higher defection rates than when one or
both of the players affirmatively choose to participate in the game.239 But the
higher defection levels shown in the experimental setting may not reflect a
behavioral change in reaction to the indignity of being forced to play a game
against one's will: the defector may have been a dyed-in-the-wool defector
all along who simply -would have removed herself from the game
otherwise. 4 In contexts like education and neighborhood security, exit from
the default pool does not mean avoiding strategic interactions altogether, but
rather choosing to "play the game" within some other user pool. In such a
situation, the people leaving the default pool are not particularly likely to be
incorrigible defectors; instead, it is likely that the "super-cooperators" will
want to exit if it is possible to find another user pool in which mutual
cooperation is assured. 241 It is unclear whether a super-cooperator locked
into a default pool would be more likely to defect in that setting.
Nevertheless, it remains possible that the conditions under which one
participates in interactions with others may affect the character of those
interactions.
Another interesting finding from the same study was that more
cooperative interactions occurred in "unilateral choice" games (in which the
interaction takes place at the option of just one party and the other party
cannot choose to exit from the interaction) than in "mutual choice" games
(which are played only with the assent of both parties).242 One possible
interpretation of this result would be that the presence of willing participants
in a given interaction has positive spillovers influencing the cooperation
levels of those who are in the game involuntarily. At the same time, the fact
that some participants are unable to leave may provide a level of security and
stability that is conducive to cooperation. If this is so, the presence of some
locked-in participants would not necessarily have negative results and might
even lead to more cooperation than would occur in a world where everyone
can costlessly opt out.
Whether or not mandatory lock-in mechanisms would decrease
cooperation within user pools probably does not matter very much, given the
constitutional and political barriers to implementing such mandatory locks,
239. See Esther Hauk & Rosemarie Nagel, Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person
Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Study (July 2000) (presenting empirical work
suggesting that forcing participants to participate in a Prisoner's Dilemma game yields higher
defection rates within the game than exist when participation in the game depends on the assent of
one or both players), at http://www.econ.upf.es/deehome/what/wpapers/postscript/487.pdf.
240. See id. at 14 (observing that "[i]ntending defectors are more likely to opt out than
intending cooperators").
241. Indeed, the discussion in the preceding Part describes how such super-cooperators might
succeed in "pooling up" with each other. See supra subpart IV(B).
242. See Hauk & Nagel, supra note 239, at 9, 17 (concluding that cooperation may not arise if
mutual agreement is necessary).
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Yet even when "softer" locks are in place, such as financial barriers to exit,
the fact that people are in a particular pool against their will may have an
influence on the level of cooperation. This is particularly true where people
view escape from a given user pool as imminent. For example, it has been
hypothesized that renters might avoid forming social attachments or having
children if they expect that they will eventually purchase a home in a
different neighborhood, so as to minimize later adjustment costs.-43 This lack
of investment in the social network might be expected to reduce their
propensity to cooperate with neighbors to raise the quality of the local
neighborhood and schools.
Likewise, to minimize transaction costs, people might choose to rent
rather than buy if they expect to move again soon. Renters, unlike
homeowners, do not have the value of their largest financial asset tied to the
success of the local neighborhood and schools and may therefore be less
motivated cooperators. 244 A person who buys a home, in contrast, might be
more likely to "put down roots" in the community, and these roots would
increase her attachment to the home and to the neighborhood.245 She will
also sink significant transaction costs into the house purchase. Both the
attachment and the transaction costs will make her less likely to leave. In
this sense, homeownership itself might be thought of as a type of lock, albeit
one assumed voluntarily. A homeowner who plans to stay will be motivated
to cooperate, both to maximize her family's consumption value and to
protect her investment in her home.246 For these reasons, well-intentioned
policy changes which have the effect of burdening the home-ownership
decision (such as bans on home sales or a steep tax on home sales in
changing neighborhoods)247 may be counterproductive.
Stability might more usefully be promoted through changes in the
design of neighborhoods or in prevailing norms. For example, a norm in
favor of loyalty to one's school or neighborhood might serve as a stabilizing
force.2 s Such a norm would offer a powerful counterbalance to market-
oriented rhetoric which suggests that switching to a new school or
neighborhood is an appropriate and even laudable exercise of consumer
sovereignty.
243. Mark Dynarski, Residential Attaclunent and Housing Demand, 23 URB. STUD. 11, 19
(1986).
244. See FISCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Apr. 2001 at § 1-2) (discussing
capitalization of local public services into home prices and noting that the home is the largest single
asset of most individuals).
245. See Dynarski, supra note 243, at 19.
246. See FISCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Apr. 2001 at § 1-5) (contending that
homeowners are motivated to participate in local politics because of the impact of local-govrnmnt
action on their property values).
247. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123, at 2009-11 (discussing the possibility of
deterring exit through the imposition of a steep tax on home sales in neighborhoods experiencing
high turnover).
248. See IIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 76-105 (presenting a theory of loyalty).
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V. User Pools and Legal Rules: Two Examples
Understanding the significance of user participation leads to policy
prescriptions with a much different focus than those which have recently
dominated the debate. Vouchers and other market-oriented programs purport
to improve the world by focusing on demand-side impacts on what are
conceptualized as exogenously provided goods. The idea is that granting
consumers sovereignty and choice will force product improvements in much
the same way as it might for a consumer good like a lawnmower. "Choice"
has therefore been touted as a panacea.249 The analysis in this Article
suggests that product improvements must come, in substantial part, from
within the user pool. This understanding of local public goods suggests a
different policy focus: improving the user pool in each and every school and
neighborhood.
If user pools are the key to the quality of local public goods such as
education and security, and if society at large has an interest in keeping the
quality of these goods above some minimum threshold, legal rules should be
structured to give all user pools the best chance of achieving that quality.
250
Sorting mechanisms that stratify users into pools based on criteria such as
income and ability are unlikely to achieve this result. On the contrary, they
are likely to result in some very troubled user pools at the bottom of the
ladder, resulting in negative spillover effects throughout the relevant
community. Precisely how sorting occurs under various legal rules, and
precisely what the impacts of such sorting are for the affected user pools, are
empirical questions that I cannot resolve here. What I can do is offer a
caution, based on the theoretical observations I have outlined.
To make this caution more concrete, I will briefly discuss two
controversial legal measures that affect the way user pools are formed-
education vouchers and residential zoning. Each of these topics enjoys an
exhaustive literature which this Article cannot even begin to plumb, and a
thorough exploration of the notion of user participation as it relates to either
of these topics would require another article. These final pages merely
introduce some important and timely applications of the ideas in this Article.
A. Education Vouchers
The premise of education vouchers is very appealing-grant purchasing
power to all families and make the schools compete for the student-
249. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 42, at 217 ("Without being too literal about it, we
think reformers would do well to entertain the notion that choice is a panacea."). John Witte writes
of the dominance of what he terms "choice theater" in current policy debates about education,
WrrrE, supra note 126, at 172.
250. I am assuming that communities cannot afford to have even one abysmal user pool in their
midst without suffering serious negative spillover effects-in other words, that the goal just outlined
is defensible on utilitarian grounds. From the perspective of social justice, the case for working to
improve all user pools is even more clear.
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customers.25 The idea resonates not only with those who believe in
consumer autonomy and free-market choice but also with those who are
troubled by the inequities built into the current system of educationdelivery. 52 Allowing only the wealthy to opt out of troubled public schools
seems deeply unfair and offends basic notions of equality of opportunity253
Thus, vouchers occupy an odd space in the public discourse: they seek to
reduce the ability of the wealthy to acquire a "better" education on the open
market, but they attempt to do so by expanding, rather than contracting, the
role of the market in allocating educational opportunities. This seeming
paradox is explained by voucher proponents' faith in the power of
competition to improve the quality of education.
Schools will have to improve under a voucher system, we are assured,
or they will simply go out of business like any other shoddily run
enterprise.25 At least as told in its purest form, this story casts school
administrators into a role not unlike that of competing providers of an
exogenously provided good like long-distance telephone service. When
telephone companies compete to provide long-distance service to customers,
their goal is straightforward-subscribe as many customers as possible. The
personal characteristics of the customers (aside from the threshold question
of solvency) have no impact on the good itself. Therefore, long-distance
service providers are not selective about whom they sign on. The
architecture of nationwide long-distance service is such that there are no
immediate limits to the number of subscribers who can be added. In this
context, competition for customers works very well, and there is indeed
every incentive for the providers to try to offer the best product at the lowest
price.
251. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Reforming School Reforn, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 263-72
(1999) (setting forth and critiquing eight assumptions about competition that underlie the school-
choice movement); Trebilcock et al., supra note 2, at 209 (discussing voucher supporters' argument
that "the threat of exit will induce suppliers to produce goods and services that are highly responsive
to citizen preferences and to do so in the most efficient manner").
252. I do not mean to suggest that these are mutually exclusive categories, only that some rather
surprising alliances have emerged in the debate over education vouchers.
253. See, e.g., Jay Mathews, Group Pushes for Vouchers, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at
http:Ilwashingtonpost.comlac2lwp-dyn1A26599-2000Decl9?language=printer (last visited Oct. 17,
2001) (arguing that "it is hard to imagine how any affluent parent, blessed with the ability to choose
private or public [schools], could in good conscience tell a D.C. shop clerk she can't have a
voucher"); Jodi Wilgoren, Young Blacks Turn to School Vouchers as a Civil Rights Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at Al (discussing the pro-voucher campaign launched by a new national
organization, the Black Alliance for Educational Options).
254. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law. and Theory, 71 MARQ. L REV.
449, 460 (1988) (discussing the assumption that, under vouchers, "any school, public or private, that
did a good job of educating children at a reasonable price would flourish ... while schools that did
a poor job would go out of business, sell out to better managers or take other steps to improve their
performance in order to attract voucher dollars"); Minow, supra note 251, at 264, 266-67
(questioning the assumption that good schools would expand and bad schools would shut down
under a voucher system).
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As should be apparent by now, schools diverge in important respects
from this model. For one thing, schools are finite structures that can only
accept a limited number of students; thus, maximizing the number of
customers cannot be their central goal. More important, schools' success is
bound up in their students-those important coproducers of the educational
product. In other words, to succeed, a school requires a sufficient pool of
quality-enhancing users. Indeed, a school will seek to pack its ranks with
quality-enhancing students and to exclude any students who would have a
negative impact on the school's quality.25 The reason for this is simple. A
pool filled with quality-enhancing users will be very easy to serve because
the students, in large part, help themselves learn. Good teachers and
administrators could be expected to flock to such a school and to accept
much lower pay than they might demand to teach a harder-to-serve segment
of the population. Supported by helpful parents and attentive, smart, well-
behaved students, schools can easily achieve excellent educational outcomes.
In a pure market setting, this would enable the school to charge a premium
price and also maintain the selectivity that will ensure continued excellence.
Under a voucher system, the school's ability to ration spots on the basis256
of price will likely be partially or fully suppressed. In order to fulfill the
market-oriented promise of vouchers, however, the school must be granted
some selectivity in admissions. If schools can exercise this selectivity freely,
the result would be a stratified ladder of user pools sorted by ability.257
Despite this sorting effect, will there also be laudatory competition among
schools that will "raise all boats"?, It is certainly possible that schools would
compete based on inputs (adding teachers or building more and better
buildings), but it is unclear how efficacious these inputs would be in
255. See Cass, supra note 254, at 487-88 (discussing incentives to serve "the low-cost, high-
demand segment of consumers"); Trebilcock et al., supra note 2, at 212-13 (discussing the risks of
"cream skimming").
256. See WrIT, supra note 126, at 82 (noting that the Milwaukee program required schools to
admit students randomly and were therefore unable to "cream-skim"); Liebman, supra note 3, at
287-92 (detailing the ways in which voucher programs disable market mechanisms).
257. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 284-87 (describing the stratification that might be expected
under a voucher program). Empirical work in Europe indicates that school-choice plans do tend to
increase stratification. See John S. Ambler, Who Benefits from Educational Choice? Some
Evidence from Europe, in MARKET APPROACHES TO EDUCATION: VOUCHERS AND SCHOOL
CHOICE, supra note 24, at 353, 372 (concluding, based on the European results, "that the primary
negative effect of school choice is its natural tendency to increase the educational gap between the
privileged and the underprivileged."). Similar empirical results have been observed in New
Zealand, where an across-the-board school-choice plan was recently implemented. See generally
EDWARD B. FISKE & HELEN F. LADD, WHEN SCHOOLS COMPETE: A CAUTIONARY TALE (2000)
(presenting results of this empirical study). Although the New Zealand schools were not permitted
to expressly ration spots by price, there was a good deal of sorting by income based on (1) access to
transportation to reach the school of one's choice and (2) various sorts of activity fees which were
attached to desirable curricular and extracurricular programs in the top schools. See id. at 208-09.
In addition, oversubscribed schools were allowed to select students, with the result that students
were often competing for the schools rather than the other way around. Id. at 222-23. While more
students were able to attend better schools after the choice plan's inception, the schools (and
students) at the very bottom of the ladder were made worse off. Id. at 231-34.
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improving education except to the extent they succeed in attracting quality-
enhancing users. Such inputs cannot solve the problem of stratified user
pools that results when quality-enhancing users pool together. However, as I
suggested earlier, users who are in a pool from which they cannot easily exit
may indeed make an effort to raise quality endogenously in order to attract or
retain other quality-enhancing users. This sort of competition, which
involves the participation of the users themselves, might well have laudatory
effects across the board. But what happens if exit becomes costless? Will
the few quality-enhancing users in a troubled user pool work for endogenous
change in the hope of attracting more quality enhancers? Or will they seek to
abandon the troubled user pool and enter into competition with other quality-
enhancing users for the coveted spots in "better" user pools?
Of course, it is possible to call a program a "voucher" program and yet
allow schools no power to ration seats either by price or by other admissions
criteria. Where there is more demand for a given school than the available
supply of seats, rationing might be done by lottery or in accordance with
some administrator's sense of the optimum mix of students. Some of the
"controlled-choice" and other _ilot voucher programs in the United States
follow one of these strategies.'" But it is hard to understand why any school
would bother to "compete" under such a constrained voucher system beyond
the minimum level required to keep its seats filled. If quality is largely
determined by the concentrations of quality-enhancing and quality-detracting
users in a given pool, there is nothing to be gained by attracting additional
entrants who will be administratively or randomly selected. The suppression
of the price mechanism means that no matter how popular the school
becomes, per-pupil revenue will not increase; moreover, removing the ability
to ration spots on other criteria eliminates the possibility of reducing costs by
selecting only easy-to-serve students.25
9
To be sure, the mix of user pools that results from this type of
controlled-choice scheme may be normatively desirable and may generate
some important benefits. Indeed, my analysis has attempted to show that
reconfiguring user pools may result in real improvements. But such
improvements cannot accurately be attributed to competition. The
irrelevance of competition under these conditions becomes clear if we
consider higher education, where "customers" similarly serve as inputs.!6 If
colleges and universities were suddenly forbidden to ration seats based on
admissions criteria or on price and were instead assigned students through a
lottery or administrative assignment program (based on the students' "wish
258. See FISK & LADD, supra note 257, at 302-05.
259. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 288 (discussing the loss of market discipline that occurs
when the ability to compete on the basis of price is removed); Trebilcock, et al., supra note 2, at 218
(questioning whether "an intensively government-managed form of competition is likely, in
practice, to yield the efficiency properties that economists often claim on behalf of unconstrained
competitive markets").
260. See generally Rothschild & White, supra note 39.
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lists"), the resulting array of educational products and student pools would
not be the result of competition among the schools in any meaningful sense.
Empirical work on the effectiveness of existing, limited voucher
programs in improving student performance has yielded mixed and contested
results.261 But even where evidence indicates that granting students vouchers
to transfer from deteriorating public schools to good private schools results in
improvements in performance, this does not establish that competition is
responsible for the improvements or that the programs would be successful if
implemented on a broad scale. These improvements would also be
consistent with a user-participation model, in which the private school
receiving the new entrants has high concentrations of quality-enhancing
users. These users are producing a high-quality educational product that is
then consumed by the new entrants. In other words, one might expect an
executive edict mandating the same transfer of a student from a "bad" school
to a "good" school to do just as well at raising that student's performance. 262
Some might argue that if there is any evidence that vouchers are
working for some students, never mind the reason, we should eagerly
embrace them. One response is that there is something very troubling about
touting a program that succeeds for reasons entirely different from those
proffered. A more pragmatic response is that the illusion that vouchers are
"working" cannot be sustained on a large scale. If vouchers were
universalized, we would expect to see one of two negative outcomes. One
possibility is that the rhetoric of market competition will be taken seriously,
and schools will accordingly be allowed some ability to select among
students. This can be expected to result in the sorting of students into strata,
with significantly deleterious effects on the sector of society that ends up at
the bottom (and ultimately, these negative effects will be experienced by the
community as a whole). The other alternative would require abandoning the
idea of "choice" altogether, and bureaucratically orchestrating student
placements to achieve the sort of user mixes that will avoid the problem of
leaving behind the lowest rung in the sorting game. Given the perceived
261. See, e.g., WrrrE, supra note 126, at 119-43 (presenting and discussing empirical work on
student outcomes under the Milwaukee voucher program and questioning the validity of prior
findings that vouchers led to improved performance); Jay Mathews, Scores Improve for D.C. Pupils
With Vouchers, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 25412776 (reporting study results);
William Safire, Editorial, Vouchers Help Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at A25, LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File (discussing results of a three-year study in Washington, New York, and Dayton
by Professor Paul E. Peterson et al.); Jay Mathews, Some Researchers Question Voucher Study,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2000, at B4, 2000 WL 25416854 (reporting controversy over voucher study
results showing gains for children in Washington, New York, and Dayton); D.W. Miller, The
Problem with Studying Vouchers, CHRON. HIGHER ED., July 13, 2001, at 14, LEXIS, News Library,
CHEDUC File (discussing difficulties in designing voucher studies that are free of distortions),
262. This might not be the case if the students participating in voucher programs are self-
selected and hence more motivated than a randomly chosen student. Even in that case, however, the
gains would stem from the user and the user pool rather than from market discipline.
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interference with individual freedom that the latter solution would involve,
and the fact that it would run directly counter to the "choice" rhetoric
employed by voucher supporters, we might expect any widespread voucher
plan to contribute to further deleterious sorting among user pools.
Using voucher programs to consciously "disperse" the poor into better
neighborhoods and schools presents its own risks. The notion of dispersal
reflects both an awareness that users influence the quality of these goods and
a blind spot about the logical implications of the policy prescription. For
"dispersal"-the outflow of impoverished residents from the inner city-can
only be successful if it is matched with an influx or retention of quality-
enhancing users within that urban core.263 The best candidates for dispersal
will be those persons who will show the largest gains as a result of moving to
a better neighborhood or school. Because these candidates are likely to be
the best quality enhancers within their current user pools, their dispersal can
only further degrade the goods being consumed by those remaining in the
default user pool.
In short, the notion that vouchers can instantly transform education
through the simple operation of competitive market forces is illusory.2
What voucher success stories instead demonstrate is that moving a student
from an environment dominated by quality-detracting users into an
environment dominated by quality-enhancing users can do wonders for that
student's achievement.265  Moving a family from an unsafe neighborhood
into one filled with quality-enhancing consumers of neighborhood security
may well produce an analogous outcome for the lucky family making the
move.2 In each case, it is not the effect of competition that produces the
gains for the newcomers but rather the influence of the other users on the
public good in question.
A user-participation model suggests that we should find ways both to
encourage and to facilitate the optimal mixing of users and also to assist
263. I am assuming here that total dispersal-dhe removal of everyone from an inner-city
neighborhood or school-would be both infeasible and undesirable. While it is possible that an
inner-city school could be closed and all its students sent elsewhere, the notion of a residential core
without a local school does not seem like an appealing long-term solution.
264. See, e.g., Trebilcock et al., supra note 2, at 232 (arguing that the idea that vouchers offer
"an escape from the messy and unprincipled compromises of politics and the frailties of voice as a
disciplining mechanism is largely an illusion").
265. See Ryan, supra note 46, at 297-98 and sources cited therein.
266. See LEONARD S. RUBINOWlIZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND
COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHrM SUBURBIA (2000) (assessing the effects of the
court-ordered Gautreaux program in Chicago, which assisted the relocation of several thousand
families from inner-city neighborhoods to middle-class suburbs); id. at 189 ("While the studies
discussed in this book showed that families' experiences were very complex, they supported the
basic premise of the concept of 'geography of opportunity'--people who move to better areas can
improve their opportunities and attainments:); see also Lawrence F. Katz et al., Moving to
Opportunity in Boston: Early Results of a Randomized Mobility Erperintent, 116 QJ. ECON. 607
(2001) (discussing improvements in well-being experienced by recipients of housing vouchers in
the Boston area).
20011
Texas Law Review [Vol. 80:1
more people in becoming quality-enhancing users. Markets are not designed
to do either of these things. 267 Instead, market-oriented voucher programs
can stratify users and may thereby generate undesirable results. Limited
"choice" programs which prohibit schools from screening by ability or
income might offer benefits for some students but would still entail risks for
the students left behind.268 It is also important to recognize that any gains
associated with these constrained programs would be the result of
government-selected policy choices and user participation, not the operation
of competition.269
B. Residential Zoning
Focusing on user participation also has some interesting implications for
a longstanding mechanism for structuring the delivery of local public
goods-zoning.270  Zoning is usually thought of as a set of regulatory
exclusions that keep out the disfavored uses, and this is certainly accurate.
But in a metropolitan area, a pattern of zoning regulations may also operate
to trap less well-off users in a particular user pool by erecting financial
barriers to exit.271 Zoning thus fences users into certain user pools, even as it
fences them out of other user pools. In order to understand how zoning
affects the formation of user pools, it is necessary to look at what is
happening on both sides of that fence.
1. Zoning as Exclusion.-On the exclusionary side of the fence, zoning
facilitates the creation of stable, stratified communities. Zoning allows
267. This should not be surprising given that a public good, and hence cooperation, is involved.
See Liebman, supra note 3, at 313 & n.269 ("One thing markets are not good for is allocating public
goods, and an educated public is just that.").
268. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 291 & n.145 (pointing out equity concerns associated with
stratification by parental sophistication); Minow, supra note 251, at 281 (discussing risk of
stratification by degree of parental concern and involvement under school-choice plans); Levin,
supra note 24, at 44 (explaining, that because "[tihe ability to use educational choice effectively
depends heavily upon occupational experience, education, and other resources such as the capacity
to obtain and interpret information in a useful way," school-choice plans "will tend to favor more
advantaged families").
269. The design details associated with voucher programs are critically important and are likely
to be both complicated and controversial. See Trebilcock et al., supra note 2, at 232 ("Once we
move beyond mere aphorisms or sloganeering, the detailed design of voucher systems raises
technically complex and normatively contentious issues."); Ryan, supra note 46, at 312 (observing
that "the details will make all the difference" for education vouchers); Isabel V. Sawhill & Shannon
L. Smith, Vouchers for Elementary and Secondary Education, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION
OF PUBLIC SERVICES 251, 260-69 & tbl.9-2 (C. Eugene Steuerle et al. eds., 2000) (discussing
various voucher programs and emphasizing that the "[d]evil is in the [d]etails").
270. There are many kinds of zoning regulations, which vary both in intent and effect. I will
focus here on zoning rules that exclude certain kinds of housing types or sizes from particular
residential neighborhoods.
271. It is true that poor people could leave the metropolitan area entirely and seek affordable
housing elsewhere, perhaps in a rural setting. But if we assume that the metropolitan area is
attractive for social, familial, and employment reasons, the choice to remain in the inner-city portion
of that metropolitan area may be something of a non-choice.
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communities desiring premium services to effectively charge admission to
the community in the form of minimum housing-consumption requirements,
which translate into minimum property-tax contributions.m In this manner,
zoning can ensure that every family is bearing a relatively equal share of the
tax burden required to fund local public goods like neighborhood security
and education. Were it not for zoning, the argument runs, the poor could
"free ride" on premium local goods and services by moving into inferior
housing units in a wealthy neighborhood. 3 With zoning in place, the world
can work in a reliably Tieboutian fashion, with various jurisdictions offering
various packages of goods and services from which individuals can select
based on preferences.
While this justification for zoning makes sense, a focus on user
participation suggests a much more deep-seated attraction to zoning: it
enables one to prescreen members of one's user pool.274 This might, in part,
reflect a desire to realize certain associational preferences. The analysis in
this Article suggests, however, that there are additional instrumental reasons
why one might wish to control entry into one's user pool. If wealth is
positively correlated with being a quality-enhancing (or cooperative) user,
then a wealth requirement would help maintain the desired concentrations of
quality-enhancing users in the user pool.275  So zoning not only permits
groups of individuals to procure the goods and services they desire (without
free riders encroaching on the deal) but also allows them to decide who can
consume those goods and services with them. 6 Because consumption is (in
272. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments,
12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975).
273. See id. at 205 (explaining that in the absence of constraints such as zoning, "the Tiebout
Hypothesis seems to be a formula for musical suburbs, with the poor following the rich in a never-
ending quest for a tax base"); Oates, supra note 4, at 204 ("We can thus envision a process in which
wealthy households establish a community with high levels of public outputs only to find
themselves 'invaded' by lower-income families seeking the pecuniary advantages of the large tax
base--a continuing game of hide-and-seek with no stable solution:) (footnote omitted).
274. The idea that zoning might be motivated not only by fiscal considerations but also by
concerns about the effects of population characteristics on public goods has been convincingly
presented by Wallace Oates. See Oates, supra note 4, at 201-19.
275. Wealth is not a perfect proxy for quality-enhancing potential. It is clearly underinclusive,
screening out large numbers of quality-enhancing users of more modest means. But while this
underinclusiveness is troubling on social-justice grounds, wealth may remain a serviceable
screening criterion as long as enough wealthy quality enhancers exist to form a viable pool. On the
other hand, if a wealth requirement allowed many quality detractors to slip past, it would not be a
useful screening device. Private user pools typically add other admissions criteria to the wealth
requirement to guard against just such a possibility. Nevertheless, if the degree of overinclusiveness
is not large and enough other quality enhancers exist in the user pool, this is unlikely to create
serious problems for the user pool. Most important, perhaps, is the widespread belief that wealth
maps fairly reliably onto quality-enhancing potential. If most quality enhancers believe that a
wealth requirement does a good job of screening out quality detractors, they will be attracted to user
pools that have wealth requirements (perhaps straining their budgets considerably to get in), and this
will enhance the user pool's ability to address any quality-detracting behaviors that seep in.
276. See Oates, supra note 4.
2001]
Texas Law Review
important respects) production, having control over one's co-consumers
means having control over the quality of the local public good.
Of course, zoning is not the only way in which people can form
exclusive consumption communities. Robert Nelson has argued that if
zoning is ruled out, wealthy individuals might form communities with few or
no public services to eliminate any incentive for the less wealthy to enter. 7
The wealthy could then simply obtain their services privately. 278  The
formation of separate communities in this story reflects the reality that the
cooperation of other users is required to produce certain goods, like
neighborhood security. An individual wealthy homeowner could hire
bodyguards, erect fences, and set various alarms in any neighborhood, but no
real sense of security can be obtained in an isolated fortress. Certain
elements of security, such as the ability to move freely about one's
neighborhood and to allow one's children to play on local sidewalks, cannot
be purchased by an -individual family-these require the cooperation of a
user pool.
279
Recognizing this reality, Nelson (writing in 1977) somewhat presciently
noted that "[p]olice protection might even be provided privately to some
extent as the wealthy congregated in large privately managed developments
with guards, entry gates, and other protections paid for by the residents. 280
Today, millions of Americans live in gated enclaves with private police
forces, and such arrangements are on the increase.28' Since these
communities are not given tax rebates but still must contribute financially to
the public goods being provided by the municipalities in which they are
located, the impetus seems to be the choice of a user pool rather than a desire
for fiscal advantages. Thus, eliminating zoning could not keep people from
forming stratified user pools, unless the law were to limit the ability of
private communities to exclude users.282 Eliminating or changing the nature
277. NELSON, supra note 33, at 41. Nelson notes that funding services at the state or federal
level would preclude this maneuver but would necessarily make spending less responsive to local
preferences. Id. at 42.
278. Seeid. at41.
279. An outlandishly wealthy individual could theoretically hire a user pool and live in a
neighborhood resembling a movie set with numerous paid employees acting as neighbors. Aside
from the implausibility of this solution, it would likely conflict with other values that the person
might be seeking in life-such as sense of life's being authentically lived. Jane Jacobs describes a
less extreme example of a hired user pool in residential Park Avenue. She notes that "if its rents
were to slip below the point where they could support a plentiful hired neighborhood of doormen
and elevator men, it would undoubtedly become a woefully dangerous street." JACOBS, supra note
49, at 40.
280. NELSON, supra note 33, at 41-42.
281. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1173 (1999)
(discussing the "surge in walled-off, gated housing developments, which commonly use homeowner
fees to pay for patrols by private security guards").
282. For two perspectives on the appropriate degree of judicial intervention into the affairs of
residential associations, compare Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U,
CH. L. REv. 1375 (1994) (suggesting that judicial deference might be appropriate to protect
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of zoning would, however, remove local government support for stratified
communities. 83 The extent to which this would result in a reduction in user-
pool stratification would depend, in part, on the respective amounts of
stratification currently attributable to fiscal considerations and to other
considerations relating to the choice of a user pool.2 It would also depend
on the overall cost differentials associated with moving to a private
alternative, given the fact that consumers of private alternatives must
continue to pay taxes for publicly provided goods. At a minimum,
eliminating zoning would raise the cost of forming exclusive user pools.
From a user-pool perspective, there are problems with stratification and
good reasons for wanting to reduce governmental support for it, even if the
stratification cannot be eliminated altogether. Zoning may have at least two
other negative effects on user pools. First, the existence of exclusively
residential zones may actually reduce the safety of those areas. Much of
what makes a neighborhood safe is the presence of "eyes" out and about in
the streets. s  Having a mixture of residential and commercial activity on a
given block will tend to maximize the number of people who will be moving
to or from some legitimate errand at any given time.r The presence of
people out on the streets tends to attract more eyes and more activity, and
thus enhances safety.
287
Second, zoning patterns across a community may foster user-pool
instability. If zoning restrictions result in fine gradations of housing size and
type, a person will be forced to move from neighborhood to neighborhood
residential-association autonomy), with Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that excessive
judicial deference to residential-association autonomy could compromise the ideal of community).
283. As Frug writes, law plays a central role in maintaining current patterns of suburban
residential homogeneity:
To achieve any significant level of homogeneity, suburbs need state-granted autonomy.
the right to incorporate as a separate municipality; immunity from annexation by the
central city; the privilege of engaging in exclusionary zoning; the ability to legislate
and provide services solely in their own self-interest; the authority not only to tax the
real property located within city boundaries but to spend the revenue collected solely
on local residents.
Frug, supra note 1, at 1070.
284. It is difficult to know to what extent zoning in a given area is "fiscal zoning" (that is,
motivated by fiscal considerations) as opposed to "public-goods zoning" (that is, motivated by the
desire to regulate population flows and hence to affect the quality of public service). See Oates,
supra note 4, at 212 (observing that "there is a real problem of collinearity in distinguishing
between the extent of fiscal and of public-goods zoning"); Vicki Been, Conunent on ProfessorJerry
Frug's The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1996) (noting the "vast
literature about the fiscal zoning thesis that provides evidence that fiscal motivations are one of the
most important reasons that people move to the suburbs and choose income-homogeneous
communities when they make that move").
285. See generally JACOBS, supra note 49, at 35-42 (discussing the importance of eyes on the
street).
286. See id at 36-37 (explaining how public places, stores, restaurants, and bars promote safety
by getting people out on the streets and by adding the eyes of storekeepers).
287. See id. at 37 (noting that "the activity generated by people on errands, or people aiming for
food or drink, is itself an attraction to still other people").
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during a typical life cycle to keep pace with changing life circumstances. An
individual might perhaps start out as a single person in an apartment in one
part of a large metropolitan area, move to another neighborhood filled with
two-bedroom cottages upon marrying, and then move to a suburb dominated
by four-bedroom houses after having children. The person might later move
to a "better" suburb or gated community, to a smaller home once the nest is
empty, or to a retirement community. 2s8 To be sure, mobility is increasing
generally and certain forms of it-such as company transfers from one
metropolitan area to another-cannot be readily eliminated. However,
adding a high degree of movement within a metropolitan area over the life
cycle serves to further destabilize user pools. If housing types were mixed
within a given neighborhood, it might be possible for our hypothetical
individual to live in the same general neighborhood (even if not in the same
home) throughout her life.289
At this point, it is important to emphasize that zoning need not be used
to generate narrow, stratified, homogeneous residential zones-although it
has often been used in this way.29° It is fully possible to zone for mixed uses
and for mixed types and sizes of housing.291 If used in this way, zoning
might still be a mechanism for keeping out certain nuisance-like uses and
would have continuing vitality for that reason. William Fischel's work
points to another important function that such heterogeneous zoning might
continue to serve-that of providing stability and predictability and thereby
protecting the value of the largest single investment of most homeowners:
their house.292 When zones yield a predictable, even if heterogeneous, mix of
homes, it is possible for the value of local public goods such as education and
neighborhood security (net of the taxes for these goods) to be capitalized into
home values.293  This avoids the unstable scenario in which the poor
continually attempt to free-ride on premium services and the wealthy
294
continually depart as the tax base erodes. It is not necessary for everyone
to consume the same amount of housing for this to work, as long as the stock
of each type of housing is limited by zoning.295 When such capitalization
occurs, people who live in smaller houses may pay less tax while receiving
288. See id. at 139-40 (discussing 'the instability problems associated with homogeneous
neighborhoods).
289. Id. at 139 (noting that people who "live in diversified, rather than monotonous, districts"
can "stay put" despite changes in jobs, family size, and interests and can thereby contribute to
neighborhood stability).
290. See FISCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-16) (discussing viability of
zoning for heterogeneous communities).
291. See id. (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-17) (describing "private planned 'new towns.'
containing "a mix of building types to appeal to a heterogeneous market").
292. Id. (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-7) (explaining how capitalization of public services
into home values depends upon zoning to create inelasticity of supply).
293. See iL (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-16) (explaining how zoning regulations can
limit the supply of various types of housing stock to facilitate capitalization).
294. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
295. FISCHE., supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-16).
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the same services, but they will end up paying adremium for their home that
equals the value of this property-tax "bargai.
It is plausible that heterogeneous zones might provide the stability and
predictability of zoning while avoiding the unfortunate results of
stratification. The time may be right for such a shift in zoning practices:
many people no longer crave homogeneity and are expressing preferences for
297more heterogeneity. Whether or not this result would be politically
achievable is a question beyond the scope of this Article, but one that will
likely be heavily impacted by user-pool concerns.
2. The Other Side of the Fence: Zoning as Forced Inchsion.-By
blocking certain opportunities to exit from a given user pool, zoning may
also have the effect of "trapping" some users in that pool. If zoning
restrictions were eased so that more users could afford to enter suburban
areas, inner-city default pools might be further depleted of quality-enhancing
users. Housing vouchers, if adopted on a sufficiently large scale, could have
the same effect.
One way to answer this concern is to note that the suburban areas
largely became attractive in the first place because of their ability to exclude
lower-income users, and that their reason for existence would disappear if
that exclusionary power were stripped away. While this would be an
excellent argument for never allowing exclusionary zoning to get started in
the first place, there is no guarantee that removing zoning would return
people to the default pools they initially left behind. Higher density housing
might begin to make inroads into previously exclusive suburbs, but the
response among those already living in those suburbs would likely be to
either stay put or move to a private gated enclave that would be protected
against any future encroachments. A family living in the suburbs would
probably not choose to move into the inner-city default pool, which would at
that point be even further depleted as a result of the easing of zoning
restrictions.
The work of zoning would only be fully undone if the decision to move
to the suburbs in the first place could be undone-that is, if the flow of
people from city to suburbs became bi-directional. This does not necessarily
require luring current suburbanites in from the suburbs; rather, mobility for
other reasons results in a steady influx of new families to a given urban area,
who will then be in a position to choose among communities. But without
some incentives or unique attractions associated with the inner city, an influx
into that area seems unlikely. Without measures designed to ensure that the
expected additional outflow from the city would be matched by an inflow to
296. See id.; Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local Tax
Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743,744 (1976).
297. See FISCHEL, supra note 30 (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-17) (discussing the
possibility that heterogeneity may increase home values).
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the city, lifting zoning could have unintended negative consequences for the
user pool left behind. Put another way, lifting zoning might amount to
another instance of the "dispersal" fallacy. Dispersing the poor among
wealthy neighborhoods can only result in a pocket of residual poor unless
measures are taken to make the dispersal complete and mandatory (which
presents its own serious problems) or the dispersal is matched by an inflow
into the previously troubled areas.
This line of analysis is admittedly troubling. Recognizing the utility of
zoning as a means of forcing inclusion in a given user pool raises obvious
social-justice issues. Also, -there are other valid objections to retaining
zoning solely to trap quality-enhancing users into a given pool. First, there is
a concern that a user who is in a particular user pool against his or her will is
unlikely to be as'quality-enhancing (cooperative) as a user who is there by
choice. Second, a user who does not expect to stay in a given user pool is
likely to be a less cooperative user. Many quality enhancers currently
trapped in troubled pools doubtless expect to soon gain the financial
wherewithal to exit that user pool. Nevertheless, by raising barriers to exit,
zoning may help to avoid the worst societal outcomes. If this is so, then
zoning is an even more effective tool of the well-off than has previously been
recognized. It not only furthers the consumption interests of the well-off by
enabling them to form exclusive communities but also helps to maintain the
composite value of local public goods by keeping a core of quality enhancers
in the default pool. This enables the well-off to defect in the "choice of
pool" game described earlier, safe in the knowledge that there will be enough
other cooperators to avoid a disastrous outcome.
The situation is patently unjust, mirroring concerns of voucher
proponents: Why should low-income quality enhancers be forced to stay in
troubled user pools while high-income quality enhancers always have
opportunities to opt for better user pools? The role of exclusionary zoning-
and hence of law-in contributing to this state of affairs should generate
discomfort among thinking people. Maybe it is time for the voucher
proponents and the opponents of exclusionary zoning to converge on the
solution of easing zoning restrictions, perhaps by moving towards more
heterogeneous zones. This would provide low-income people with a broad,
meaningful range of choice as to both education and public safety, 298 but it
would also present certain risks, including the risk that inner-city user pools
would become dangerously depleted.299 To avoid this, the zoning changes
298. See id. (manuscript dated Oct. 2000 at § 3-11) (noting that most people in the United
States live in metropolitan areas that offer a choice of a significant number of local-governmental
entities).
299. Any drastic change in current zoning practices affecting existing housing stock also runs
the risk of working an unfairness on those who paid a premium to buy into an exclusive zone. See
William A. Fischel, Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL'Y 301, 311-12
(1979); see generally Harold M. Hochman, Rule Change and Transitional Equity, in
REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 320 (Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson eds.,
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could be coupled with other measures designed to improve default user
pools: for example, incentives to attract and retain users, and programs
designed to mobilize and transform users.
VI. Conclusion
The problems I have explored in this Article are complex ones, for
which no easy solutions exist. Everyone senses that users have a profound
influence on locally provided goods like education and neighborhood
security. Yet nobody knows quite what to do with this fact. Too often the
users' influence is shunted aside as something that is too resistant to policy to
be confronted head-on. The result has been wrong-headed policy
prescriptions that treat these goods as if they were ordinary consumer goods.
Of course they are not. Education and neighborhood security are in large
measure endogenously produced by those who consume them. Moreover,
users of schools and neighborhoods are producing true public goods (or
bads)-from which no one in the larger community may exit.
Understanding goods such as education and security as user-produced
public goods makes it possible to identify and begin to work through the
collective-action problems associated with the provision of these goods. A
user-centered approach also allows a clearer view of legal and policy
alternatives. For example, the user-participation model shows why
competitive solutions that might make sense for exogenously produced goods
may fail for goods that are largely user-produced. It also calls into question
the exclusive focus on fiscal impacts that often dominates analyses of
interjurisdictional dilemmas. A focus on users as producers of the goods
suggests that these dilemmas are not just about financial obligations, but also
and more importantly about participation.
Refocusing on the user's role in producing these public good offers an
interesting new perspective for legal scholars and suggests some potentially
promising directions for policy. Instead of seeking to improve these
"products" through the manipulation of exogenous factors, we should
redirect our attention to the user pools themselves. The ideas that I outline in
this Article are only starting points, but I hope that they suggest the promise
associated with a user-focused approach to local public goods.
1974) (discussing equity concerns that accompany rule changes). Given the positive value many
now associate with heterogeneity, however, it is unclear whether opening the door to additional
housing types and kinds of uses would actually decrease home values. See supra note 297 and
accompanying text.
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